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Abstract 
 
Nigeria’s ability to play a regional stabilizing role in the Gulf of Guinea is severely thwarted 
due to unresolved conflict in the Niger Delta. Stemming from agitation by local communities, 
it evolved from peaceful rallies into an armed insurgency with the youth as the vanguard, and 
the conflict has subsequently spread into neighbouring countries like Cameroon, Equatorial 
Guinea, and Benin.  
The aim of this study was to analyse the conflict in the Niger Delta, southern Nigeria in order 
to assess its impact on the political risk of the Gulf of Guinea. Taking the form of a political 
risk analysis, a means of forecasting potential pitfalls for an investing client to mitigate or 
manage risk, the study postulated that a country specific risk analysis would not be sufficient 
to analyse an integrated system like the Gulf of Guinea. Many scholars have suggested that 
regional analysis has become more important than national. In the context of Africa 
contagion effects, the spill over, positive as well as negative from one country to another, 
casts doubt on the value of assessing only a country specific risk analysis. Taking this 
phenomenon into account, a regional risk index was created in order to assess the regional 
implications of the conflict in the Niger Delta. The index consists of six variables chosen 
from four political risk frameworks, namely the Economist Intelligence Unit, the Business 
Environment Risk Intelligence, The Brink Model, and finally the International Country Risk 
Guide. The variables were chosen on their utility for regional political risk analysis and their 
status as major risk variables, universal risk variables employed by various risk frameworks.  
In the subsequent political risk analysis, the first four variables were rated as having a high 
risk while the latter two garnered a medium risk rating. As such the overall rating for the 
political risk of the Gulf of Guinea was found to be high. This study finds that conventional 
country specific risk models are still very much the preferred means of analysing risk, but 
that regional risk analysis would have to take a larger role in political risk analysis in the 
future.  
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Opsomming 
 
Nigerië se vermoë om ‘n streeks-stabiliserende rol in die Golf van Guinea te speel, word 
ernstig gedwarsboom deur die onopgeloste konflik in die Niger Delta. Die oorsprong van die 
konflik in vreedsame gemeenskaplike protestaksie vir meer regverdige verdeling van olie 
inkomste het uitgekring na gewapende konflik, beide in die Delta self en in buurlande 
Kameroen, Ekwatoriale Guinee en Benin.  
Hierdie studie het gepoog om die konflik in die Nigeriese Delta te bestudeer om die impak 
van politieke risiko op die Golf van Guinea te assesseer.  Die studie het die vorm van ‘n 
politieke risiko analise aangeneem, ‘n middel van vooruitskatting om potensiële valstrikke 
aan ‘n kliënt wat wil belê uit te wys om sodoende konflik te verlig of te beheer. Die studie 
veronderstel dat ‘n landspesifieke konflik analise onvoldoende is om ‘n geïntegreerde sisteem 
soos die Golf van Guinea te analiseer. Met menige akademici wat voorstel dat streeksanalise 
belangriker geword het as die nasionale, word daar in die konteks van die gevolge van 
Afrika-besmetting, die oorloop daarvan van een land na ‘n ander, positief sowel as negatief, 
‘n skaduwee gegooi op die waarde van die assessering van slegs ‘n landspesifieke konflik 
analise.  Met hierdie fenomeen in gedagte, is ‘n streek risiko inhoud geskep om die 
implikasies vir die konflik in die Niger Deltastreek, te assesseer.  Die inhoud is saamgestel uit 
‘n verskeidenheid van ses variante gekies uit vier politieke risiko raamwerke, nl die 
‘Ekonomist Intelligence Unit’, die ‘Business Environment Risk Intelligence’, die ‘Brink 
Model’ en ook die ‘International Country Risk Guide’.  Die variante is gebruik vir hulle 
waarde vir streekspolitieke risiko analise, asook die belangrikheid van hulle hoof  risiko 
veranderlikheid, ‘n universele Hoof risiko variant wat gebruik word in verskillende risiko 
raamwerke. 
In die gevolglike politieke risiko-analise, is die vier variante beskou as ‘n baie hoë risiko, 
terwyl die laaste twee as medium risiko beskou word.  Dus is die algemene taksering vir die 
politiese risiko in die Golf van Guinea baie hoog.  Die studie vind uiteindelik dat lande se 
spesifieke risiko modelle steeds die verkose manier is om risiko’s te analiseer, alhoewel 
politieke risiko analise ‘n groter rol sal speel in toekomstige streek risiko analise. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1. Background 
In a world ever increasing in its political insecurity, international actors are turning to 
political risk analysis to provide them with a decision making tool to guide potential 
expansion. However, as political insecurity has become significantly amplified in specific 
pockets of the world in the last few decades, political risk analysis as a discipline has 
transformed from an original mechanism to identify the political risks and assess the 
profitability of an operation, to a method that concentrates on managing the posed risk. This 
is specifically accurate relating to investors operating in the extraction industry of essential 
resources, such as oil in the Niger Delta, southern Nigeria.  
This study will assess the growing insecurity in the Niger Delta and how this insecurity 
affects the regional political risk of the Gulf of Guinea. A political risk analysis of the impact 
should prove invaluable to international actors as possible future scenarios could be outlined 
and prepared for, thus mitigating the political risk.  
1.2. Problem Statement 
There has always been a relationship between politics and business, and the 
acknowledgement of and respect for this relationship enables a better understanding of risk. 
This relationship forms the dynamic against which international business is conducted. For 
this reason political risk analysis becomes an integral part of multinational company’s 
planning for international expansion. It has been noted that the primary purpose of political 
risk analysis is the identification and forecasting of potential losses, or events that could 
potentially reduce returns (Howell and Chadwick, 1994:5). A secondary function of political 
risk, albeit of the same importance as the first, is suggesting ways in which the risk can be 
mitigated and losses avoided. There has been an extensive focus on risk aversion, but seeking 
opportunities and formulating country strategies are an integral part of any political risk 
analysis (Overholt 1982 in Hough, 2006:7). 
Investors put assets at risk to achieve pre-determined financial objectives, and the analysis of 
these risks, including political risk, is the key to successful operations. Weighing up 
opportunities against potential losses becomes possible only after the initial risk assessment 
has been conducted. However, it is no longer prudent to simply investigate a specific country 
and draw up a compressive risk report.  
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The shift in emphasis from the nation-state to the regional power bloc has placed a significant 
amount of attention on the changing dynamics of international business. Because of this 
phenomenon, political risk analysis has also taken on new forms moving away from a narrow 
country focus to a more generic regional one. This study will focus on such a case where the 
narrow focus can not apply to an all-inclusive risk analysis. The case of Nigeria is a prime 
example of how insecurity in one country can expand beyond borders and significantly 
impact the political risk of a region as a whole.  
Nigeria is one of the major sources of oil for the world market. In 2005, it was the eighth 
largest producer of oil in the world and has become an important supplier of liquefied natural 
gas (Ikelegbe, 2005:208). The insurgency in the Middle East, coupled with the failing 
relationships of the first world with major oil producing nations like Venezuela, has made 
Nigerian and generally African oil more strategic.  
Oil and gas is the livelihood of Nigeria’s revenues. As of 2008 it accounted for about 40 
percent of the country’s GDP and 70 percent of government revenues. However Nigeria’s oil 
belt, the Niger Delta, is embroiled in resistance against the Nigerian state and the 
Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs). The region is generally restive with sporadic 
insurrection and armed rebellion being a part of everyday life for the locals. Decades of oil 
exploitation, political manipulation, environmental degradation and state neglect has created 
an impoverished, marginalised and expiated citizenry which has in turn produced a militia of 
which the youth is the vanguard (Ikelegbe, 2005:208). A regime of state repression and 
corporate violence has generated further criminal hostility, lawlessness, and insecurity. 
Moreover, the area is saturated by a proliferation of arms and institutions of violence ranging 
from the Nigerian Armed Forces to community ethnic youth militias, armed gangs and 
criminal networks, pirates and protection rackets.  
The security situation in the Niger Delta is fragile and near collapse, as law and order as 
traditional authority systems and community governance structures have been severely 
eroded, due to the culmination of prolonged neglect and social crisis (Ukiwo, 2009). 
Conventional systems and structures have been replaced by militias and protection rackets 
that barter security for cash. The formal federal state structures such as state governance and 
local councils seem to have little impact on the estimated 30 million people living in the 
Delta region (BRS, 2007). Such government structures only exist on paper and constitute a 
nuisance to communities.  
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At the time of conducting this research, the magnitude of military deployments in the region 
indicates in stark terms that the Niger Delta is, despite the counterclaims by government, in a 
state of war. Unfortunately, massive troop deployments which cost the Nigerian Government 
millions of dollars every month have only had a minimal positive impact, on security in the 
region (Ukiwo, 2009)  
The Niger Delta region in Nigeria is made up of nine states separated into 185 government 
areas. The region’s population consists of at least 40 ethnic groups housed in around 6000 
communities and settlements, speaking some 250 dialects. More than 1000 of these 
communities play host to oil-company operations of some sort or another (BRS, 2007). When 
oil was discovered in the 1950s hopes were high that its production would benefit the local 
communities, but due to the cost of training locals, MNOCs simply brought in foreigners to 
work within the industry. A combination of both high and low level corruption and general 
government neglect led to the social and economic degradation of the area. This resulted in 
the formation of numerous militia groups, each fighting for their community’s share of the oil 
revenue.  
Instability in the world oil supply and the critical link of oil to the conflict in the Niger Delta 
arose in the early 1990’s due to tensions between the foreign oil companies and a number of 
Niger Delta minority groups who felt they were being exploited,  particularly the Ogoni and 
the Ijaw ethnic groups (Murray, 2006:343). The ethnic unrests and subsequent conflicts in the 
early 1990’s (such as those between the Ijaw and Itsekiri ethnic groups) coupled with the 
spike in the availability of small arms after the fall of communism led increasingly to the 
militarisation of the Delta (Reynolds, 2004). By this time the local and state officials had 
become involved by offering financial support to those paramilitary groups they believed 
would attempt to enforce their own political agenda further dividing the warring ethnic 
groups and increasing hostilities. Conflagrations have been primarily concentrated in the 
Delta and River states (Ikelegbe, 2005:212).   
One cannot discuss the security situation in the Niger Delta without mentioning the causal 
relationship between the militias, the MNOCs and the neglect of the federal government as 
trigger causes for insurgency in the Niger Delta. It is common understanding that the Niger 
Delta militias arose in response to the repressive state, MNOCs’ irresponsible environmental 
policies, and because of tension between the dominant minority groups.  
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Since 2006 the focus has been on attacks of oil installations, kidnapping and ransoming of 
foreign oil workers and the disruption of oil exports as a result of mounting attacks by heavily 
armed militias. If one were to profile these militia groups one would find the Federated Niger 
Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), the Nigeria Peoples Delta Volunteer Force (NPDVF), the 
Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) and the most prominent, the Movement for the Emancipation of 
the Niger Delta (MEND) (Obi, 2008). Although the origins of MEND is still uncertain, the 
organisation is perceived to have arose due to the belief that certain militia groups had been 
corrupted by the government. What ever their origins, MEND has thus far become the 
leading proponent in the fight for the minority Ijaw ethnic group in the Delta.  
There have been signs of a gradual departure from the intra-Delta ethnic rivalries that had 
historically weakened solidarities for pro-Delta initiatives. The possible existence of some 
elements within the Nigerian military that are sympathetic to the cause of Delta militants is in 
itself indicative of the new trend in which most Delta ethnic minority rights stakeholders are 
rallying around the self-determination and resource-control agendas (Ukiwo, 2009). This 
factor is a great cause of concern to the region as a unified insurgency is more dangerous, and 
could potentially be the cause of ever greater insecurity in the already unstable Gulf of 
Guinea. 
The insurgency led by MEND and its affiliates has since 2006 almost halved oil production 
in the Delta Region. In 2006 Nigeria was producing 2.6 million barrels bpd; however, after 
several crippling attacks by the insurgents the current Petroleum Minister Rilwanu Lukman 
put the figure at about 1.5 million bpd, less than half the nation’s capacity (Lhuillery, 2009). 
The attacks against oil installations have taken on new forms as MEND are becoming more 
and more daring in their raids, venturing out further into the Gulf of Guinea than ever before. 
As a result the security situation in the Gulf of Guinea has become dire and the Gulf is second 
only to the waters of Somalia as the most dangerous in the world (BRS, 2007). As a point of 
clarification, the term Gulf of Guinea refers to part of the eastern tropical Atlantic Ocean off 
the western African Coast, extending westward from Cape Lopez near the Quarto, to Cape 
Palmas at longitude 7° west (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2009). Countries that fall in this 
range are Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Sao Tome 
and Principe.  
Countries like Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon have thus far been in the firing line of the 
growing insurgency. Cameroon has experienced several piratical attacks in its waters and 
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some of its coastal town banks have even been raided while Equatorial Guinea has 
experienced numerous damaging militia attacks on their shores. It would seem the new sense 
of unity and the rallying behind the MEND banner has been translated into a heightened state 
of violence which severely affects the political risk of the Gulf of Guinea.  
1.3. Aims and objectives 
The main aim of this study is to analyse the conflict in the Niger Delta in order to assess the 
impact of the conflict on the regional political risk of the Gulf of Guinea. First and foremost 
this study is a political risk analysis. Political risk is a means of forecasting potential pitfalls 
for an investing client so as to mitigate or manage them. The use of political risk analysis will 
allow international actors to gauge the success of their operations in the Gulf of Guinea by 
means of a number of variables that will be selected in chapter two and analysed in chapter 
four. Because of the insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea, it is important for all potential investors 
to assess first the presence and second the level of political risk. In order to achieve this, a 
series of major political risk variables and regional important risk variables will be 
extrapolated from four risk frameworks, namely the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), the 
Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI), The Brink Model (BM), and finally the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) in order to construct an index for regional political 
risk analysis. As noted by Brink (2004:83), what the bulk of the literature on political risk 
analysis has in common are overlapping areas that are of the foremost concern to foreign 
investors. From this one can deduce that there are certain major risk variables that most risk 
analyses frameworks have in common, and these variables will be termed major risk 
variables for the purpose of this study. As opposed to the variables being selected on the basis 
of their universality, some variables will also be chosen on their utility for regional political 
risk analysis.   
The aim of this study is to determine political risk on a regional scale. Many scholars writing 
on the topic have suggested that regional analysis has become more important than national. 
In the contemporary landscape of both unsettled and reformed geographies, many parts of the 
world have become integrated economic units, with the European Union a prime example of 
such a case. In Africa a few such, albeit not as integrated regional power blocs have 
developed. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) or the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), are a few examples of such regional 
economic blocs. By carefully noting these political and economic developments, it has clearly 
become necessary to evaluate the risk of a particular region rather than the risk of a specific 
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country. Contagion effects, the spill over, positive as well as negative from one country to 
another casts doubt on the value of assessing only a country specific risk analysis. 
In order to achieve the above aims, the dynamic of the insurgency in the Niger Delta will 
firstly be examined. This analysis will determine the nature and the impact of the insurgency. 
A brief history of the conflict will be provided, before the new indicative trends that are 
currently emerging will be analysed. This section will provide the groundwork on which the 
second section of this study will be built. The second section of this study will determine the 
impact of the insurgency in the Niger Delta on the region – or the political risk of the Gulf of 
Guinea, using the major risk variables and variables useful for regional analysis (utilised in a 
regional risk index) that were extrapolated from the aforementioned risk frameworks.   
1.4. Research question  
The main research question guiding this study is: What is the impact of the conflict in the 
Niger Delta on the political risk of the Gulf of Guinea? Three sub-questions will be asked in 
order to ascertain this goal:  
 Looking at a number of established risk analysis frameworks: What are the major risk 
variables and regional important risk variables that can be extracted from these 
frameworks that will provide insight into regional political risk?  The discussion will 
highlight the so-called major risk variables while also looking for variables that can 
be utilised for their usefulness in analysing regional political risk.  
 Looking specifically at the general criminality, lawlessness and insecurity, what are 
the characteristics of the conflict in the Niger Delta? This question will focus on an 
analysis of the region’s largest insurgency group MEND and will specifically 
investigate if the organisation is changing its form and/or becoming more intense in 
its attacks. 
 The final sub-question addressed in this research study is: What is the current 
political risk of the Gulf of Guinea? This will be achieved by using the regional risk 
index constructed from both Major risk variables and regional important risk variables 
extrapolated from the four risk frameworks to the Gulf of Guinea. These in turn will 
be applied to the conflict in the Niger Delta so as to determine this conflicts regional 
implications.  
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1.5. Literature Survey 
For the purposes of this study a range of authors from various backgrounds will be consulted. 
For the underlying theory of political risk Charlotte Brink’s (2004) book Measuring Political 
Risk: Risk to Foreign Investment will be used as the groundwork. Further articles from 
authors like Korbin (1978) When does Political Instability Result in Increased Investment 
Risk; Fitzpatrick (1983), The Definition and Assessment of Political Risk Assessment: An 
Overview; Baker and Hashimi (1988), Political Risk Management; Steering Clear of Risky 
Business;  Alon and Martin (1998),  A normative model of macro political risk assessment; 
Hough, Du Plessis and Kruys (2008), Threat and risk analysis in the context of strategic 
forecasting will be used to substitute where necessary. These authors will provide a clear 
understanding of political risk. As such, in order to perform the political risk analysis firstly 
the major risk variables from the four risk models will have to be extrapolated. The BM that 
will be used will be taken out of Brinks 2004 publication, while the EIU, BERI, and ICRG 
frameworks will be taken out of Howells’ (1998) Handbook of Country and Political Risk 
Analysis. Howell and Chadwicks (1994) Models of political risk for foreign investment and 
trade: an assessment which discusses some of the frameworks relevant to this study will also 
be consulted. As far as regional political risk is concerned, authors such as Hawkings (1996) 
Country risk profiles with specific reference to Southern Africa, and Hough (2006) an 
Introductory Context of the Methodological, Conceptual, and Theoretical Framework of Risk 
Analysis will be consulted. Further to understand the conflict dynamic in regional security 
Mohammed Ayoob’s (1995) book The Third World security predicament which focuses on 
state making, regional conflict and international systems will be used.  
 
In order to obtain relevant literature on the Niger Delta and the Gulf of Guinea academics as 
well as some journalists will be looked at.  The research of authors like Augustine Ikelegbe 
(2005) The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria, (2006) 
Beyond the threshold of civil struggle: Youth militancy and the Militia-isation of the resource 
conflict of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, Cyril Obi’s (2001), Global, State, and Local 
intersections: power, authority, and conflict in the Niger Delta oil communities, (2008) 
Nigeria’s Niger Delta, understanding the complex drivers of conflict, and Ukiho Ukiwo, 
(2007) From ‘pirates’ to ‘militants’: A historical perspective on Anti-state and anti-oil 
company mobilisation among the Ijaw of Warri, Western Niger Delta, (2009) Delta Causes 
and cures of oil related Niger Delta conflicts, to name but the most important sources, will be 
studied. Along with academic sources, various news agencies will be consulted in order to 
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understand the current situation in the Niger Delta. News agencies like the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Reuters, This Day, News24, as well as various risk groups 
like Corporate Risk International and Bergen Risk Solutions will be looked at to determine 
the most up to date information on the Niger Delta and the Gulf of Guinea. In order to present 
an effective risk analysis, the information one uses has to be as up to date as possible. 
Situations are continually in flux, and this constant movement and oscillation could result in 
the success or failure of business propositions and transactions in that specific country or 
region.  
1.6. Research design and research methods 
This research will use a qualitative approach to explore the nature of the conflict in the Niger 
Delta region of Nigeria and its influence on the regional stability of the Gulf of Guinea.  A 
qualitative study is used as it allows one to measure soft variables such as social and political 
events, something quantitative data struggles with. This thesis will have an ontological 
perspective i.e. the reality is seen as subjective and an answer to what happened will be 
sought. However, to further enhance the study field a forecast for the Gulf of Guineas’ 
security will be provided.  
The study will be historical/descriptive and analytical in manner. The historical/descriptive 
part will be formed by examining the literature on the Niger Delta. Here the current situation 
in the Niger Delta will be explained and put into historical perspective. The thesis will be 
analytical as, once trends are analysed, it will look at forecasting possible future scenarios for 
the Gulf of Guineas’ security. Although the components of the analytical framework are 
deductively linked, the factual matter is dealt with in an inductive manner based on literature 
and factual data study. As the study revolves around the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, a 
micro analysis of the region will be undertaken but the macro environment that this region 
finds itself i.e. the Gulf of Guinea will also be examined. 
For the purpose of this study textual data will be utilised. Secondary data in the form of news- 
paper articles, reviewed academic papers published in journals, academic books, and credible 
internet sources will make up the bulk of the research material. Although it would be ideal to 
include primary data such as field work in this study, this is not a possibility due to time and 
financial constraints. It is hoped however that the vast body of research on the Niger Delta 
could mitigate this problem.   
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1.7. Research limitations and delimitations  
The study will be delimited as only data until June/July of 2009 will be utilised. The area that 
this research circumscribes is very volatile, and dramatic changes happen ever so often. As 
such to delimit the study’s content to June/July of 2009 will make the research more 
manageable and less sporadic.  This study is qualitative and not quantitative and for this 
reason it is not at the mercy of inaccurate statistics or reports.  However, because of its 
qualitative nature, caution still needs to be assured when conducting the research in terms of 
the reliability of the sources used as well as their applicability. Another limitation of this 
study has to do with the three of the four political risk frameworks namely; EIU, BERI, 
ICRG. In the modern world of competitive business companies usually do not supply their 
frameworks as it forms part of their intellectual property rights. This makes it extremely 
difficult to obtain risk frameworks, as they are essentially the competitive advantage the 
company relies on. Therefore the three frameworks were selected because they are on of the 
few examples where companies readily supplied their frameworks, and on the basis of the 
qualitative pool of variables that they represent. The BM framework formed part of Brinks 
(2004) publication and as such was easily attainable 
 
An obvious limitation to this study is the lack of primary sources. It is my hope that this 
factor can be mitigated by the vast body of literature that already exists on the Niger Delta 
crisis and current news affairs. As I have no control over the production of this secondary 
information so in order to maintain an academic standing, only peer reviewed texts and 
credible news agencies will be utilised. Furthermore, because of the vast body of literature on 
Nigeria and the numerous almost innumerable ethnic and youth militias in the Niger Delta, 
there needs to be a limitation of focus. Although I acknowledge that there are numerous 
ethnic and youth groups in the Delta this study will primarily focus on MEND and their 
affiliates.  
1.8. Thesis outline 
The first chapter provides a general introduction into the topic. Firstly, a problem statement is 
presented followed by the aims and objectives this study hopes to achieve Also included in 
this chapter is research design and methods and the study’s limitations and delimitations.  
 
The second chapter will start with an extensive literature review, with the purpose of 
conceptualising key terms central to this study. Further, this chapter will serve the purpose of 
extrapolating a series of major risk variables and regional important risk variables that will be 
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grouped in a risk index and used in the fourth chapter to analyse the political risk of the Gulf 
of Guinea.  
 
The Third chapter will provided a historical background  to the conflict in the Niger Delta. 
The history of the conflict will be examined in conjunction with the history of MEND. 
Finally the current situation in the region will be examined in so doing creating a 
springboard, from which the political risk analysis can be undertaken. 
 
The fourth chapter will serve the purpose of determining the political risk of the Gulf of 
Guinea. The major and regional risk variables that were derived at in chapter two will be 
applied to the conflict in the Niger Delta and the impact of these variables for the whole 
region will be examined. The second part of chapter four will be a discussion of the findings 
of the political risk analysis.  
 
Finally, the fifth chapter will serve as a conclusion for the study. In this chapter the findings 
of the five previous chapters will be summarised. An evaluation of the usefulness of regional 
political risk analysis, as well as the value of this study as a whole, will be provided before a 
conclusion is drawn.  
1.9. Conclusion 
This chapter sought to provide an introduction into the topic which this study proposes to 
investigate. It has become clear that political risk has become a prominent decision making 
tool to guide potential investment. The primary use of political risk analysis is to forecast 
losses, while a second tier use is to suggest means of managing the risk and in so doing 
avoiding loss.  
 
The object of investigation in this study is the Gulf of Guinea and how the continuing 
insurgency in the Niger Delta is affecting the political risk of the region. Although political 
risk is still mostly used on a country basis, this study proposes to identify major and regional 
risk variables that would extend the disciplines reach into the regional arena rather than the 
national. In modern times with the integration of many countries into regional power blocs it 
has become imperative to analyse risk on a regional scale. If one wants to conduct a thorough 
political risk analysis, then geo-political considerations must be underscored.   
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Chapter Two: Conceptualisation and contextualisation  
2.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, concepts that are central to this study will be 
conceptualised. This will create a clearer, concise understanding of the underlying theoretical 
elements of risk analysis. The second section of this chapter will look at four political risk 
frameworks in order to extrapolate major and regional political risk variables. As a result of 
the current abundance of risk frameworks, overlapping variables have been identified and it is 
possible to select universal risk variables which are also regarded as major variables as 
mentioned in chapter one. The regional risk variables will be chosen on the basis of their 
utility for conducting a regional risk analysis. 
Risk analysis is an ancient art practiced for centuries by decision makers from various 
backgrounds, be they merchants, or individuals in the political or military field. Political risk 
analysis however emerged as a scientific field during the Cold War era and reached its apex 
in the 1980s (Hough, Du Plessis, Kruys, 2008:6). Although it remains an important tool in the 
modern context, the field has been subjected to critical review and even deemed to have 
passed its usefulness. The decline of soft science during the 1980’s can be attributed to 
among others, the fact that the assessments were not integrated into corporate decision 
making (Howell, and Chadwick, 1994:71). However, increased uncertainty and the salience 
of non-traditional business and societal risks such as terrorism, corruption, and global 
warming in the 21
st
 century has increased the awareness of the risk complex environment 
while subsequently increasing the demand for risk analysis.  
The demand has spread to the security field, mainly as a result of the broadening and 
deepening of human security thinking, and emerging trends in ever expanding feelings of 
insecurity. As Hough, Du Plessis, Kruys, (2008:7) explain, analysts subsequently applied the 
term risk to these security related challenges, in the process including the wider range of 
residual security risks than normally associated with risk analysis.  
In order to determine the political risk of the Gulf of Guinea, four risk frameworks will be 
consulted in order to extrapolate major and regionally important risk variables from them. 
The four political risk frameworks are the EIU, BERI, BM and ICRG. These four 
frameworks were selected on the basis of the qualitative pool of variables that they represent. 
In addition, the selected risk frameworks can easily be analysed as the common attributes 
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(risk variables) are available. In the current context of political risk analysis, many risk 
companies see fit to tailor their services for every client, making it difficult to find the major 
variables as there is no standard framework from which to work. In such cases the risk 
variables or risk frameworks usually form part of a company’s intellectual property right. 
This study will aim to use the analysed risk variables to create a regional political risk index, 
which can be used as a blueprint when looking at regional political risk analysis.   
2.2. Problem Solving Theory – A theoretical grounding 
If an investor is interested in an investment opportunity, yet is uncertain about the best 
option, various possibilities can be analysed and compared by means of political risk analysis 
as a way of managing such uncertainty. The application of management science can be 
viewed as a rational attempt at problem solving, bearing in mind that such ‘problems’ do not 
exist in a vacuum, but relate externally to the decision making environment as well as 
internally to individuals understanding of reality.  As the name problem solving denotes, the 
theory concerns itself with situations in which one or more choices must be made, often 
under conditions of uncertainty and risk.  
In all decision making processes Bunge (in Brink, 2004:30) explains that rational agents 
behave as risk-averse person’s intent on minimising uncertainty with the help of expert 
knowledge. Moreover, if the individual is unable to reduce these uncertainties to below an 
acceptable level, the rational agent will refrain from acting, or the foreign investor will refrain 
from continuing that specific expansion. Complementing problem solving theory, decision 
theory is generally assumed to be a theory underlying rational decision making and 
uncertainty (Brink, 2004:30). In problem solving, potential solutions require a consecutive 
ordering of idea’s that can be tested. It becomes evident that solving the problem of where to 
invest requires observation in order to find potential solutions.  
Political risk analysis and country risk analysis are based on problem solving theory, but 
includes some elements of decision theory. In the following section, the concept risk will be 
conceptualised before the concepts of political risk and country risk are investigated.   
2.3. Conceptual clarification   
Although the terms risk, and political risk have been used in a self explanatory manner in the 
study thus far, the nominal definition and operationalisation of these concepts is greatly 
contested and highly problematic. Since these terms, among others are central to this study it 
suffices to provide some conceptual clarification of them. In the following section concepts 
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that are central to this study will be conceptualised while also creating a better understanding 
of some underlying theoretical elements of risk analysis.  
2.3.1. Risk  
The concept risk encompasses any actions of which the consequences are uncertain and 
equally undecided. Risk has been defined as the uncertainty surrounding an event and 
outcome in a specific situation (Valsamikis, Vivian, and Du Toit, 1999:39-40). In certain 
descriptions of risk, probabilities and not only outcomes are salient, and in this regard risk, is 
viewed as the likelihood that validly,  predictable direct and indirect consequences with 
potentially adverse values will materialise arising from particular events, self behaviour, 
environmental constraints, or the reaction of an opponent or third party (Vertzberger, 
1998:22). The extent of risk is determined by the degree of uncertainty surrounding a specific 
event in a specific situation in which loss is possible (Hough, 2006: 3). In this regard it has 
also been argued that risk denotes a degree of uncertainty regarding a specific occurrence and 
not the degree of probability that it will occur. The question therefore is whether an event will 
occur and what the outcome will be (Valsamikis, Vivian, and Du Tiot, 1999:39-40).  
The concept of risk, threat and uncertainty are at times used as synonyms or related concepts 
where they represent degrees of intensity or impact. Risk refers to a lack of knowledge about 
problem structure and consequence in a situation where decisions have to be made (Hertz and 
Thomas, 1984:3). However as Vertzberger (1998:20) points out risk should not necessarily be 
equated to uncertainty as ‘risk exists even when there is a perfect knowledge of all possible 
outcomes associated with an event and what is known of the probability distribution of its 
result’. Thus risk simply refers to a potential danger, while uncertainty refers to when a 
decision maker has neither the knowledge nor the information on the probability distribution 
of these outcomes.  Further, while risk is viewed as the potential for negative consequences 
following from a certain course or action (or inaction), threats are seen to be the potential for 
negative consequences arising from a specific situation and to which some responses have 
been formulated. In this regard threat assessment precedes risk assessment.  
In addition, the texture of, taste for and context of risk is also noted. Texture refers to the 
attitudes that define the nature of and salience of risk, these are transparency, or clarity and 
understanding of risky consequences; severity, or its seriousness damaging nature; certainty, 
or the (un)certainty of it actually materializing; horizon, or its closeness in time; complexity, 
as determined risk dimensions; reversibility, or whether it can be reversed and at what cost; 
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controllability and containability, or the extent to which it can be maintained to manageable 
propositions; and accountability, or whether decision-makers will be held responsible for it 
Hough, Du Plessis, Kruys, 2008:12). The taste for risk refers to decision-maker preference 
for a particular type or combination of risk and risk attitudes.  
The context of risk is determined by the vividness and salience of risk, prior to planning, and 
existing commitments. Vividness is associated with the inherent nature of the risk and its 
salience within the context of the situation involving risk. Risks become more salient if more 
information is available; if the time horizon decreases and the risk draws nearer; if events are 
intrinsically risky; if outcomes are irreversible; if decision-makers are personally held 
accountable for their decisions; if risk involve core values, interests and objectives; and if 
risks emerge in a comprehensive rather than in a piece by piece meal fashion (Hough, Du 
Plessis, Kruys, 2008:12). Since risky ventures are preceded by planning, the planning process 
has to anticipate and manage risks. Paradoxically, (over) planning can be counterproductive if 
it leads to over-confidence in the incorrect estimation of the time required to attain goals, and 
to greater involvement of decision makers who lack knowledge and experience.  
The concept of risk is used when the probabilities of outcomes are uncertain but the situation 
itself poses a plausible possibility that at least some outcomes are unknown and will have 
adverse consequences for decision makers (Vertzberger, 1998:20). As such risk lies 
somewhere between certainty (where outcomes are known) and uncertainty (where the 
outcome are not known). As such a typology of risk emerges that distinguishes between real 
risk, perceived risk, and acceptable risk (Hough, Du Plessis, Kruys, 2008:10). Real risk, 
irrespective of whether decision-makers are aware or unaware of it, is the actual or objective 
risk resulting from behaviour or a situation. Perceived risk is the socially constructed and 
differently experienced level of risk subjectively attributed to a situation or behaviour by 
decision-makers in pursuit of their goals. Finally, acceptable risk is the level of sustainable 
risk borne by decision makers in pursuit of their goals. Real, perceived, and acceptable risk 
may be incongruent with each other, although some correspondence is the ideal.   
2.3.2. Political risk and political risk analysis 
As discussed earlier political risk and the analysis thereof has undergone a series of 
definitional and operational challenges and consequently as noted by Hough, Du Plessis and 
Kruys (2008:17) the discipline suffers from over-definition. 
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Early definitions of political risk focused on adverse government actions. According to Alon 
and Martin (1998:10), three problems were inherent in the first definitions. Firstly, the scope 
of political risk was too narrow which led to inappropriate conceptualisation, wrong selection 
of data, improper use of analytical tools, and misinterpretation of the results. Secondly, the 
assumption that political risk necessary exerts negative influences on a firm is not always 
true. A number of researchers have challenged this notion. An example of a positive variation 
of political risk is the transition of former communist countries to market economies (Alon 
and Martin, 1998:11). Thirdly the emphasis of government actions and political events 
distract from other causes of political risk. It is suggested that political risk should be viewed 
as a discipline that changes over time.  
Part of the success of a business operation can be attributed to the political risk analyst who 
will have to assess the level of political risk before initial deployment by studying trends and 
signs. In addition, after deployment, the cost of running high political risk business operations 
in the modern world can be extremely expensive and as Baker and Hashmi (1988:40) 
correctly assert ‘political risk analysis is an integral part of multinational business 
operations.’ Instability in foreign political and social systems, changing power structures in 
international relations and growing demands by host countries for a greater control over 
operations of Multinational Enterprises have all brought into question the traditional ways of 
assessing foreign investment opportunities. As Simon (1984:123) correctly asserts, market 
surveys, cash flow and foreign exchange analyses, econometrics, and theories of comparative 
advantage are not designed to forecast political and social upheavals. For this reason political 
risk analysis has become one of the fastest growing sectors in international business study. 
Political risk analysis is a means of managing the risk for investors in such a way that a profit 
can be made. Micallef (1981:48) conceptualises political risk as ‘the systematic means of 
assessing and managing political risk of foreign direct investment or international business.’ 
A less tautological definition comes from Howell (1998:3-4), who describes political risk as 
decisions or events of a political nature, whether the result of direct or indirect government 
action or inaction, or the result of non-government political event and forces. Another 
definition comes from Hough, Du Plessis, and Kruys (2008:17) who define political risk as 
the possibility that political decisions or events in a country will affect the business climate in 
such a way that investors will lose money or not make as much money as they expected when 
the investment was made.  
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A more extensive definition is one provided to us by Brink (2004). According to Brink 
political risk analysis is: 
  ‘the analysis of the probability that factors caused or influenced by the (in) action or 
reaction of stakeholders within a political system to events outside or within a country, will 
affect investment and  business climates in such a way that investors will lose money or not 
make as much money as they  expected when the initial decision to investment was made 
(Brink, 2004:1).’ 
For the purposes of this study the Brink (2004) definition of political risk will be used:  
 The definition correctly asserts risk analysis’s purpose i.e. to forecast a country’s 
future for the benefit of the investor. In the field of political risk analysis many 
authors agree that forecasting and not prediction should be at the forefront of the 
investigation (Brink, 2004:27-28). A prediction can be seen as stating that something 
will happen, whilst forecasting refers to the likelihood and/or probability that 
something may happen if other factors come into play. Therefore a forecast presents 
an estimate to something that may happen in the future, a probability that a certain 
country might pose a certain degree of political risk to a foreign investor (Brink, 
2004: 27). 
 Brink’s definition is also notable in mentioning the fact that influences can be external 
as well as internal to a country. Judging by the definition, the perceived value of risk 
analysis is that it removes a certain amount of uncertainty in a presented host 
environment.  
In order to further conceptualise political risk, the mentioned interdisciplinary nature thereof 
has to be kept in mind. An awareness of an investment scenario includes updated knowledge 
of a country in the areas of politics, history, culture, law, economics, and international 
relations, as well as knowledge of the investing firm’s role in the host countries economy and 
its impact on the environment and society. However, one has to note that although political 
risk (the actual risk) and political insecurity are mentioned as negative contributing factors to 
political risk (the discipline of analysis) these uncertainties can sometimes be regarded 
positively. If an investor knows the risk the risk can be turned into a positive by adapting to it 
and working around it. As Brink (2004:21) argues, ‘if the uncertainties are managed 
accordingly the possibility of being able to exploit them becomes a reality.’  The presence of 
political risk does not thus always have to be negative, there are possibilities of turning them 
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into an advantage as long as the investor is aware of them. Certain types of manageable levels 
of risk analysis can even encourage certain investment endeavours.   
The management of risk is described as a managerial function aimed at protecting the 
organisation, its staff, assets and profits against the physical and financial consequences 
(adverse) of event risk (Hough, Du Plessis, Kruys, 2008:13). To the extent that it is related to 
but distinguished from risk analysis, risk management is the process by which risk analysis 
findings are evaluated in the context of political values and a decision is made about what s to 
be done about the risk problem. Accordingly, risk management is an executive or political 
function of a value-laden nature that involves a risk strategy and approaches aimed at risk 
avoidance, risk control, and risk recovery.  
2.3.2.1. Political risk and Political Instability 
As with the various definitions and typologies for risk, so too must the distinction be made 
between political instability and political risk. Political instability refers more to unexpected 
or unforeseen changes in leadership succession, government policy, or in a government’s 
implementation of power than political risk (Brink, 2004:19). It is thus but one criterion that 
points toward the probability of risk occurring. Political instability can be political risk factor 
and it is biased uncertainty about the probability of political events taking place. Kobrin 
(1978:114) explains it best by noting ‘political instability is a property of the environment 
whilst political risk is the property of business.’ Political instability is the property of the 
environment, because the environment does not necessarily affect the business’s investment 
in the country (Fitzpatrick, 1983:250), whilst political risk is a property of business, as it is to 
be regarded as posing a high probability that it may affect investment.  
2.3.3. Country risk and Country risk analysis. 
When looking at political risk analysis it is important to distinguish between political risk and 
country risk. In certain views, political risk analysis has a narrower meaning than country risk 
analysis, however in other views country risk originally had a narrower meaning relating 
mainly to the credit-worthiness of a country (Hough, 2006:5). As a result of the limitations of 
this approach, a separate set of variables was developed which incorporated political risk into 
country financial risk analysis. Although political risk analysis and country risk analysis are 
often used as synonyms, the former is more specific than the latter. Whereas political risk 
assessment is and management of risk emanating from political decisions or event (including 
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some social events), country risk is a broader concept including economic, financial 
considerations in a specific environment and some aspects such as travel risk not directly, or 
indirectly related to political decisions (Hough, 2006:1).  
Country risk can be defined precisely by referring to sovereign, credit and transfer risk 
(Brink, 2004:23). Country risk differs from political risk in the sense that it can be explained 
as potential financial losses due to problems arising from macroeconomic events within a 
country. Country risk thus focuses more on the economical data of a country, looking at the 
portfolio investment and the financial sector. Another difference between country risk and 
political risk that Brink (2004:23) provides is that ‘Country risk implies a country’s inability 
to repay loans, while political risk relates to the country’s unwillingness to do so.’ The latter 
point refers to the unwillingness to repay a loan even if the country is capable of doing so, be 
it for ideological or other reasons.  
The distinction between intended (un)willingness and (in)ability to repay loans is important 
but problematic to differentiate. This is where political risk can make a contribution. As 
country risk greatly relies on the components of a country’s balance of payments, these 
fluctuations in these components are really often a symptom of more deeply manifested 
policy problems that are identifiable by doing a political risk analysis. This analysis is 
important as it determines some of the country’s government’s intentions and makes it 
possible to forecast its likely behaviour in other situations that may affect an investment 
while also assessing the willingness of a government to follow through on what they have 
agreed to do.  
This may be pertinent in situations where an agreement is made between a company and a 
host country stating the ground rules for investment i.e. the country will not nationalise its 
industries etc. It may also be important in situations where there are joint ventures between 
the national government and a foreign investor.  
It is essential to note that levels of country risk are not attached to levels of political risk and 
vice versa. A country may experience high levels of country risk while having little political 
risk. Further, factors within country risk could be included as variables in a political risk 
analysis; however political risk variables hardly ever appear in country risk reports (Brink, 
2004:18). Country risk and political risk is therefore somewhat related, as seen above, but 
they are usually used for different purposes.  
19 
 
2.3.4. Regional Security  
In the world of political and country risk and the analysis thereof, many authors such as 
Hawkins (1996), Hough (2006) and Ohmae (1996) have argued that risk analysts should take 
cognisance of the fact that the regional has become more important than the national when 
assessing the level of risk. Globalisation of markets and the growth of the international 
portfolio investment have diverted attention away from the narrow nation view. In many 
views the regional state has taken prominence over the nation state (Ohmae in Hawkins, 
1996:2). One cannot for example conduct a meaningful risk analysis of a country such as 
Germany without assessing the regional risk for the European Union as a whole. Contagion 
effects, the spill over, positive as well as adverse, from one country to another casts doubt on 
the value of assessing only a country specific risk analysis. A country like Cameroon for 
example might have an effective administration that is business friendly but unless one looks 
at its neighbour, Nigeria, and the trouble that country has with security in the Niger Delta, a 
complete political risk analysis cannot be conducted effectively.   
According to Ayoob (1995:47), there are two major sources of interstate conflict and 
insecurity in the Third World; (1) the intermeshing of domestic insecurities with interstate 
antagonisms, and (2) the autonomous dynamic of regional conflict, which is often centred on 
the aspirations of preeminent regional powers. This study will primarily be concerned with 
the latter option. In many instances, the major evidence of the existence of a security complex 
(a regional defined primarily in conflict and security terms) is the presence of a pre-eminent 
power in a geographic area with latent or overt claims to the status of the security manger of 
that area. As Vayrynen (in Ayoob, 1995:59) states, ‘usually such regional powers centres sit 
at the top of the hierarchy of an identifiable regional subsystem, Indonesia, India, and Nigeria 
may be seen as examples of this’. Regional power centres can have coherence to regions by 
arranging the security concerns of discrete geographic areas around their own ambitions and 
capabilities. When viewing an integrated system like the Gulf of Guinea, it is almost 
impossible to determine the security of a single country without accepting the casual 
relationship between the various players in the region. 
2.3.5. Militias 
According to the Oxford (2009) dictionary, a militia is a body of citizens as distinguished 
from professional soldiers in a paramilitary group and typically regarding themselves as 
defenders of individual rights against the presumed interference of the federal government. 
For the purposes of this study, two such militias of importance for the analysis of the conflict 
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in the Niger Delta will be conceptualised namely: youth militias and ethnic militias. With the 
youth as its vanguard the conflict in the Niger delta has always been ethnically charged, when 
it is not directed at the MNOCs. As will be examined below the two concepts are 
inadvertently linked, and following their separate definition, they will be used in conjunction 
throughout the study as one concept.  
2.3.5.1. Youth militias 
In sociological terms, youth is a social category of early adulthood, emerging in activity and 
involvement in society but somewhat limited by societal values and some level of 
dependency and perhaps agency (Durham in Ikelegbe, 2006:88). The definition of youth is 
situational and cultural specific, while the African concept of youth is broad in its 
chronological specification and role.  
 
In Nigeria the militia movement is perpetuated by the youth and as such the insurgency in the 
Niger Delta has almost become synonymous with this age group. This is partly due to the fact 
that the vast majority of Nigeria’s population is between the ages of 15-35 (Ikelegbe, 
2006:88-89). Furthermore, in Africa the particular material conditions in which the youth are 
immersed have been anything but friendly and supportive and often act as risk factors in their 
own right that lead to further instability and violent activity in communities. The bad 
governance of certain African states has created conditions that are problematic instead of 
prosperous for the youth. Inept governments, corrupt administrations, poor leadership, state 
abuse, declining legitimacy and pervading erosion of authority saturate the political process 
steering many African countries into prolonged poverty and vitriolic warfare. Prolonged 
militarism, state repression, decisive and summary action and suppression have created a 
youth culture tolerant of violence. Consequently, in many new democracies the youth have 
remained a problem segment of the population.   
 
Within their neighbourhoods the youth militias of Nigeria act as guards. They are the fighting 
arm of communities in the contentions, conflicts and local wars over land, MNOC locations 
and water resources with neighbouring communities and in the event of the encroachment, 
damage against community members and resources. The militia members also participate in 
community development emblematised in the shape of mobilisation of the community for 
projects and communal activities; be it under threat of force in many instances. Furthermore, 
the youth militia sensitise the citizenry concerning issues and grievances in the Niger Delta. 
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They organise protests and demonstrations to express their plight and sufferings of the region. 
In many cases, the youth militias take direct physical action against the MNOC’s. The actions 
range from, stoppage or disruption of oil production and operations, kidnapping of MNOC 
staff, damage to the MNOC facilities, and piracy to name but a few.  In this realm, the youth 
militia members operate outside the ambit of their elders and more specifically outside the 
operational modes of petitions and peaceful and lawful agitation utilised with little success by 
the elders.  
2.3.5.2. Ethnic militias 
A concept related to youth militia is ethnic militia. This study is concerned with a part of the 
world where ethnicity plays an immense part in everyday life. As will be expanded on in the 
second section of this chapter, ethnic tensions can be a very important trigger of violence, 
particularly in the Niger Delta. Ethnicity has always been a point of contention in the Gulf of 
Guinea, and it is the opinion of this research study that any analysis that does not take that 
into consideration will be incomplete.  
Although the Greek term ethnos  has been around for centuries, the  term ‘ethnic’ was first 
derived at by the American sociologist David Riesman in 1953  (Erikson, 2002:4). Ethnicity 
by definition is characterised by a common consciousness of being one in relation to the other 
relevant ethnic groups (Nnoli, 1989:8). The concept others groups of people separating ‘us’ 
from ‘them’ (Sandve, 2008). However, ethnic boundaries change over time especially when 
there are competitions for scarce resources. Nnoli (1980: 5) contends further that ethnicity is 
‘a socio-political phenomenon associated with interactions among members of a society, 
consisting of diverse ethnic groups, characterised by cultural and linguistic similarities, 
values and common consciousness.’ The foregoing definitions suggest that ethnic differences 
are natural and should not necessarily lead to conflicts of a negative nature. To conceptualise 
the term further, Erikson (2002:53) divided the term into two distinct fields, namely 
Primordial which sees ethnicity as something inherent and given, and Instrumentalist which 
does not.   
In Nigeria ethnicity is an especially troubling concept, as its 140 million people are divided 
into an innumerable amount of languages, cultures, ethnic groups and geographical regions. 
The Delta alone plays host to some 40 ethnic groups housed in around 6000 communities and 
settlements, speaking at least 250 dialects. The background to the emergence of ethnic 
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militias was the manipulation of ethnicity by the governing elite across the various regions 
especially as a means of bargaining for power in the post democratic era (Babawale, 2001). 
Most scholars who write on Nigeria discuss ethnicity as a bargaining tool in the struggle for 
primitive accumulation (Alugbo 2004, Igwara 2001, Osaghae 1995, Ukiwo 2003). This view 
agrees with the position by Glickman (1995:3), which along with most of the above authors 
states that ethnicity in Africa is instrumental- that the deployment of the identity can be seen 
to serve a material or political end. Studies have further shown that ethnic conflicts are bound 
to increase in the immediate wake of political liberalisation (Smith, 2000:3). Indeed as is the 
case in Nigeria, democratic openings have intensified ethnic competition.  
The realisation that a society as diverse as Nigeria may be difficult to manage 
administratively partly informed the decision to adopt the Lyttelton Constitution of 1954, 
which formally inaugurated the practice of federalism in Nigeria (Babawale, 2001).  
Regrettably, the structure of the federal government is lopsided and unbalanced which 
resulted in the northern region of the country being a bigger entity than the rest of the 
country. Consequently, the struggle for power sharing was reduced to a struggle for 
hegemony among the three main ethnic groups, the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo from 
which the Hausa-Fulani emerged as the victor. The other two factions, along with numerous 
smaller ethnic groups, have cause to complain of marginalisation. In the Delta the Igbos 
complain about being singled out for punishment and discrimination as a consequence of 
their secessionist attempt which led to Nigeria civil war. The Yoruba’s on the other hand feel 
cheated by the annulment of the 1993 presidential elections which was won by one of their 
own, the late chief M.K.O Abiola who was denied his victory by a military government 
dominated by the Hausa-Fulani (Babawale, 2001).  
As a consequence of marginalisation, numerous ethnic groups created ethnic militias to 
further their ethnic interest. In Ikelegbe’s (2006) study of youth militias in the Niger Delta he 
found that the respondents in the various samples tend to see the youth/ethnic militias as 
organised standing groups of youths who protect certain ethnic interests and rights and 
forcefully make demands on the state, oil companies or other ethnic groupings. These ethnic 
militias have been in a state of war with each other and the state for decades creating a 
volatile environment for business.  
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2.4. Selected political risk Frameworks 
As Brink (2004:83) notes, what the bulk of literature on political risk and country risk 
analysis has in common are overlapping areas that are of major concern to foreign investors. 
The assumption is thus that there are certain major risk variables that most risk frameworks 
share. Examples of such overarching concerns to foreign investors are as Brink (2004:83) 
points out political stability, political effectiveness, monetary policy, exchange rate policy, 
trade policy, fiscal policy, the regulatory environment, the global environment, debt, growth, 
the financial structure, current account, and the liquidity of a host country. A further two 
variables that were isolated in Howell and Chadwick’s (1994) study of political risk 
indicators, are negative influences of regional political forces (bad neighbours) and restrictive 
measures required retaining power (authoritarianism) (Venter, 1995:3). The two variables 
could most often account for actual losses incurred.  
For the purposes of this study, four frameworks for analysing political risk will be utilised. 
These frameworks represent different approaches and methods to political risk analysis: rank 
ordering or scoreboard approaches (qualitative and quantitative); judgement by experts 
(quantitative); the decision tree approach (qualitative); and statistical approaches such as 
multiple regression analysis and discriminant analysis (quantitative) (Fouche, 2003: 28). The 
four political risk frameworks that will be analysed are: EIU, BERI, BM, and ICRG. These 
frameworks were selected on the basis of the qualitative pool of variables that they represent. 
In addition, the selected risk frameworks can easily be analysed as the common attributes 
(risk variables) are available. Moreover, they are some of the few examples where risk 
companies and risk researchers readily supplied constructed frameworks; many companies do 
not for fear of losing their advantage in the rather competitive field of political risk analysis. 
Furthermore, the variables in each of the four risk frameworks will be ideal for the purposes 
of this study as will be expanded on below. The most relevant major risk variables and 
regional risk variables will be extrapolated from the above four risk frameworks and used in 
turn to determine the political risk of the Gulf of Guinea.   
2.4.1. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 
In 1986, The Economist published a risk analysis framework under the title of ‘Countries in 
trouble’ made up of political, social, and economic variables (political and social were 
combined under the name socio-political). The framework provides a scheme for weighing 
each variables individual impact and relative roles and further offers a method for combining 
the risk scores and ranking them in such a way as to advise a potential investor of useful 
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directions to take in their investments (Howell and Chadwick, 1994:74). The EIU assess 
composite country risk through four types of risks to investors, namely political risk, 
economic policy risk, economic structure risk, and liquidity risk. As this study in socio-
political in nature, it will therefore not consider the economic variables. Political risk 
constitutes 22 percent of the overall score and is further subdivided into two categories; 
political stability and political effectiveness. Political stability asks the question whether the 
political scene is free of internal or external threats to security, whereas political effectiveness 
addresses the issues pertaining to good governance and the outcome of good governance. 
Political stability is represented by five variables namely, war, social unrest, orderly political 
transfer, politically motivated violence, and international disputes. Political effectiveness is 
based on six indicators. They are: change in government/pro-business orientation, 
institutional effectiveness, bureaucracy, transparency/fairness, corruption, and crime.  
The EIU chose to reduce these indicators to six political and four social variables to represent 
the origins of what is generally called ‘political risk’ in a process allocating a points based 
scoring system to be expanded on below (Howell and Chadwick, 1994:76-78). 
(a) Political variables 
 
 Bad Neighbours, (3 points). ‘Bad neighbours’ refers to the regional situation the 
country finds itself in. If a country is near a superpower in geographical terms it will 
almost undoubtedly suffer, due to superpowers wanting to control their periphery 
often with the use of force. It also includes trouble spots which are explained as 
regions which have a history of unrest or insecurity or continuous violence such as the 
Middle East, Somalia and with relevance to this study, the Niger Delta.  
 Authoritarianism, (7 points). This variable pertains to the lack of democracy. 
Whether authoritarianism of totalitarianism if a country is not a democracy business 
will undoubtedly suffer. Even rigid totalitarianism control is only a temporary holding 
pattern with disruption and violence sure to boil underneath.  
 Staleness, (5 points). Staleness refers to when a leader is in power for more than ten 
years. EIU argues that a leader needs about five years to get his or her manner but 
after ten years he or she becomes detached leading to complacency, entrancement, 
corruption, nepotism, distain and delay. 
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 Illegitimacy, (9 points).  Legitimacy implies an un-coerced and positive acceptance 
of the state by the citizenry. The gap between acceptability and the government’s 
persistence in power could pose a high political risk. 
 Generals in power, (6 points). In the face of instability or the absence of a competent 
civilian government, the military authorities often step in to take control. The 
argument is that the military does not understand the functioning of government nor 
do they step aside gracefully when a competent civilian government presents itself.  
 War/armed insurrection, (20 points). This variable has the most impact of all of the 
variables selected. War destroys physical facilities, disrupts the economy and brings 
about losses in a number of other ways. Raw materials and goods and supplies are 
delayed or diverted to war use. Further the labour force shrinks as able bodied men 
and women join the war.   
 
(b) Social variables.  
 
 Urbanisation, (3 points). When the urbanisation process is too rapid, or is too 
geographically concentrated on a single city, a number of problems accompany the 
shift. These include idleness and crime, an expansion of the drug trade, and economic 
irregularities, such as the pricing of foods. It is not urbanisation itself that threatens 
investment but rather the conditions that come along with it. 
 Islamic Fundamentalism, (4 points). The EIU argues that there has never been much 
political fervour in Hinduism or Buddhism and that Christianity is a spent force. 
However they add that Muslim radicals have the potential to be a very strong force in 
the world and where they are strong, the risk to investors is high especially when 
investors are foreign and not Muslim. 
 Corruption, (6 points). Corruption exists in all societies in some shape or form; 
however, in some places it has become rampant and adversely affected the running of 
everyday business. Corruption can distort an economy in ways that that the best 
investor awareness or even power cannot accommodate. 
 Ethnic tensions, (4 points). Ethnic, religious, and racial tensions provide an 
environment in which industry cannot suffice. It may redirect government attention, 
invoke restrictions (e.g. hire more from one ethnic group than another), restrict labour 
26 
 
resources, or result in open conflict. Governments can be severely affected by the 
intricate nature of ethnic tension. 
As this study is concerned with the political risk of the Gulf of Guinea on a regional basis, 
only a few of the EIU variables are applicable. The most important variable is undoubtedly 
Bad neighbours. In a regional context this variable is very significant and in the context of 
the Gulf of Guinea Nigeria would undoubtedly be the bad neighbour.  For example, 
Cameroon which is located to the south east of this regional powerhouse, has experienced 
numerous acts of violence as a direct consequence of the conflict in the Niger Delta. 
War/armed insurrection is also a variable that can have a dramatic effect on the regional risk 
of a country as has been illustrated in a number of cases in Africa. A prime example of this is 
crisis in the Darfur region in Sudan which has led to millions of refugees fleeing to the 
country’s neighbour Chad. Authoritarianism and generals in power may also be added as 
variables vital to a regional political risk analysis. These two variables reflect ineptitude in 
the running of a country and relate directly to the bad neighbour variable. If a country is not 
run properly, tensions could flare up and affect the region.  
Islamic fundamentalism and ethnic tensions are more consequent risk variables but have a 
definite ability to heighten the hostilities within a given region. For this reason they will be 
added to the list of variables extrapolated from this framework. 
To summarise the variables that will be utilised are: Bad neighbours, War/armed 
insurrection, Authoritarianism, generals in power, Islamic fundamentalism, and ethnic 
tensions. 
2.4.2. The Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) 
The Business Environment Risk Intelligence framework provides a complete country analysis 
based on a set of quantitative indicators developed and refined since 1975 (Howell, 1998:36). 
The framework comprises of the Political Risk Index (PRI) which consists of 10 weighted 
political and social variables, the Operations Risk Index which includes weighted ratings on 
15 economic, financial, and structural variables, and finally the R Factor, also a weighted 
index covering a countries legal framework, foreign exchange, hard currency reserves, and 
foreign debt. The average of these three ratings is known as the Profit opportunity Risk 
Index. Only reliable statistics from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are 
used in these ratings. As this is not a study focussed on the economic aspects of risk analysis 
only the PRI will be used.  
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The ten PRI variables are divided into three categories namely; internal causes of political 
risk, external causes of political risk and symptoms of political risk. Each of the ten variables 
is assigned as many as seven points by an expert analyst. A rating of seven represents an ideal 
situation and a total score of 70 represents a perfect country. To further add to the value of 
the PRI it is required that political risks be analysed over four time periods, the present 
conditions, +1 year conditions, +5 year conditions, and +10 year conditions (Howell, 
1998:41).  
Under internal causes there are 6 variables as opposed to 2 each in external causes and 
symptoms of political risk (Howell and Chadwick, 1994:82-83).  
(a) Internal Causes of Political risk  
 
 Factionalism of the political spectrum and the power of these factions. This 
variable represents divisions among political perspectives in the society, with 
numbers of perspectives seen as representing a threat to consistency and regularity in 
the political process. When strength is added to numbers, the score to be assigned is 
reduced.  
 Factionalism by language, ethnic and/or religious groups and the power of these 
factions. This is to be considered as a social variable as opposed to the more 
political/ideological above. Risk would increase by the compounding of the 
divisions, as well as by the increased power of the distinct groups.  
 Restrictive (coercive) measures required to retain power. Restrictive measures and 
the source of such measures is a common concern among political scientists 
examining the functioning of the state. The existence of authoritarianism or the use of 
coercive measures reflects the prospect of arbitrary action, abrupt changing of rule, 
and alienation due to government’s handling of the implementation of decisions.  
 Mentality, including xenophobia, nationalism, corruption, nepotism, willingness 
to compromise. Corruption and willingness to compromise are somewhat related as 
are xenophobia and nationalism however this does not mean that these variables are 
mutually interrelated. Corruption may point to an excess of willingness to 
compromise and include a level of nepotism. 
 Social conditions including population density and wealth distribution. Once 
again an investor is not threatened by urbanisation itself but rather the conditions that 
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are discovered through it. Wealth and distribution is another dimension that 
highlights a disparity between levels of society, as distinct from conditions that are 
pervasive. 
 Organisation and strength of forces for the radical left government.  This variable 
represents a concern of the 1970s more than the present but can be indicative of any 
radical force.  
 
(b) External Causes 
 Dependence on and/or importance to a hostile major power. This variable is 
concerned with the major power involvement. It is interesting to note that friendly 
major powers are not accredited to cause trouble.  
 Negative influences of regional political forces. This variable pertains to influences 
by a neighbour and can be translated into trouble-spots which are explained as regions 
which have a history of unrest or insecurity or continuous violence  
 
(c) Symptoms of political risk  
 Societal conflict involving demonstrations, strikes, and street violence. This 
variable concerned with civil strife and its influence on the business environment.  
 Instability as perceived by non-constitutional changes, assassinations, and 
guerrilla wars. Instability was one of the earliest and most enduring concerns of 
firms about doing business outside their own domain. The threat of assassins and 
guerrilla warfare are ominous to any investing company. 
Risk analysts at BERI grade a country’s political risk climate by variable, assigning a grade 
for each of the ten variables under internal causes, external causes, and symptoms of political 
risk. Like the EIU framework evaluations are done over a time span; present conditions, +5 
years, +10 years.  
Once again, as is the case with the EIU, not all the above variables are relevant to this study. 
Under internal causes of political risk factionalism by language, ethnic and/or religious 
groups and the power of these factions is the most important as it might be a trigger cause or 
result in a heightened state of violence. However, also to be included in the list of variables 
extrapolated from this framework is factionalism of the political spectrum and the power of 
these factions and restrictive (coercive) measures required to retain power. It is 
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acknowledged that these variables will not necessarily have a direct impact on the regional 
situation, but in a country like Nigeria, where ethnicity and factionalism go hand in hand, it is 
a vital component in determining the situation in the Niger Delta, and its influence on region 
i.e. the political risk of the Gulf of Guinea. The latter variable is added for the same reason as 
the EIUs generals in power and authoritarianism; it has an adverse affect on the country 
which could spill over into neighbouring regions.  
Under external causes, the negative influence of regional forces will be utilised as well as the 
dependence on and/or importance to a hostile major power (but with some changes). Under 
the latter variable friendly major powers are not seen to cause trouble. This is a point of 
contention that has been identified with the BERI framework as the case of Nigeria and the 
neighbouring region will clearly illustrate. Although none of the countries in the Gulf of 
Guinea are openly hostile to one another, the conflict in the Niger Delta is affecting most of 
them. So the variable will be added but will include, as well as hostile foreign power, friendly 
foreign power.  
Finally, under symptoms of political risk instability as perceived by non-constitutional 
changes, assassinations, and guerrilla wars will be included not so much for non-
constitutional changes but for the assassinations and guerrilla warfare. To summarise, the 
variables extracted from the BERI framework are: factionalism by language, ethnic and/or 
religious groups and the power of these factions, factionalism of the political spectrum and 
the power of these factions and restrictive (coercive) measures required to retain power, the 
negative influence of regional forces, the dependence on and/or importance to a hostile 
major power, instability as perceived by non-constitutional changes, assassinations, and 
guerrilla wars. 
2.4.3. The Brink Model (BM) 
In 2004, Charlotte Brink released the book Measuring Political Risk: Risks to Foreign 
Investment. As noted by Brink (2004:2), the measurement and observation of political risk 
depends to a great extent on the subjective human judgement which is in some instances a 
handicap for political risk analysis. The book proposes a balance of user subjectivity with a 
framework that can reflect researched information, in order to attempt a more objective 
probable estimation of risk.  
The system of analysis proposed in the book is not an inanimate object, apart from the 103 
political risk variables and their 411 indicators used to conceptualise each risk factor; it also 
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absorbs the experience and knowledge of its users. The variables are separated into 37 
political, 41 economic and 25 social factors. For the purposes of this study, only the political 
and social variables will be taken into consideration.  
In an effort to quantify traditionally subjective political, economic and social phenomena, 
quantified data presented as weighted factor  indicators of risk can be calculated by relaying 
information into a model designed to reflect the outcome of an operationalised analysis. The 
model aims to assist during the decision-making process surrounding foreign investment, 
where human rationality is limited when operating in conditions of considerable uncertainty 
(Simon, 1972 in Brink, 2004:2).  
As this model contains 103 variables with some 411 indicators it would be unpractical to list 
all of them and extract the relevant ones as is done with the other political risk frameworks in 
this study.
1
 Instead only the variables useful to this study will be listed and they are as 
follows:  
(a) Political variables  
 Racial, ethnic, religious, nationality, language issues. This variable concerns 
liberation movements, legitimacy for the government and occurrences of racially or 
ethnically motivated violence. 
 Border disputes/external conflict and international relations. This variable is 
similar to the bad neighbours of the EIU or BERI’s negative influences from a foreign 
power.  
 Political terrorism. This variable pertains to politically motivated terrorism. 
However the distinction between political terrorism and guerrilla activity is unclear. 
Brink conceptualises this variable as the use or threat or violence or violent means in 
order to coerce a government, authorities or entire populations by inducing fear.  
 Civil war. When a country is at war with itself business can be severely affected. 
Depending on the extent of the conflict business can be affected at every level. The 
BM allows this variable to be rated much higher if the conflict is ethnically motivated   
 Political (in)stability. This variable has to do with the state of flux or political 
disequilibrium, and unforeseen shifts in government policy. 
                                                          
1
 The complete Brink model including the list of variables and indicators will be presented in Appendix A. 
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 (Lack of) political will. The variable which pertains to the extent at which political 
policies are designed and enforced in the best interest of the public and the political 
will to change them if necessary.  
 Geographical position and geopolitics. This variable pertains to the geopolitical 
region the host country finds itself in. Where the country is situated will determine its 
regional vulnerability, further if it is involved in a systemic conflict what is its status 
(direct party to the conflict or mediator). 
 Political violence. This variable concerns revolutionary uprisings, rebellion, 
insurrection, hostile acts, and instances of malicious damages to property etc. 
(b) Social variables 
 Societal uprisings. Violent demonstrations aimed at MNOCs, instances of collective 
subversion, looting, vandalism, malicious damage are all indicators of this variable.  
With the exception of (lack of) political will, these variables are similar to those utilised by 
the other frameworks. The unique variable (lack of) political will was introduced to add 
another dimension to the analysis of regional political risk. If a county is affected by a 
regional power, then unless the neighbouring country has the political will to change the 
situation for the host country the political risk will undoubtedly remain unchnaged. 
2.4.4. The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
The International Country Risk Guide for forecasting financial, economic and political risk 
was created in 1980 by the editors of International Reports, the widely respected weekly 
newsletter on international finance and economics (Howell, 1998:185). The ICRG provides a 
rating composed of 22 variables in three subcategories of risk namely political, economic and 
financial. A separate index is created for each subcategory. The political risk index is based 
on 100 points the financial and economic each has fifty points. The total points of the three 
indexes are divided by two to produce the weights for inclusion in the composite country risk 
score. This study will not focus on the economic or financial or economic aspects of the 
ICRG, as it is political in nature. The political variables are composed of 12 weighted 
variables that are both political and economic are as follows (Howell, 1998:187).  
 Government stability (12 points). This is a measure of the government’s ability to 
carry out its declared programs and its ability to stay in office. This will depend on 
the type of governance, the cohesion, of the government and governing party or 
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parties, the closeness of the next election, the government’s command of the 
legislature, and popular approval of government policies.  
 Socio-economic conditions (12 points). This is an attempt to measure general public 
satisfaction, or dissatisfaction with the government’s economic policies. The greater 
the popular dissatisfaction the greater chances are that the government will be forced 
to change track, possibly to the determent of business.  
 Investment profile (12 points). The government’s attitude toward inward investment 
is determined by an assessment of four subcomponents: the risk to operations (scored 
from zero (very high risk) to four (very low risk)), taxation (scored from zero to 
three), repatriation (scored from zero to three), and labour costs (score from zero to 
two).  
 Internal conflict (12 points). This variable assesses the political violence in the 
country and its actual or potential impact on governance. 
 External conflict (12 points). The external conflict measure is an assessment both of 
the risk to an incumbent government, and to inward investment. It ranges from trade 
embargoes and restrictions, whether imposed by a single country, a group of 
countries, or the international community as a whole, through geopolitical disputes, 
armed threats exchanges of border fire border incursions, foreign supported 
insurgency and full scale warfare.  
 Corruption (6 points). This is a measure of corruption in the political sphere. The 
measure is concerned with nepotism, job reservations, excessive patronage, etc.   
 Military in politics (6 points). In the face of instability or the absence of a competent 
civilian government, the military authorities often step in take control themselves. The 
argument is that the military does not understand the functioning of government nor 
do they step aside gracefully when a competent civilian government presents itself.  
 Religion in politics (6 points). Religious tensions may stem from the domination of 
society and/or governance by a single religious group that seeks to replace civil law 
by religious law and exclude other religions from the political and/or social process. 
 Law and order (6 points). Law and order are assessed separately, with each sub-
component comprising three points. The law component is assessed of the strength 
for impartial law, while the Order component is an assessment of popular observance 
of law. 
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 Ethnic tensions (6 points). This variable measures the degree of tension within a 
country attributable to racial, nationality or language divisions.  
 Democratic accountability (6 points). This is a measure of how responsive 
government is to its people; on the basis that the less responsive it is the more likely 
it is that the government will fall, peacefully in a democracy setting, or violently in a 
non-democratic one.  
 Bureaucratic quality (4 points). The institutional strength and quality of the 
Bureaucracy tends to minimise revisions of policy when governments change. 
Therefore high points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the expertise 
to govern without drastic changes in policy and interruption in government services. 
Although they are listed under Political, there are a few of the above variable that can be 
listed under economic or even a subcategory social if one existed in the ICRG. For the 
purposes of this study Bureaucratic quality, democratic accountability, corruption, 
investment profile, and socio-economic conditions have little relevance.  These variables, 
although pertinent in a country based analysis, are not as useful in analysing regional political 
risk. The bureaucratic quality of a country, investment profile, socio-economic conditions as 
well as democratic accountability has to do with the internal running of a country and could 
not be considered for a regional analysis on these criteria. Although one could argue that they 
may be trigger causes to regional conflict, there are in my opinion more important trigger 
causes as examined above.  
Internal and external conflicts, religion in politics, ethnic tensions, and law and order are 
pertinent. These variables are similar in meaning to those used by the other frameworks and 
they will be presented in order of their combined and commutative explanatory utility of the 
variance in the independent variable in the next section of this research paper.  
2.5. The major risk and regional risk variables 
As mentioned previously, what most political risk analysis companies or frameworks have in 
common are overlapping risk variables. This is a good departure point from which to extract 
the major risk variables and regional risk variables that will be used to determine the regional 
political risk of the Gulf of Guinea. It has to be noted that in the context of regional political 
risk analysis not all variables are valid, particularly in the case of the Gulf of Guinea where 
security (or lack thereof) is the main concern for many investing companies. Although 
monetary and fiscal policies or socio-economic conditions can be added to the analysis it 
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would prove obsolete as this variable on its own will have very little impact on the security of 
a region. Having said this, and as Brink (2004:83) has pointed out, consequent risk variables 
might seem less significant, but are by no means less important, as they are closely related 
and causally linked to the major variables. What Brink says is extremely important, although 
these variables on their own do not count for much in regional risk analysis; they may for 
example be a trigger cause. Risks do not exist in isolation, and the casual relationship 
between the major and micro variables clearly illustrates this.  
The variables pivotal to the study of regional risk analysis in the EIU are bad neighbours, 
war/armed insurrection, authoritarianism, and generals in power. Bad neighbours is a very 
important variable, as it encompasses a wide range of problems that a host country could 
experience if a neighbour is hostile or have hostile actions within its borders. War/armed 
insurrection is clearly an adverse variable. In the context of modern warfare, armed conflict 
seldom stays within a territorial boundary. Authoritarianism and generals in power are two 
variables that can potentially go hand in hand as they both bring about ineptitude in the 
running of the country and they both generate unrest.  
The BERI framework adds a new dimension to the important variable list by adding 
factionalism by language, ethnic and/or religious groups and the power of these factions. 
This variable, if present in a country, can heighten unrest. Factionalism of the political 
spectrum and the power of these factions would usually not have been added to a regional 
analysis but because of the close proximity of ethnicity and factionalism in Africa it would 
seem fit to include this variable. Restrictive (coercive) measures required to retain power is 
also included as it is added for the same reason as the EIUs generals in power and 
authoritarianism; it has an adverse affect on the country which could spill over into 
neighbouring regions. The negative influence of regional forces will be utilised as it is similar 
to the bad neighbours of the EIU. Some changes have been made to the next variable to be 
included. The dependence on and/or importance to a hostile major power will be added but it 
is interesting that friendly major powers are not accredited to cause trouble. The variable will 
be added but will include, as well as hostile foreign power, friendly foreign power. Finally 
under symptoms of political risk instability as perceived by non-constitutional changes, 
assassinations, and guerrilla wars will be included not so much for non-constitutional 
changes but for the assassinations and guerrilla warfare.  
35 
 
The BM has most of the variable the previous two have namely racial, ethnic, religious, 
nationality, language issues, Border disputes/external conflict and international relations, 
political terrorism which is conceptualised as the use or threat or violence or violent means in 
order to coerce a government, authorities or entire populations by inducing fear, civil war 
political (in)stability, geographical position and geopolitics, political violence and societal 
uprisings which are very important as they relate  to violent demonstrations aimed at 
MNOC’s. There is a unique variable in (lack of) political will which introduces another 
dimension to the analysis of regional political risk. If a county is affected by a regional power 
then unless the neighbouring country has the political will to change the situation for the host 
country the political risk will undoubtedly not change. 
The  ICRG framework have a few variables that are not applicable to this study, however  
internal and external conflicts, religion in politics, ethnic tensions, and law and order are 
pertinent. As the ICRG conceptualises the variable law and order, it can be a trigger cause to 
internal conflict. The law component is assessed of the strength for impartial law, while the 
order component is an assessment of popular observance of law. 
2.6. The synthesised major political and regional risk variables 
The above section identified the variables from each of the four political risk frameworks that 
will be used to determine the political risk of the Gulf of Guinea. This next section will 
attempt to synthesise the variables from the different frameworks, which will in turn be 
conceptualised and utilised in the regional risk index. The synthesised variables are as 
follows: 
 Political stability/ (lack of) political will/law and order. Political stability is a major 
risk variable that can also be used in a regional analysis. The variable is the measured 
by monitoring the incidents of internal and external conflict; social unrest; orderly 
political transfers, politically motivated violence government stability, policy 
stability, socio-economic conditions; military in politics, religion in politics law and 
order, ethnic tensions; and international disputes. It is a measure of both a 
government’s ability to carry out policies, and its ability to retain office. Regime 
legitimacy also contributes to political stability. A political system under fundamental 
stress from dissatisfied groups, and the rule of law being questioned, might pose 
strains on the legitimacy of the country. The (lack of) political will is only evident in 
the BM and as such was chosen for its utility for regional risk analysis. It refers to 
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poor plan performance and the growing gap between plan formulation and 
implantation which can be attributed to the lack of commitment and political will on 
the part of many developing country leaders and decision makers.  
 Bad neighbours/dependence on a foreign power/external conflict.  The EIU, BM, 
BERI, and ICRG each identify this as a critical variable. It indicates that the country 
in question is under the influence of either a superpower or a regional hegemony 
(Venter, 1999:6). Although not indicated by the BERI framework, this variable also 
includes trouble spots which are explained as regions which have a history of unrest 
or insecurity or continuous violence. The measure of external conflict is an 
assessment of both risks to the government and to investment (Brink, 2004:85). It can 
range from qualitative type conflicts like trade embargoes, and geopolitical disputes; 
to armed threats exchanges of fire on and across borders, foreign supported 
insurgency and full scale war. External conflicts can adversely affect foreign business 
in many different ways ranging from restrictions to operations, trade investment, to 
distortion to the allocation of economic resources; and violent changes in the structure 
of society.  
 War, armed insurrection. This variable is both a major risk variable and one that 
can be used in regional political risk analysis. War and armed insurrection have the 
most telling impact on an investment. It includes destruction of physical facilities and 
the disruption of the economy to produces war material and to support armed 
combatants. Internal conflict is an indication of political violence in a country as well 
as its potential or actual impact on governance. A country would be considered to be 
low risk if there is no evidence of armed opposition to the government, and a 
government does not indulge in arbitrary violence, directly or indirectly, against its 
own people. Judging by this definition, it is assumed that a high risk rating will be 
given if a country is embroiled in an ongoing civil war. However, certain criteria have 
to be taken into consideration like, whether the conflict is confined to a certain area or 
attacks occur nationwide, whether the movement has widespread support, or only a 
few individuals, and whether the acts of violence are sporadic or sustained.  
 Ethnic/religious and/or politics/radical tensions social conflict, deep ideological 
cleavages. The EIU, BERI, BM, and ICRG all recognise the importance of this 
variable and as such it is a major risk variable. These tensions and divisions in society 
are well known predicators of political turmoil and hence an increase in political risk. 
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Such tensions redirect government attention to their solution, restrict resources 
available for economic development, or may result in open conflict and destruction of 
property. A government may even fall on account of social tension. This variable 
caters for divisions in society that are not however necessary ethnically based, but 
may have class and/or ideological origins. It represents a threat to consistency in 
economic and social policy. It implies inter alia that a conservative government may 
favour investment and business, while leftist governments may favour social welfare 
and state interventionist policies. 
 Authoritarianism/undemocratic measures to retain power/ generals in power. 
This variable was chosen more on the basis of its regional impact, than it 
classification as a major risk variable. This variable seems to be counter-intuitive; 
generals in power or authoritarian governments at first glance would indicate political 
stability. Although authoritarian rule may induce short-term stability, it is quite likely 
to mask a greater popular discontent that could result in political violence against the 
ruler and a mass based revolt- in fact increasing the political risk for investors rather 
than decreasing it. The role of the military in politics has always been a contentious 
one, and can include rising and dropping government expenditure on military defence, 
to military coups and revolutions (Brink, 2004:93). Generally military rule is accepted 
to have a negative correlation with economic development and often results in 
political regression. If an authoritarian regime is evident in a region, the political 
stability of that region is brought into question and as such the variable becomes 
important in the context of this study.  
 Religious fundamentalism/radical religious forces/religion in politics. Most 
frameworks include this variable in their analysis. The resurgence of the state and/or 
political inspired Islam fundamentalism and terror makes this a powerful indicator of 
political risk. From the Iranian revolution in 1978 onwards; Islamic fundamentalism 
seems at odds with capitalism and foreign investment. This variable may stem from 
the dominations of society and/or government by a single religious group that seeks to 
replace civil law with religious law and exclude other religions from the political 
and/or social classes. The risk from such situations range from inexperienced people 
imposing inappropriate policies, to civil dissent and civil war.  
Having extracted the major and regional political risk variables, they will now be 
operationalised and placed within a regional risk index to determine the political risk of the 
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Gulf of Guinea. To note again, no economic political risk variables have been included as it is 
not the purpose of this research to determine the economic security of any endeavour but 
instead to assess the validity of a venture in the Gulf of Guinea based on political and social 
variables.  
2.7. Operationalisation of synthesised major political risk variables for regional 
political risk analysis 
This study is analysing the conflict in the Niger Delta in order to assess the impact of this 
conflict on the regional political risk of the Gulf of Guinea. Besides the historical narrative 
that will be focused on in the next chapter, it is in essence primarily a political risk analysis. 
As such, for operational purposes, the above variables will have to be placed or ordered in a 
risk index in order to achieve this goal. In chapter four each of the above six variables will be 
rated as having either a low, medium, high or extreme risk to potential investors, based on 
purely qualitative analysis. The variables and what is to be considered to be a low, medium, 
high, or extreme risk, will be conceptualised and operationalised in the corresponding table.  
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   - If any of the variables receive an extreme rating, the overall risk rating will be extreme 
   - If two or more of the variables are rated as high, the overall risk rating will be high 
   - If none of the above is evident, the overall risk rating will be compiled by a majority rating 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk 
ratings  
 
Regional Risk variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extreme 
risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Medium 
risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Low risk 
Political 
stability/ (lack 
of) political 
will/law and 
order. 
Bad 
neighbours/ 
dependence on 
a foreign 
power/external 
conflict 
War, armed 
insurrections 
Ethnic/religious 
and/or 
politics/radical 
tensions social 
conflict, deep 
ideological 
cleavages. 
Authoritarianism/ 
undemocratic 
measures to retain 
power generals in 
power. 
Religious 
fundamentalism
/radical 
religious 
forces/religion 
in politics 
There is great 
political instability 
and widespread 
instances of political 
violence. 
Furthermore the 
future of many 
governments is 
uncertain. 
Governments are 
indifferent to their 
populations and 
political will is non-
existent. 
Region is in 
turmoil as 
countries within 
the region are 
severely affected 
by the hegemony. 
Violence is 
continuous with 
no signs of 
respite. 
The region is in a 
state of war. One 
or more countries 
are involved and 
sustained attacks 
have been 
widespread. 
One or many groups 
of ethnically or 
ideologically 
motivated 
organisations have 
has become 
involved in a 
liberation struggle or 
are motivated to 
change the current 
government. 
Violence is 
widespread and 
ethnically or 
ideologically based. 
An authoritarian 
and/or military regime 
is in place. There is 
great discontent and 
democratic ideals are 
suppressed. 
Religious forces are 
in power within a 
country and are 
shunning business. 
Politically the 
region is very 
unstable. Civil 
unrest, politically 
motivated 
violence, and 
lawlessness are 
evident. 
Governments 
performing poorly 
as almost no 
political will is 
evident. 
 
Countries within 
the region are 
under the negative 
influence of a 
regional 
hegemony. As 
well as having a 
history of unrest 
the region is 
currently 
experiencing 
violence. 
A country in the 
region is 
embroiled in a 
continuing 
insurgency with 
attacks being 
widespread. 
Governments and 
politics are 
ethnically based. 
Ideological and 
ethnic tensions are 
evident and unrest is 
being felt widely. 
There is a big threat 
that the military might 
take power and/or an 
authoritarian regime 
will be implemented. 
Religious 
fundamentalism is 
felt throughout the 
country or region. 
Western business is 
severely affected. 
Previous political 
instability, but no 
recent regime 
change with minor 
civil unrest. 
Government’s 
performance 
acceptable. 
Countries within a 
region have in the 
past been affected 
by a regional 
hegemony or are 
currently 
experiencing 
some mild spill-
over effects. The 
region has a 
history of unrest 
but is currently 
stable. 
In the past war 
and armed 
insurrection has 
been evident 
although no 
serious threat 
exists of violence 
flaring up again. 
Ethnic and/or 
ideological tensions 
have been felt in the 
past but currently 
their are sporadic 
instances of tensions 
but not to the 
determent of 
business. 
In the past 
authoritarianism 
and/or military rule 
was evident but 
currently the country 
is democratic and 
there is little evidence 
of reverting back to 
military or 
authoritarian rule. 
Religious 
fundamentalism 
plays a small role in 
a country Business 
is not direly 
affected. 
The region is 
politically stable 
with the rule of law 
being upheld as well 
as regime 
legitimacy. 
Governments within 
the region are 
performing well as 
political will is 
evident. 
 
Countries within 
the region are not 
influenced 
negatively by a 
regional 
hegemony. The 
region has no 
history of unrest 
or insecurity or 
continuous 
violence. 
 
The region is 
stable as 
governments do 
not indulge in 
arbitrary violence 
directly or 
indirectly against 
its own people. 
No ethnic or 
ideological tensions 
exist within a 
country. 
Governments cater 
for the needs of all 
equally. 
The country within the 
region is not 
authoritarian and there 
are currently no 
generals in power. 
Democracy is 
entrenched. 
There is no religious 
fundamentalism 
within a country or 
region. Business is 
not at all affected. 
Table I: Regional Risk index. 
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As noted in chapter one, this study will look at how the major risk variables as well as those 
chosen for their regional importance will impact the conflict in the Niger Delta and how this 
conflict affects the region. The above variables will be applied to the conflict in the Niger 
Delta so as to examine its affect on the political risk of the Gulf of Guinea. As one would 
notice many of these variables are somewhat interrelated. For example political stability/ 
(lack of) political will/ law and order is determined by assessing the rest of the variables. As 
such it is difficult to promote some variables above others in terms of importance for regional 
stability. For this reason all the above variables will be weighted equally.  
2.8. Conclusion  
The chapter’s aims were twofold. Firstly the concepts that are central to the study were 
conceptualised. These concepts are risk, political risk and country risk, regional security, and 
militias. They were chosen on the basis of their utility throughout the study. The second 
section of this chapter looked at four risk frameworks namely the EIU, BERI, BM, and 
ICRG. From these four risk frameworks the major risk variables and variables useful for 
regional political risk analysis were extracted and synthesized into six universal variables. 
The variables were chosen on their utility for regional risk analysis and their status as major 
risk variables.  For operational purposes the universal variables were placed in a regional risk 
index which both conceptualises the risk variables and also operationalises the risk rating of 
low risk, medium risk, high risk or extreme risk.  
In the next chapter the conflict in the Niger Delta, on which the premise of this study is built, 
will be analysed. The history of the conflict will be examined as well as the contending views 
concerning the trigger causes of the conflict. Chapter three aims to create a foundation on 
which chapter four will be built i.e. a background on which the impact of the conflict in the 
Niger Delta on the political risk analysis of the Gulf of Guinea can be assessed.  
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Chapter Three: Historical Narrative  
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to investigate the current conflict in the Niger Delta. Firstly, a brief history 
of the conflict will be provided, followed by an examination of the recent new trends before a 
conclusion is reached. 
Nigeria’s political and economic fortunes, and the country’s ability to play a stabilising role 
in the African region, partly depend on the resolution of the protracted Niger Delta conflict. 
The Niger Delta covers nine out of 36 states and 185 out of 774 local government areas of the 
Nigerian Federation (Ukiwo, 2009). A 2006 population census showed that 30 million out of 
the country’s 140 million people reside in the region. The region houses most of the country’s 
oil and gas reserves but paradoxically is still be least developed area in Nigeria.  
Oil and gas play an important part of the Nigerian economy, and a vital role in global energy 
security. Production of crude oil in the country began in December 1957. Currently Nigeria is 
the seventh largest producer of oil in the world (Stuijt, 2009). However to add to this the 
country has recently also become an important supplier of liquefied natural gas (LNG) of 
which some 4,007 trillion cubic meters are exported annually (Oyefusi, 2007:3). For the 
purposes of extraction six major oil companies presently dominate the Nigerian oil industry. 
These are Shell, Mobil, Chevron, Elf, Agip, and Texaco. In an effort to enhance its own 
industry while also increasing indigenous participation in the upstream sector, the Nigerian 
government granted 38 licenses to local companies between 1990 and 1994. These 
companies regrettably have been unable to register their presence in the Nigerian oil sector in 
any significant measure. Through their agent the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
(NNPC) which was established in 1971, the Nigerian government receive 57 percent of total 
crude oil, most of which is subsequently exported (Oyesfusi, 2007:4). Oil and gas are the 
lifeblood of the nation’s revenues, economy and national survival. These natural resources 
account for 40 percent of the nation’s GDP, and 70 percent of government revenues. 
Moreover in 2003 the oil and gas accounted for 80.6 percent of the total federal government 
receipts (Lawal in Ikelegbe, 2005:208).  
The Niger Delta region in Nigeria contains most of the country’s hydrocarbon deposits. By 
implication, the Delta holds the bulk of the economic resources that sustains the public 
treasury (Ibeanu, 2000:23). However this oil belt is embroiled in a resistance against the 
Nigerian state and the MNOC’s. Decades of oil exploitation, environmental degradation and 
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state neglect has created an impoverished, marginalised, and disgruntled citizenry which has 
produced a very effective youth resistance.  
3.2. The phases of the Niger Delta conflict 
According to Augustine Ikelegbe (2006), the Niger Delta experienced five distinct phases of 
struggle for environmental, social, and political equity and justice. For the historical purposes 
of this section, these five phases will be discussed in detail.  
The first phase, prior to independence, began as an agitation for special developmental 
attention because of the immense challenges posed by the unique ecology. Depending on 
definition, the Niger Delta region is the world’s largest wetland (Ibeanu, 2000:20). The 
wetland region comprises 36 000 square kilometres of marshland, creeks, tributaries, 
swamps, mangroves, and lowland rain forest which drains the Niger River into the Atlantic at 
the Bight of Biafra. In response to their challenging surroundings the locals wanted special 
protection and developmental guarantees. This in part led to the Willinkis Commission of 
1958. Its recommendation led to the creation of the Niger Delta Developmental Board 
(NDDB) being established in 1962. During this time local political leaders such as Harold 
Dappa Biriye of the Rivers Movement gave the grievances momentum (Ikelege, 2006:105). 
With the discovery and production of oil in 1957 the locals included the demand for their 
share of the oil wealth along with development of their region.  
The second phase was a brief militant one in 1966, stemming from the weakening of the 
NDDB and the continued underdevelopment and neglect of the region. Isaac Adaka Boro, 
then a former cadet sub-inspector, led a group of youths in the Delta Volunteer force (VLF) 
in a secessionist movement and declared a separate state of the ‘Niger Delta People Republic’ 
from Nigeria on the 23 of February 1966. The actions of the youths included arming militants 
and seizing and disruption of oil production. The VLF was suppressed and its leaders 
convicted for treason.   
The third phase from the 1970’s saw disparate, un-coordinated and localised conflicts by host 
communities against the MNOCs. The communities after experiencing decades of state 
neglect and poverty amidst the oil boom in the 1970s began to direct their grievances against 
the culprits in their view, the MNOC’s. They demanded basic infrastructure such as roads, 
electricity, pipe borne water, and health and education facilities. Further they demanded 
compensation for the damage done by the oil spillage to their crops and croplands, while also 
protesting at the lack of oil spill cleanup operations. During this time most action taken by the 
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locals was non-violent and peaceful, involving community based protests, blocking of access 
roads to oil facilities and occupation of the oil facilities. 
The fourth phase between 1990 and 1996 was firstly brought on by the MNOC’s, and the 
Nigerian state’s lack of action concerning the local community’s grievances. To add further 
insult to injury, the state who backed the MNOC’s had become more repressive against the 
local agitation through attacks and murders. The increased awareness of the environmental 
degradation and the state perpetuated injustices in the region led to the Niger Delta people 
organising the struggle through civil, community, ethnic and regional groupings. The 
annulment of the 1993 presidential elections (and the ensuing crisis), also added to the 
tensions within the region and consequently led to the formation of more groups. The first 
major group was the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) which led the 
Ogoni people in massive environmental protests against Shell’s environmental degradation. 
The Ogoni Bill of Rights in August 1990 contained demands which included compensation, 
environmental remediation and ethnic autonomy (Ikelegbe, 2006:106).  
Other groups emerged which addressed the political dimensions of the struggle for increased 
attention, resource allocation and the redress of inequalities in political representation. The 
heightened awareness that was being sparked throughout the region led to a constitutional 
conference of 1994-1995 in which the groups won the concession of an increased allocation 
of 13 percent of oil revenues based on the derivation principle. However this success was 
marred by an increased repression from the state particularly against the Ogoni. The Ogoni 
region was militarised and kept under tight reigns. In 1995, after a botched trial, nine leaders 
of the MOSOP struggle, including its leader Ken Saro Wiwa were hanged. Instead of 
suppressing the conflict which was the ultimate aim of the government, they only achieved in 
escalating and radicalising it. It is common understanding that the annulment of the 1993 
elections led to the formation of ethnic militias in Nigeria (Agbu 2004, Sesay et al 2003), 
however, the ethnic militias formed in the Niger Delta arose for different aims and reasons 
and as such it can be argued the 1993 annulment was merely a trigger cause (Adebanwi 2004, 
Ukiwo 2007).  
The fifth and final phase has been characterised by a massive mobilisation of the 
communities and the people by communal, ethnic, pan ethnic and regional groups, the 
activism and concern of civil, human and environmental rights groups and the political class, 
youth militancy and ethnic militias, massive disruptions of oil production and violent 
44 
 
confrontations (Ikelegbe, 2001). This phase of the conflict is also characterised by numerous 
shifts of attitude and behaviour of the Delta communities. Firstly the activism has been taken 
over by the youths and secondly the shift of focus from accommodative agitations to those of 
self determination, self governance and greater political autonomy.  
 
Finally the shift from the MNOC’s to the state as a target of agitation has been realised. The 
demands have become largely environmental and political, including self-determination, true 
federalism, and resource control, state-restructuring through a national sovereign conference, 
the abrogation of obnoxious laws, environmental remediation and reparation for ecological 
devastation (Ikelegbe, 2006:106).  For the purposes of this study, the final stage of the Niger 
Delta conflict will be further explored, especially the new and emerging trends. The increase 
in mobilisation in the Niger Delta has led directly to increased insecurity within the region 
and could potentially lead to a heightened sense of political risk of the Gulf of Guinea.  
3.3. Youth militancy in the Niger Delta 
In terms of development, the Niger Delta remains the poorest region in Nigeria. The region 
has seen little of its oil wealth which was used to build up the rest of the country. The road to 
militancy was inevitable. It is ascribed to state repression, compounded by the fact that oil 
exploitation has brought environmental pollution, ecological disasters and socio-economic 
deprivation (Ikelgebe, 2006: 107). It has wasted scarce land and fishing waters, and 
dislocated primary occupations, culture and communal governance, creating no direct benefit 
or participation in the oil activities. The annulment of the 1993 presidential elections won by 
the late chief M.K.O Abiola who did not belong to the dominant Hausa-Fulani brought into 
light lopsidedness of the Nigerian Federation. This raised the issue of true federalism which 
embodied a national conference of ethnic nationalities as part of the democratic, liberal and 
state reform struggle as well as that oppressed and marginalised nationalities.   
 
As the Niger Delta crisis became part of the democratic struggle and concern of civil 
democratic groups and activists, the youth became emboldened and made their actions more 
consequential. The state response to these actions was severe, and as the youths lost more and 
more confidence in their traditional power structures, they decided to break away from their 
elders’ advice and guidance. State repression, instead of instilling fear and weakening the 
resolve of communities, only achieved in radicalising the youth. Militancy was the only 
option available to them, as traditional dialogue between the various concerned parties 
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became too ineffective for their liking. The youth militias have severely contributed to the 
Niger Delta conflict and politics. They have articulated ethnic interests while also 
campaigning for a greater share of the oil wealth. However, more importantly in the context 
of this study, they have contributed immensely to the heightening of conflicts, violence, 
insecurity and instability in the region, as community based militias even sometimes fight 
their traditional rules, elders and traditional governance structures over spoils from the 
MNOCs of divergences of opinions (Ikelegbe, 2005:106). 
3.3.1. The Ijaw youth struggle 
In the Niger Delta youth militancy was inaugurated by the Ijaw ethnic group. The Ijaw are 
arguably Nigeria’s fourth largest ethnic group and occupy the coastal fringes of vast sections 
of Southern Nigeria (Ukiwo, 2007: 591). They are indigenous to six states in the country and 
constitute political minorities in all but one of these states. One reason ascribed to the fact 
that the Ijaw were the first to aggressively pursue their interests is because, although they are 
a national minority, in the Delta region they are the largest ethnic group and as such have the 
largest base of unemployed and uneducated youths. The first signs of generalised youth 
restiveness and emerging militancy were the emergence of youth groups who challenged the 
traditional leaderships to assert their place and roles in the communities and in the struggle.  
 
These youth groups proliferated across clans and kingdoms of the Ijaw ethnic group. The 
second main development was the formation of numerous civil youth groups which spanned 
communities and sometimes ethnic groups, and the direction of their objectives and activity 
toward the oil economy. Prominent among these civil youth groups were the Chicio 
Movement and the Movement for the survival of the Izon Ethnic nationality (Ikelegbe, 
2006:109). The youth militancy signalled huge changes in the Niger Delta struggle. The 
youths took direct action against the MNOC’s and the state; they transformed the object of 
agitation from the socio-economic demands of development to political dimensions of 
resolving conflict. The youth militancy also placed the human and environmental rights 
dimensions of the conflict in the public eye. The youths disrupted oil flows and state 
revenues, to draw national and international attention to themselves and their respective 
causes.  Soon a wider range of actions were undertaken, which included confrontations with 
security agents, kidnapping of MNOC staff and hijacking of MNOCs helicopters and boats. 
The militant youth activism and the accompanying intense repression and militarization of 
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the region that ensued led to what Ikelegbe (2006:110) refers to ‘militia-ization ‘of the 
struggle.  
3.4. A profile of the Niger Delta militias   
There are several militant youth groups operating in the Niger Delta region. Within the Ijaw 
ethnic group, there are the Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities (FNDIC), Movement for 
the survival of the Ijaw Ethnic Nationality (MOSIEND), the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), 
Niger Delta Resistance Movement (NDRM) and the Niger Delta Oil Producing Communities 
Development Organisation, to name but a few. The IYC was conceived as an umbrella 
organisation of Ijaw youth associations at the grassroots. The group shot to prominence in 
1998 with the historic Kaiama Declaration of December of that year outlining the position of 
the Ijaw youths on the present frameworks for oil exploitation and marginalisation of the Ijaw 
in the Nigerian federation (Ukiwo, 2007:601). While most of the groups remained largely 
anonymous to the general public, two became particularly prominent. These are the Egbesu 
boys of Africa and the FNDIC.  
3.4.1. The Egbesu Boys  
The Egbesu is the fighting arm of most militant Ijaw groups coordinated by the IYC 
(Ikelegbe, 2006:112). Having said this, the Egbesu are not a closely knit organisation as its 
members or initiates are in fact members of various militant groups. The Egdesu Boys gained 
public attention during the military onslaught that followed the Kaiama Declaration, in which 
there grew a perception that its members, who were protected by the Ijaw deity Egbesu, were 
invulnerable to bullets (Ukiwo, 2007:602). The fact that one of its leaders, who had resigned 
from the Nigerian army after a peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone and freely granted 
interviews also led to the groups’ prominence in the Niger Delta. He and other ex-soldiers 
had allegedly procured a vast amount of weapons for the Egbesu Boys.  
 
The Egbesu Boys’ role in the struggle is not through itself as an organised and cohesive 
militia, but through its initiates in the various affiliate groups of the IYC.  As such, it is 
difficult to assign any specific action or encounters to the Egbesu as a militia group because 
most militant actions of the Ijaw in relation to the state, oil companies and other ethnic 
groups have been undertaken by the Egbesu in different militant organisations. The Egbesu 
have been the vanguard of armed conflicts involving the Ijaw youths. In 1998 they stormed 
the Bayelsa Government house to free MOSIEND president Timi Ogoruba, in the later 
months of 1998 and early 1999 they clashed with government forces in Mbiama, Yenagoa, 
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Kaiama and other towns in Bayelsa state which precipitated the declaration of the state of 
emergency in January 1999 (Ikelegbe, 2006:112).  Furthermore, they fought in numerous 
ethnically motivated clashes with the Itsekeri in the Delta State and the IIaje in the Ondo 
State. There have been two organised groups of the Egbesu militias. The first is the Niger 
Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) and the second the Supreme Egbesu Assembly (SEA). The 
former group will be looked at for the purposes of this study.  
3.4.2. The Evolution of MEND 
The most prominent group in the Niger Delta conflict was the FNDIC, who were originally 
known as the Niger Delta Volunteer force (NDVF) but decided to change their name in 2001 
when Mujahid Asari Dokubo, president of the IYC established the Niger Delta Peoples 
Volunteer Force (NDPVF) after his controversial tenure (Ukiwo, 2007:603). The FNDIC rose 
to prominence in 1997 when it mobilised youths to attack and occupy 13 Itsekiri villages 
which they believed the Itsekiri had no right to. In 2003, the group went further and were 
alleged to have killed dozens of civilians in three Itsekiri villagers. They claimed the villages 
were a base from which the Itsekiri attacked FNDIC activists. What distinguished the FNDIC 
from other groups was that it combined violent activity with media mobilisation strategies.  
 
Initially, the FNDIC embarked on a newspaper and internet campaign to draw attention to 
what they perceived as an attack on the Ijaw sovereignty. The FNDIC claimed that the 
communal conflicts between the Ijaw and the Itsekiri are consequences of the divide and rule 
strategies employed by the Nigerian state and the MNOC’s. Additionally, they claimed that 
government forces stationed in Warri to keep the peace were biased in favour of the Itsekiri. 
On this basis they justified the war declared by the Ijaw youth on the Nigerian security 
forces, Shell and Chevron-Texaco. In this task the FNDIC had seemed to have learnt from the 
experiences of the other groups in the region. For example, the four principle leaders always 
sign paid newspaper adverts and internet publications, these are Hon Chief (Dr) Bello Oboko, 
Hon George Timinimi, Kingsley Otuaro ESQ, Comrade Dan Ekpebide (Ukiwo, 2007:604). 
The multiple signatories were intended to show that the FNDIC were an organised group, and 
not another bunch of disgruntled youths, a charge that has often been made against other 
groups. As well as courting external audiences, the FNDIC also seek to mobilise the 
sentiments of the Ijaw. The efficiency of these strategies soon manifested itself in the rising 
profile of the leaders of the FNDIC among their people and in government and oil company 
circles. The FNDIC helped the government maintain a level of peace in the Delta through 
48 
 
mediation while the organisations leaders they were also being patronised. In 2000/1 
Chevron-Texaco funded Oboko to undertake a one year MSc course in Environmental 
Science at an American university. Shell also reportedly offered the FNDIC lucrative security 
contracts. It comes as no surprise that when MEND took expatriate oil workers hostage in 
February 2006, both the federal government and the FNDIC officials negotiated their release.  
 
Along with the rise of the FNDIC as an organisation, its president Oboko also became a 
prominent figure in the Niger Delta conflict. His involvement in numerous government 
sanctioned meetings led to his removal as head of the FNDIC in 2006. The charges were that 
he had become entangled with the government and no longer had the best interest of the Ijaw 
at heart. Following the killing of 15 suspected militants by the Nigerian security forces in 
August 2006, Oboko was able to re-launch himself as the champion of the Ijaw. 
Consequently the FNDIC officially acclaimed representative of the Ijaw of Warri. For 
instance on the 25 of November 2006 FNDIC represented the Ijaw of Warri in a peace 
agreement aimed at guaranteeing the re-entry of Shell and the Nigerian Gas Company, a 
subsidiary of the NNPC, to some Ijaw communities in Warri (Ukiwo, 2007:605).  
 
This trend where the Nigerian government has been able to tame and sometimes co-opt 
popular organisations, led to the formation of MEND and has influenced its strategies. In 
2005 MEND announced its existence shortly after the arrest of Asari Dokubo on treason 
charges. Furthermore the humiliation and impeachment and detention of Governor Deopreye 
Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa State and the arrest and detention of Chief Ebitimi Banigo, an 
Ijaw Businessman who provided employment for hundreds of Ijaw youths, was seen as an 
attempt to humiliate the Ijaw nation. Against this backdrop MEND emerged as the new face 
of the conflict in the Niger Delta. It is thought that MEND arose due to some of the militia 
groups, like the FNDIC being corrupted by the government and losing track of their ideals.   
  
MEND operates in collaboration with other militant groups throughout the Niger Delta. 
Through such an alliance, the organisation has been able to extend its influence to other parts 
of the Niger Delta. Although it emerged from the backwaters of Warri, the organisation has 
been able to effectively network with several militant organisations and has taken up 
agitations of the Niger Delta people for resource control and wider struggles in Nigeria for 
democracy and good governance. Like FNDIC, MEND has perfected the use of the internet 
to fight its causes. Most of its threats and demands are contained in emails sent to the 
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newspapers and posted on the web. The group has been effective in attracting international 
attention to the plight of the Ijaw trough this medium (Obi, 2008). MEND as tried to distance 
itself from the local political class and the ransoming of foreign workers, and tapping into 
local idioms, symbols and grievances, to embed itself in the people’s consciousness. It has 
however gained international notoriety by its threats to cripple the Nigerian oil exports.  
 
While it has targeted foreign oil workers, it has released all such hostages after a period, 
giving credence to the view that they are used to draw international attention to the injustices 
in the region, seen as an important aspect in globalising local resistance in the Niger Delta. In 
an interview by Brian Ross (2007 in Obi, 2008) Jomo Gbomo, the spokesperson of MEND 
elucidated on the objectives of the group:  
 
‘The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is an amalgam of all arm bearing 
groups in the Niger Delta fighting for the control of oil revenue by indigenes of the Niger Delta who 
have has relatively no benefits from the exploitation of our mineral resources by the Nigerian 
government and oil companies over the last fifty years.’  
 
It would appear that MEND’s anger is against the government and the control over oil 
resources, which in tandem are held responsible for the plunder and pollution of the Niger 
Delta. Although the militant group has recently been affected by factionalism following three 
developments, the release of Asari Dokubo, leader of the NDPVF from prison in June 2007, 
the election of Jonathan Goodluck (of Ijaw ethnicity) as Nigeria’s Vice president in 2007 and 
the arrest and detention in Angola of Henry Okah aka Jomo Gbomo, the core of MEND 
seems to have remained resolute and steadfast in its aims and ambitions.   
 
Consistent with its insistence on remaining consistently rebellious in action and character, 
MEND rarely negotiates directly with the government. The militant group saw that Dokubo 
was arrested six months after he had been a guest of the previous president of Nigeria, 
Olusegun Obasanjo in Abuja and since then have been suspicious of the government.  To 
demonstrate that it is actuated by the agitations for self determination and resource control, 
MEND requires its chosen mediators to publicise and popularise its missions and objectives 
to critical national and international audiences. It is not only the negotiators that are expected 
to carry the message of MEND to the outside world, but also the hostages the organisations 
takes who are subjected to indoctrination during their periods of confinement. It is speculated 
50 
 
that MEND does not exchange hostages for money, as they see them as bargaining tools to 
actualise the political objectives of the Niger Delta people. The movement claims that it 
depends on support that it receives from the people whose concern it advances, and has 
denied all involvement in oil bunkering (siphoning of oil from pipelines and illicit sale in 
unconventional markets). However, the sheer size of the economy of conflict estimated at the 
theft of about 100 000 barrels of oil a day (Ikelegbe, 2005:209) makes these claims 
unconvincing. Another source of income, in which MEND also denies involvement, is 
hostage taking that has become a prominent feature in the conflict. Between January 2006 
and March 2007 militants abducted well over 100 oil-sector employees. An active ransom 
market has emerged that has brought considerable financial resources to various militia 
groups. The rising level of hostage taking has made oil companies increasingly aware of risks 
in the region, and more reluctant to send out repair crews to sabotaged or ruptured pipelines. 
This contributes to the enduring shut down of oil production. 
 
In 2007, the temporary truce declared between MEND and the Nigerian state in mid 2006 
collapsed, resulting in the further deterioration of the security situation in the Niger Delta 
(Obi, 2008). In 2007 MEND and their affiliates targeted Shell, Agip and Chevron, leading to 
the shut down of 27 percent or 675 000 bpd out of Nigeria’s estimated daily production of 2.4 
million bpd the highest levels since the crisis began. However, the most recent figures for 
January 2008 indicate that the current crude oil shut‐in has increased from 600,000 to 1 
million bpd, thereby suggesting a worsening of losses linked to the tensions and conflicts in 
the Niger Delta (Lawal 2008). Apart form the huge loss of oil revenue and profits, numerous 
civilians and military personnel have lost their lives. 
 
3.5. The current situation in the Niger Delta
2
  
When President Umara Yar’Adua was inaugurated as president in Nigeria in 2007 he 
undertook to deliver on his campaign promise; to resolve the Niger Delta crisis within the 
first 100 days of his office. Ironically he fared worse than his predecessor Obasanjo in the 
resolution of the conflict. He set up a committee headed by Ledurn Mitee to brainstorm 
possible solutions to the crisis, the report of which he refused to implement (Amor, 2009). He 
further created a phantom ministry of the Niger Delta Affairs and allocated to it a paltry N51 
billion whereas he approved N89 billion for the improvement of the Abuja/lokoja road.  Even 
                                                          
2
 The limitation this study puts on the use of source material is June/July 2009 and as such this deals with up to 
date information until that time.  
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as he authorised military onslaught on Ijaw communities in the Delta State, Yar’Adua is yet 
to release over N300 billion to the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), the 
agency tasked with developing the Niger Delta taking over from the NDDB. This money is 
still being held by the presidency.   
Against this backdrop, the security situation in the Niger Delta is tense and fragile as law and 
order as traditional authority systems and community governance structures have been 
severely eroded due to government neglect and social crisis. They have been replaced by 
militias and security rackets that trade protection for cash. Local government institutions have 
had little impact on the lives of the citizenry, and are seem to exist only on paper. The 
magnitude of military deployments in the region indicates in stark terms that the Niger Delta 
is, despite the counterclaims by government, in a state of war. Unfortunately, the massive 
troop deployments have only had a minimal impact, if any, on security in the region (Ukiwo, 
2009). Moreover, there seems to be a gradual departure from the intra-delta ethnic rivalries 
that had historically weakened solidarities for pro delta initiatives.  
Most ethnic minorities and stakeholders are now rallying around ideas of self determination 
and resource controls. However there have been counterclaims to this new found solidarity. 
According to Strategic forecasting
3
 (2007) MEND is splintering instead of consolidating. 
Attacks against oil interests in the Niger Delta are often attributed to MEND. It is conversely 
more likely that many attacks are carried out by groups that operate under the MEND banner 
by no longer feel compelled to report to central leadership. MEND is no longer the 
coordinated organisation it once was, as evidenced by its weakened ability to carry out large-
scale attacks. Rather it has become a loose cooperation of criminal gangs and cult groups that 
seek control of trade routes and certain communities in the Niger Delta. The lack of 
leadership with Henry Okah being detained, has left a gap from which two potential new 
heads can rise, either Government Tompolo who is believed to be the leader of MENDs Delta 
State faction or Prince Farah Ipalibo of the Niger Delta Strike Force.  
                                                          
3
 According to their website, STRATFOR is the world's leading online publisher of geopolitical intelligence. 
The global team of intelligence professionals provides members with insights into political, economic, and 
military developments to reduce risks, to identify opportunities, and to stay aware of happenings around the 
globe. 
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Criminal activities draw attention to the attacks on international firms. These attacks can 
broadly be divided into three categories: militant political activists, criminal thugs and 
community bounty hunters (BRS, 2007). There is often a thin overlapping line between these 
groups. Many coastal cities in the Gulf of Guinea have experienced criminally motivated 
attacks from militant groups. Banks are usually targeted, and thus far the raids have been very 
successful. Assaults on banks in Benin, Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea point to organised 
crime instead of politically motivated violence. Furthermore a strong economy of oil 
bunkering and hostage taking has taken precedent over politics. Many militant groups are 
seemingly deviating from the political course and attempting to enrich themselves as opposed 
to their communities. These trends suggest the individuated workings of rebel groups seeking 
self-enrichment, rather than the fight for the rights and riches many believe is their birthright. 
As such the transformation from militant groups to criminal organisations has spread through 
the Niger Delta and consequently the Gulf of Guinea.   
3.6. Regional concerns  
The ultimate concern of this study is to determine impact of the conflict in the Niger Delta on 
the regional political risk of the Gulf of Guinea. In its most recent phase of the conflict, the 
politics of local resistance has been decisively violent. The new trend in the Niger Delta is 
also feeding into the global securitisation of the region and the surrounding Gulf of Guinea, 
whereby the international community, particularly the United States (US) is concerned about 
its energy security interests and a possible contagion effect of the volatile Niger Delta on its 
maritime commercial and strategic interests in West Africa (Obi, 2008). Apart from the 
billions of dollars worth of oil investment by the US oil companies, and the safety of 
American oil workers, the entry of oil companies from China, Indian and Brazil Malaysia and 
Korea into the region is perceived as a threat by some US policy makers.  
In Nigeria the Delta’s insurgents and criminals have proven time and again their capacity for 
planning and executing attacks against foreign shipping and offshore installations. They have 
on occasion succeeded on their own merit, sometimes with the help of corrupt company 
insiders as well as officers within the security forces (BRS, 2009). The Nigerian attacks for 
political reasons involve heavily armed militants launching seaborne sabotage attacks on 
facilities and vessels. In an unprecedented attack in June 2008 MEND managed to attack 
Shell’s Bongo oilfield some 100km offshore. Some oil executives of the smaller oil industries 
who operate closer to shore and are vital to the offshore industry have considered 
withdrawing from the area if the recent rise in piracy is not checked (CRI, 2009).  
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Although a lot of attention has been placed on the piracy of the coast of Somalia, the Gulf of 
Guinea has become an increasingly vulnerable spot for offshore attacks. Nigeria’s coastal 
waters ranked second highest in the world in the number of piracy attacks in the first quarter 
of 2009 when seven piracy incidents were recorded- unconfirmed reports indicated at least 
another 13 had occurred (CRI, 2009). Although piracy incidents off the coast of West Africa 
are more prevalent in the Nigerian coastal waters and near the financial capital of Lagos, 
recent incidents have also been recorded off the coast of Benin, Cameroon, and Equatorial 
Guinea (CRI, 2009).  Piracy attacks in the Gulf of Guinea are carried out for either political 
or criminal reasons and often tend to be deadly and destructive. Cameroon’s coastal waters 
have also seen a number of piracy attacks, most committed by rebels opposed to a deal with 
Nigeria that signed the oil rich Bakassi peninsula over to Cameroon, which will be discussed 
below.  In 2009 At least six attacks on vessels and oil facilities were recorded in Cameroon 
coastal waters. Elsewhere seaborne gunmen attacked Equatorial Guinea’s capital of Malabo 
in February 2009 shooting their way into the presidential palace before they were repelled by 
armed forces. Although the government has blamed the attacks on MEND the organisations’ 
spokesperson denied involvement.  
3.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a historical narrative of the Niger Delta conflict, offering a basis 
on which a political risk analysis of the Gulf of Guinea can be built. What the chapter has 
shown is that the intense violence that has become an almost daily occurrence with far 
reaching national and regional ramifications (BRS, 2007, Obi 2008, CRI 2009). The violence 
is underpinned by the high stakes involved and a deeply felt sense of grievance arising from 
perceived injustices which have not adequately been addressed by the federal state, in spite of 
vast earning from oil. Most of the wealth has not been invested within the country, 
contributing to most Nigerians living below the poverty line, and to the deepening social 
crisis whose effects can be seen in the cities and villages of Africa’s most populous country 
and leading oil exporter (Obi, 2008). Evidence shows that the conflicts have complex causes 
that even mutate over time in response to various factors and force and defy the simplistic 
explanations or ‘quick fixes’. Failure to recognise the historical specifications and dynamic of 
each conflict tend to aggravate those involved. As pointed out in this chapter, this violence 
has spread as a result of government failure and ineptitude. What should have been dealt with 
years ago was allowed to boil over. It is now not only affecting the Delta region, but almost 
the whole of the Gulf of Guinea.  
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Chapter Four: The Political Risk of the Gulf of Guinea 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to determine the political risk of the Gulf of Guinea. As noted in the first 
chapter the central research question is concerned with the impact of the conflict in the Niger 
Delta on the political risk of the Gulf of Guinea. As such the regional risk index which was 
developed in chapter two will be applied to the conflict in the Niger Delta.  Using the risk 
index, which conceptualised the rating system each of the six variables will be rated as either 
having a low risk, medium risk, high risk, or extreme risk. Following from this regional 
impact of the conflict can be determined. A complete explanation as to how the risk rating is 
derived will be provided under each of the variable headings. Finally chapter four will end 
with an evaluation of the political risk findings.  
4.2. Conducting risk analysis 
When analysing risk, a rational choice approach is not enough (Fouche, 2003:19). According 
to Vertzberger (1998:5), a more sophisticated, contingent and empirically grounded theory of 
risk judgement and risk-preference formation is required. Vertzberger (1998:5) argues that 
decision maker should be able to: 
 Be aware of and understand all variables impinging on the outcomes of investment; 
 Correctly and coherently assimilate such variables in producing and integrated 
evaluation; and  
 Know the potential biases that may affect their analysis of the variables.  
Furthermore, all relevant contingencies, prepared plans and standard operating procedures 
must be continually and rapidly adjusted before they become outdated and irrelevant because 
of a high level of risk, indeterminacy and uncertainty.  
4.3. Major and regional risk variables  
4.3.1. Political stability/ (lack of) political will/law and order 
Nigeria is potentially a regional hegemon that could bring stability to the region because of 
its vast population size and relative importance to the world economy. According to Ayoob 
(1995:142) regional hegemons must possess not only the military but also the economic 
means and the domestic political capacity to sustain a dominant regional role over a relatively 
long period of time. Nigeria, with its unstable political situation, especially evident in the 
Delta, is however a very weak candidate for the role of regional manager, despite its lead in 
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deploying ECOWAS forces into Liberia in August 1990, following the outbreak of civil war 
in that country. The country’s ability to become a regional stabilising force, depends on the 
resolution of the lingering Niger Delta conflict (Ukiwo, 2009). The protracted conflict is 
costing the government millions of dollars deploying security forces in the region and in lost 
oil revenue. Due to government neglect the traditional authority structures have been severely 
eroded. The formal state structure and local councils have little impact on the populace. Such 
government structures only exist of paper, and are disregarded by communities.  
To fill the vacuum left by a reduced state capacity, numerous protection rackets and militias 
arose, bartering security for cash while also trying to acquire their share of the oil wealth. A 
regime of state repression and corporate violence has generated further criminal hostility, 
lawlessness, and insecurity within the Delta. The area is saturated by a proliferation of arms 
and institutions of violence, ranging from the Nigerian Armed forces to community, ethnic, 
youth militias, armed gangs and criminal networks, pirates and protection rackets (Ikelegbe, 
2005: 208). The extent at which the military is involved in the region indicates that the Niger 
Delta is in a state of war. However, these troop deployments have only the minimal 
stabilising effect.  Despite numerous assaults by the Joint Task Force (JTF), a force tasked 
with maintaining order in the region, the topography of the Delta is such that the militants can 
easily escape and reform.  
As noted in the previous chapter, the (lack of) political will refers to poor plan performance 
and the growing gap between plan formulation and implantation which can be attributed to 
the lack of commitment and political will on the part of many developing country leaders and 
decision makers. The political will to resolve the conflict in the Niger Delta by the various 
administrations in Nigeria has been somewhat of a paradox. Under President Olusegun 
Obasanjo the situation was, albeit not deliberately, allowed to spiral out of control. What is 
disturbing is that what started as genuine agitation by citizens in the Delta for a fair share in 
the management and control of the resource which has caused the ecological devastation of 
their land had been allowed to escalate into a shooting war with its attendant consequences. 
This despite the fact that several meetings between stakeholders and the government had 
been held to identify issues of critical importance and to proffer solutions that could ensure 
enduring peace in the region. Initially, stakeholders saw these meetings as a remarkable effort 
which helped dispel doubts and misgivings about the determination of government to initiate 
appropriate measure toward and amelioration of the distressful conditions of the massively 
devastated Delta basin, however it soon became clear that peace was inevitable while oil 
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exploration proceeded unhampered for as long as the promised intervention of government 
was being awaited (Amor, 2009).  
The situation soon spiralled out of control when Obasanjo submitted the NDDC bill to the 
National Assembly proposing to fund the agency through a formula that the lawmakers found 
inadequate. The National Assembly eventually passed the bill into law after it overrode 
Obasanjos veto following his rejection of the amended version. Subsequent engagements 
between government and stakeholders, usually after violent flare-ups, were followed with 
assurances that where never kept by the central authorities. Following this, since President 
Umaru Yar’Adua came to power in 2007, his response to the regions troubles, like his 
predecessor has been incoherent, indecisive and unproductive (Moncrieff, 2009). In the first 
few months of his administration, he proposed a Niger Delta Summit, which after months of 
lengthy preparations never took place.  
 
In September, 2008, he established a Technical Committee to review options for resolving 
the crisis. In December 2008, the committee submitted a report to the president 
recommending amnesty for militant leaders within a comprehensive demobilisation, 
disarmament and rehabilitation (DDR) program; an increased allocation of oil revenue to the 
Delta; urgent improvement of infrastructure and human welfare services; and new institutions 
for the region’s longer term development (ICG, 2009). While the document did not address 
all the aspects of the crisis, its proposals were sufficiently comprehensive to serve as a 
catalyst. The Technical Committee also urged the government to issue a white paper by 1 
January 2009 outlining strategies for rapid implementation of its recommendations. 
Yar’Adua’s statement at the time, that the government would implement those 
recommendations it found ‘acceptable’ raised apprehensions in the Delta and across civil 
society that it would carry out only those recommendations what was politically convenient. 
Aside from some as yet unspecified plans for amnesty for Delta militants, nothing has been 
done. Instead Yar’Adua has decided to defeat the Niger Delta insurgency militarily, 
increasing the manpower and equipment to the JTF.  The increased military presence has 
sparked some of the most violent confrontations in the Delta’s recent history. Furthermore 
thousands of people have fled their homes to escape the violence (Walker, 2009). The 
military are determined to stop the sabotage of oil installations and kidnappings, but some 
reports indicate that numerous civilians have died in this effort. However, it is almost 
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impossible to verify the amount of civilian deaths since the military are not releasing any 
figures.  
 
In a regional context, the area the Niger Delta finds itself in, has been an arena of continuous 
instability, internal turmoil and cross border conflicts. In a broader sense, the internal 
instability of Nigeria, the 25 year long civil war in Angola, the turmoil in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo since the mid 1990’s, the repeated internal conflicts in the Republic of 
the Congo and in the Central African Republic, as well as the numerous failed coup attempts 
in Equatorial Guinea have created an area in which business can potentially suffer. While the 
conflicts have involved local regimes, opposition forces, and rebels, the security situation has 
been complicated and exacerbated by external influence driven by geopolitical and economic 
interests.  
 
In many cases natural resources have been at the centre of cross-border tensions between 
producing countries. One such example in the Gulf of Guinea is Gabon, laying claim to the 
small island of Mbanie which has important oil reserves (Mane, 2005). The island was 
previously regarded as territory of Equatorial Guinea according to colonial maps. The dispute 
between the two countries has been evident since 1972, when Gabon's army chased 
Equatorial Guinea fighters from Mbanie (Afrol News, 2009). In order to resolve the dispute 
the United Nations (UN) secretary general Ban Ki-moon has appointed Swiss legal expert 
Nicolas Michel as a special adviser and mediator, 
 
The Gulf of Guinea has not experienced conflict on the scale as many other countries in 
Africa, however the region has been a hotspot for instability. A valid concern is the example 
being set by the Nigerian insurgents. With recent oil and gas finds throughout the Gulf many 
disgruntled youths might simply follow the successful example set by the Niger Delta 
militants. Furthermore the transition from politically motivated violence to criminal attacks 
has exacerbated an already restive area. Crime as an occupation is experienced in most 
countries in the Gulf of Guinea.  Benin, Nigeria and Cameroon all have high instance of 
violent crime (OSAC, 2009). Cameroon has in the past four years had a surged of violence 
mostly attributed to the militants in Nigeria. In 2008 in Cameroons coastal city of Limbe, six 
militants reportedly used explosives to break into four banks seizing sums large sums of 
money, and then barricading roads leading into the coastal town before being repulsed by 
Cameroonian soldiers and fleeing back to their boats. The raid was at least the third of this 
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kind in less than a year on the banks of the Gulf of Guinea, while countries after Benin and 
Equatorial Guinea saw similar incidents. Assaults of this kind, against banks in countries 
neighbouring Nigeria, indicate that the militants have seemingly moved away from their 
politically motivated goals in favour of self enrichment ones. 
With Nigeria’s president Yar’Adua at the helm of the regional trading bloc ECOWAS4, and 
the natural leadership that the country could accept in the region, it is firmly able to 
determine its own future within the region. As such, it is mostly up to Nigeria to decrease the 
prevalent insecurity throughout the Gulf of Guinea. The country is unfortunately unable to 
address its own problems most notably the conflict in the Gulf of Guinea and thus is in no 
position to combat the rising political insecurity in the region.  
Using the risk index derived at in chapter two the Political stability/ (lack of) political 
will/law and order of the Niger Delta is rated as high as the region is very unstable, civil 
unrest, politically motivated violence, and lawlessness are evident. Governments performing 
poorly as almost no political will is evident law and order are seemingly ignored as numerous 
protection rackets and militia groups are vying for oil wealth. The sheer amount of military 
personnel in the region acknowledges the level of instability in the Delta. Although outwardly 
the federal government are seeking solutions to the protracted conflict, it would seem that the 
committees set up to investigate the situation, are ignored. As well as having a localised 
impact on stability, the conflict in the Niger Delta also has regional implications which will 
be investigated further below under the Bad neighbours/dependence on a foreign 
power/external conflict, and war, armed insurrection variables. Nigeria being the regions’ 
most obvious regional stabiliser has to find a way to effectively end the conflict in the Delta 
and assume its role as regional hegemon. Its success in this venture relies on the country’s 
ability to deal with its internal instability.  
4.2.2. Bad neighbours/dependence on a foreign power/external conflict  
Although the Niger Delta is a prime example of a bad neighbour or a hostile foreign power 
this analysis will look at the affect the rest of the Gulf of Guinea has on it. The variable bad 
neighbours/dependence on a foreign power/external conflict examines whether the country in 
question is under the influence of either a superpower or a regional hegemon. This variable 
                                                          
4
 ECOWAS is a regional bloc that aims to promote co-operation and integration in economic, social, and 
cultural activity, ultimately leading to the establishment of an economic and monetary union through the total 
integration of the national economies of member states (African Union, 2009).Currently Nigeria’s president 
Yar’Adua is sitting in the leadership position of ECOWAS.  
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also includes trouble spots which are explained as regions which have a history of unrest or 
insecurity.   
Nigeria has the biggest economy in the region as well as the largest population. By definition 
the country is the regional hegemon, although it is currently not functioning as one. What 
makes the country even more important is its role as a stabiliser of energy security for the 
world market. The country supplies the US with 15 percent of its oil needs while being the 
seventh largest producer of the resource worldwide (Stuijt, 2009). However, the region where 
most of the oil is produced, the Niger Delta, is embroiled in an insurgency against the state 
and the MNOC’s. With the youth as their vanguard the militants representing various ethnic 
groups have been able to effectively cut the oil production in the Niger Delta to almost half 
the national capacity. The conflict has been the culmination of years of neglect by the Federal 
Nigerian government. The instability within the Niger Delta is dire, and unfortunately the 
violence has not remained within the national boundaries of Nigeria.  
However, the analysis of this variable is more concerned with the effect the rest of the Gulf of 
Guinea has on the Niger Delta and not the other way around. Many countries within the Gulf 
of Guinea are experiencing some form of insurgency, and an argument can be made that the 
cause of these insurgencies are related to the conflict in the Niger Delta. However a territorial 
dispute that influenced Nigeria and more specifically the Niger Delta is the contentious 
border dispute between the country and Cameroon over the Bakassi peninsula. The Bakassi 
peninsula is situated on the border of Cameroon and Nigeria and is said to contain up to 10 
percent of the worlds oil and gas reserves (BBC, 2006). A colonial legacy of disputed borders 
started the contention for the territory. Although Nigeria administrated the area since its 
independence from Britain in the 1960’s, Cameroon based its claim on sovereignty over the 
region on maps dating back to colonial times.  The two countries almost went to war in 1981 
while bloody clashes claimed 34 lives in 1994. That year Cameroon took Nigeria to the 
International Court in The Hague, which ruled in favour of Cameroon in 2002.  
 
Nigeria initially rejected the ruling, but after a UN intervention the two countries set up a UN 
chaired joint commission to resolve the conflict. In 2008 Nigeria completed the handover of 
the Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon in a ceremony in Calabar, Nigeria. However many 
Nigerians, some living in the disputed territory are reeling against the decision to hand over 
the peninsula. Several militant attacks have been evident throughout the transition process. In 
November 2007, 21 Cameroonian soldiers were killed when unknown gunmen in speedboats 
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attacked their positions in the peninsula. Early in July 2008 six Cameroonians including five 
soldiers and a local administrator were killed in a similar incident (Mbachu, 2008). The 
attacks have been attributed to disgruntled Nigerians living in the Bakassi as well as the 
Niger Delta militants.  
  
The history of bad governance experienced throughout the region has supplemented a 
platform which encourages the continuation of violent acts. Although democracy seems to be 
entrenched it has taken on an instrumental rather than intrinsic feel and corruption is rampant. 
As far as being influenced by a super power as noted above, Nigeria supplies the US with a 
large percentage of its oil needs therefore it is in the US’s best interests to secure the flow of 
oil form the region. For this reason, the US has continuously increased its presence within the 
region in terms of human capital and naval workshops to improve the effectiveness of the 
local security forces. However under no conditions can one argue that Nigeria is under the 
influence, or doing the bidding of the US.  
 
The Niger Delta’s insurgency came about through prolonged government neglect, and not as 
a result of a foreign governments influence. Initially the Niger Delta communities used 
peaceful means to try and persuade their governments to develop the region. However, the 
youth soon got disgruntled with the ineffective means the elders went about airing their 
grievance and soon formed militant organisations that took direct physical actions against the 
MNOC’s and the Nigerian Government. The culmination of these groups would undoubtedly 
be MEND who are seen more as an umbrella organisation.  With sophisticated planning and 
execution, MEND has been able to put up an effective resistance against the federal 
government and the MNOC’s. As such, the Niger Delta is itself a trouble spot and not under 
the influence of one.  
The Variable bad neighbours/dependence on a foreign power/external conflict is thus rated as 
high as the region is under the negative influence of a country or hegemon, has a continuous 
history of unrest and is currently experiencing violence. The countries within the region 
affect the Niger Delta in terms of creating a culture of bad governance and as such create a 
platform form which violence can erupt. It must be noted that the Niger Delta is the principal 
bad neighbour in the region but it is still affected by its neighbouring countries in the Gulf of 
Guinea.   
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4.2.3. War, armed insurrection 
Grievances on the part of local populations in the Niger Delta over environmental damage 
and low levels of development escalated in 2004, with the emergence of organised armed 
militant groups, often linked to local politicians, who demand more resources for the region. 
They have targeted oil companies, which they accuse of being complicit with a negligent 
government, and have engaged in a protracted fight with security forces. Although the 
Nigerian military has been present in the Niger Delta for some time now, President Yar’Adua 
decided to defeat the militants militarily, increasing the manpower and equipment of the JTF. 
The JTF is composed of army, navy, anti riot police and more recently air force elements 
(Moncrieff, 2009).  
 
The initial build-up has been followed by a sustained but poorly targeted offensive against the 
militants. Military helicopters have shelled militant basis while also targeting neighbouring 
villages in subsequent manhunts for military targets. However militants have responded by 
ambushing several military personnel killing 12 on the 21
st
 of May 2009 according to several 
press reports (Ezigo, Onabu, and James, 2009). The government offensive has provoked an 
outcry among organisations representing the Ijaw community in the western Delta and human 
rights groups who have said the campaign has put many civilians at risk (Green, 2009). 
Specifics are hard to verify, as journalists and aid workers have been barred from the 
operation area. According to BBC in May 2009, hundreds of civilians may have been killed 
during the military onslaught against the rebels, with many more wounded, and thousands 
displaced (Walker, 2009).  
History suggests that the military solution to the conflict has little lasting effect. Previous 
strong-arm measures, such as the military offensive in September 2008, have done little to 
degrade the militant’s capacity effectively or permanently (Moncrieff, 2009). Unfortunately, 
these troop deployments have little positive impact on the security of the region (Ukiwo, 
2009). Instead, military operations have only further militarised the region and undercut 
moderate civil society voices calling for peaceful change from within the very Niger Delta’s 
ethnic groups where the violent militants draw support. The wide availability of small arms, 
the Deltas difficult topography, and widespread local anger at government policies, all 
indicate that things may be little different this time around.  
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According to the NNPC, the recent action by the Nigerian military has not however 
significantly impacted on oil production. Companies such as Royal Dutch Shell, ExxonMobil 
and Total who have operations in Nigeria will be watching to see whether the offensive 
taking place outside the city of Warri succeeds in pushing militants on to the defensive, or 
provokes retaliatory strikes against vulnerable pipelines snaking through the region’s vast 
wetlands (Green, 2009). MEND has pledged ‘all-out war’ in one of many statements to 
journalists since the military attacked the important militant ‘camp five’ believed to be 
housing Government Tompolo suspected leader of MENDs Delta faction (James, 2009).  
MEND however, has yet to demonstrate it still has the ability to mount the kind of 
spectacular attacks seen in early 2006, when it shut down roughly a fifth of Nigeria’s 
production, much of it operated by Shell.  
As well as targeting MNOC’s for political reasons, a new trend has emerged that has been 
characterised by criminal attacks as opposed to ones carried out for political reasons. Attacks 
on banks along the coast of the Gulf of Guinea, oil bunkering as well as an increase in 
kidnappings have put in stark terms the seriousness of the criminal intent. The economy of 
conflict in the Delta has become a lucrative income for many militant groups which spans 
from, gun running, kidnapping of foreign oil workers, oil bunkering to drug trafficking. 
Given the sheer size of this economy it would seem obvious that many militant groups 
neglect their initial politically motivated ideals for ones in favour of self enrichment.  
Despite the best efforts by the JTF, the violence has however not remained localised. 
Although a lot of attention has been placed on the piracy of the coast of Somalia, the Gulf of 
Guinea has become an increasingly vulnerable spot for offshore attacks. Nigeria’s costal 
waters are ranked second behind Somalia as the most dangerous waters in the world. The 
region recorded seven pirate attacks in the first quarter of 2009 (CRI, 2009), however 
unconfirmed reports indicated that at least another 13 incident had occurred. Although most 
of the piracy incidents are centred around the financial capital of Lagos, recent incidents have 
been reported off the coast of Benin, Cameroon, and Equatorial Guinea. Piracy in the Gulf is 
carried out for either criminal or political reasons however in both cases they prove deadly 
and destructive. 
Further, seaborne attacks and sabotage on oil facilities launched by Nigerian militants have 
severely crippled the oil production in the Gulf. Despite successful results closer to the coast, 
the militants are becoming more daring, venturing out further and further into the Gulf. In an 
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unprecedented attack in June 2008 Nigerian militants attacks the Bongo oilfield 100 
kilometres off the coast (CRI, 2009). Before this attack no incidents had occurred further than 
65 kilometres from the coast (BRS, 2007). For the militants a second purpose behind 
attacking offshore targets is acquiring hostages. MEND is thought not to exchange hostages 
for money as they see them as bargaining tools to actualise the political objectives of the 
Niger Delta people. However, the practice does exist as many groups see it as a lucrative 
income.  
Cameroon’s waters have seen a number of piracy attacks, mostly committed by rebels 
opposed to the deal with Nigeria that signed Bakassi peninsula over to Cameroon. At least six 
attacks on oil facilities and service vessels were recorded off the coast of Cameroon in 2008. 
Just south west of Cameroon, the capital of Equatorial Guinea, Malabo was attacked by 
gunmen in February 2009. The heavily armed militants shot their way to the presidential 
palace before they were repelled.  The Government blamed the attack on MEND who denied 
any involvement forwarding the idea that the once mighty organisation might be splintering.  
It is more likely that many attacks are carried out by groups that operate under the MEND 
banner by no longer feel compelled to report to central leadership (Stratfor, 2009). MEND is 
no longer the coordinated organisation it once was, as evidenced by its degraded ability to 
carry out large-scale attacks. Rather it is thought that the group has become a loose 
cooperation of criminal gangs and cult groups seeking control of trade routes in the region, 
and certain communities in the Niger Delta. Whether MEND is degraded or not one cannot 
doubt the gravity of the situation in the Gulf of Guinea.  
 
The Nigerian Navy, arguably the most professional of the Government Security Forces, lacks 
investment and resources to effectively combat seaborne attacks both off the Nigerian coast 
but also in regional waters. The affected area is vast and the Nigerian navy simply do not 
have enough vessels to patrol the Niger Delta as well as the hundreds of oil platforms.  
In a region of former British, French and Spanish colonies, the most prominent in efforts to 
boost local capabilities is the US, which has a near permanent presence with ships training 
local security forces (Lewis, 2009). The new trend in the Niger Delta is also feeding into the 
global securitisation of the region and the surrounding Gulf of Guinea, whereby the 
international community, particularly the US is concerned about its energy security interests 
and a possible contagion effect of the volatile Niger Delta on its maritime commercial and 
strategic interests in West Africa (Obi, 2008). US military visits to the region have increased 
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dramatically, from almost no activity in 2004 to nearly continuous visits by US Navy vessels 
in 2006, according to conference briefing documents provided to reporters in November by 
Admiral Harry Ulrich, commander of the US Sixth Fleet and US Naval Forces Europe 
(Crawley, 2006). During their patrols, Navy teams make frequent port calls and undertake 
humanitarian and medical missions as well as meet with government and nongovernment 
officials both ashore and aboard ships. The Gulf of Guinea faces a challenging security 
environment, according to the briefing documents. Illegal fishing costs more than US$1 
billion a year. Niger Delta violence causes more than 1000 deaths a year and significant 
disruptions of Nigerian oil supplies.  
According to analysts at Control Risk
5
, the militant operations in the Gulf of Guinea appear 
to be spreading and are becoming more threatening (Lewis, 2009). The insurgency in the 
Delta has always been a troubling factor, but now that groups are taking their grievances 
further afield, striking oil platforms, vessels, high-street banks and even Equatorial Guineas 
presidential palace the war and armed insurrection seems to have reached a new epoch. The 
weakness of states in the region has allowed militant groups, at time operating off mother 
ships similar to those used by the Somali pirates, to move easily in vast stretches of waters. 
They are able to do this because of the weakness to the current navy capabilities. No country 
in the Gulf of Guinea has naval force worthy of the name (BRS, 2007). Nigeria is the main 
provider of maritime security in the region, but is severely constrained by limited resources. 
The incidents of criminal piracy outside Nigerians territorial waters have become a cause for 
concern for the regional energy security. The greater region hosts Nigeria and Angola, sub-
Saharan Africa’s two largest oil producers, Gabon, Cameroon, the two Congos and 
Equatorial Guinea, and oil nation with aspirations in natural gas (Lewis, 2009). Oil from land 
locked Chad is also exported through the Gulf. Sub-Saharan Africa produced more than 9 
million barrels of oil per day in 2008 with the Gulf of Guinea nations accounting for nearly 5 
million of the total. The US national intelligence council expects the region will provide 25 
percent of American oil by 2025.  
                                                          
5
 According to the Control Risks website the company is an independent, specialist risk consultancy that 
provides advice and services that enable clients to accelerate opportunities and manage strategic and 
operational risks (Control Risk, 2009). 
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Having watched the violence in the Delta, neighbouring countries have become more aware 
of the threat than ever before. In light of the Malabo attacks, Gabon bolstered its border and 
Cameroon replaced regular army soldiers in the Bakassi with Special Forces answering 
directly to the president. Angola, the current chair of the Gulf of Guinea Commission, has 
called for a regional security mechanism to tackle shared threats such as the Niger Delta 
militants. Cameroon and Nigeria officials have constantly been in contact over joint strategies 
and cooperation. However, in a region with vast amounts of oil and border demarcation 
disputes, coordination and cooperation has been difficult.  
The risk rating for war, armed insurrection, and instability is high, as a country in the region 
is embroiled in a continuing insurgency with attacks being widespread.  
4.2.4. Ethnic/religious and/or politics/radical tensions social conflict, deep ideological 
cleavages 
Nigeria is an archetypal society characterised by divergent languages, cultures, ethnic groups 
and geographic regions. The realisation that a society as diverse as Nigeria may be difficult to 
manage administratively partly informed the decision to adopt the Lyttelton Constitution of 
1954 which formally inaugurated the practice of federalism in Nigeria (Babawale, 2001). 
Unfortunately the Nigerian federation is lopsided and unbalanced with the northern region 
emerging as a bigger entity than a combination of the entire population of the eastern and 
western regions. The struggle for power sharing was reduced to a fight for hegemony by the 
three largest ethnic groups, namely the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo. In the course of the 
struggle, those who fell outside these groups were considered to be minorities, and were 
marginalised not only in the allocation of power but resources as well. Of the three major 
ethnic groups the Hausa-Fulani emerged as the victors and consequently controlled the 
federal power structure. The other two major contenders had cause to complain of 
marginalisation. Indeed, such feelings partly accounted for the civil war that nearly 
dismembered the country between 1967 and 1970.   
Among the minorities the cry of marginalisation has been severe. Years of military 
dictatorship have virtually cemented the Hausa-Fulani dominance in politics and left the rest 
of the ethnic groups with very little. For the purposes of this study the southern minorities 
will be focused on. The southern minorities feel they deserve to take control of their oil 
revenue which is largely extracted from their communities instead of the tokenism they 
receive in the form of revenue allocation from the federation account (Babawale, 2001). This 
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is the most controversial issue as the central government in Abuja currently return only 13 
percent of the Delta region’s oil wealth to local governments (Moncrieff, 2009). Delta 
moderates and militants alike argue this percentage should be much higher while leaders 
from other Nigerian ethnic groups and regions that are dependant on delta oil money strongly 
disagree. The Nigerian government’s aggressive response to the problems of militancy in the 
Niger Delta stands in contrast to its apparent unwillingness to lay out a clear plan for 
development in the region, or to engage with community groups. By foregoing opportunities 
for dialogue in favour of an attempted military solution, the government is merely falling 
back to tactics that proved ineffective in the past.  
Ethnicity plays a big role in Nigerian society. In essence, the background to the emergence of 
ethnic militias was the manipulation of ethnicity by the governing elite across the various 
regions especially as a means of bargaining for power in the post democratic era (Babawale, 
2001). The potential benefits from the oil economy to community leaderships and groupings 
whether solicited or compelled are quite enormous and a major element in the struggle for the 
benefits of the oil economy from the MNOCs is the ownership of land and water in which oil 
fields are located (Ikelegbe, 2005). This has fuelled inter family, group, community and 
ethnic contestations which involves highly destructive fighting. Consequently, the region has 
witnessed a regime of intra/inter communal/ethnic conflicts between ethnic groups such as 
the Ijaw and Itsekiri, Ijaw and the IIaje, Urhobo and Itsekiri, to name but a few.  
The most extensive and intense of these conflicts has been between the Ijaw and Itsekiri in 
the Warri area. The conflict is as old as the colonial era and was probably evident before, but 
when oil was discovered in the 1950’s a new point of contention was discovered. These 
conflicts have at different times, escalated generating a reign of insecurity, oil production 
disruptions and violence (Ikelgebe, 2005:13)  
However, there have been instances of unity since the 1990s. Some groups within the Niger 
Delta have increasingly forged a common front to address common development challenges 
in the region. The campaign for resource control and civic rights by the people of the Niger 
Delta has been a rallying point. The impetus for the change has partly derived from the 
proliferations of non-ethnic pan-Delta civil society movements, and the emergence of 
indigenous civilian governors (Ukiwo, 2009). Between 1984 and 1999, the military governors 
were appointed by and responsible to the commander-in-chief. They made no pretence of 
representing the interests of the people of the states they were administering and were more 
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concerned with maintaining law and order at all costs. This approach to governance 
predisposed the non-indigenous governors to work against pan-Delta solidarity. In fact, some 
of them were perceived as having used divide-and-rule strategies to maintain hegemony. The 
insensitivity of the military governors and their preference for heavy-handed responses to 
community agitation contributed to the militarisation of conflicts in the Delta. Therefore, 
democratisation and the emergence of elected governors since 1999 helped promote Niger 
Delta solidarity and the agitation for access to increased oil revenues for the development of 
the paradoxically oil-rich, but largely underdeveloped region. 
It can be argued that the ethnic militia’s and now militants have in many cases banded 
together which translates into a higher sense of insecurity in the Niger Delta and the larger 
Gulf of Guinea. MEND is seen by many as an umbrella organisation that simply puts forward 
an idea which is then interpreted by the various groups as they see fit. The rise of criminality 
in the Neighbouring countries supports this view. However, whether the militants that attack 
oil installations, kidnap oil workers, or even attack coastal banks, are from one ethnic group 
or many is unknown as no such profile has yet been created.   
The risk rating for Ethnic/religious and/or politics/radical tensions Social conflict, deep 
ideological cleavages is high as governments and politics are ethnically based. Ideological 
and ethnic tensions are evident and unrest is being felt widely. The ethnic groups are 
motivated to access their fair share of oil revenue and as such business is severely affected.   
4.2.5. Authoritarianism/undemocratic measures to retain power/ generals in power 
The Niger Delta has a history of bad administration. The very reason that the youth militias 
took up an armed struggle against the government was because of inept central planning and 
neglect. Since Nigeria returned to a democracy in May 1999 (after more than three decades of 
military rule and economic crisis), the country has been faced with many challenges such as 
national reconciliation, reconstruction and economic reform, and democratic consolidation. 
Under President Obasanjo the country rebuilt itself and tried to combat the rampant 
corruption that had been evident under the authoritarian government. In 2006 the previous 
head of the World Bank Paul Wolfowitz estimated that Nigeria has lost over US$300 billion 
to institutionalised corruption (Adeniyi, 2006).  
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Although Obasanjo had fought valiantly trying to eradicate corruption his own victory, in the 
2003 elections were marred by allegations of widespread rigging and political intimidation. 
Around 100 people died in election related violence. The Nigerian Supreme Court 
unanimously rejected all challenges of corruption and election rigging saying that fraud was 
discovered but not enough to have changed the poll results (Freedomhouse, 2006). 
Obasanjo’s successor Yar’Adua was democratically elected in April 2007. International 
observers reported overall a seriously flawed process with credible reports of malfeasance 
and vote rigging in some constituencies. The scope of violence that occurred also was 
regrettable. There were considerable degrees of difference in the conduct of elections among 
states, but serious differences were also observed within states during the two polling dates.  
The main opposition parties, All Nigeria People's Party and the Action Congress, as well as 
numerous smaller political parties and the ruling People's Democratic Party filed petitions to 
challenge the results of gubernatorial elections in 34 of Nigeria's 36 states (US State 
Department, 2009). The Court of Appeal received 1,527 petitions, a tripling of the 527 
petitions filed and received in 2003. Nigeria's National Electoral Commissions (INEC) 
principal problems included politicization and lack of independence, lack of transparency in 
its operations and decision-making and persistent failure to make adequate logistical 
arrangements for both voter registration and polling. With INEC's certification of the ruling 
party's presidential ticket as the winner with over 70 percent` of the vote, Nigeria experienced 
its first transition of power between civilian administrations when President Obasanjo 
stepped down on 29 May 2007.  
Despite the positive step towards democracy in 2007, the Delta region was severely affected 
by election violence. The flawed election exacerbated the already prevalent prospects of 
intensified conflicts in the Niger Delta (ICG, 2007). It provoked diverse reactions in the 
region. Dozens of people were killed when armed gangs, competing for a greater share of 
illegal state government handouts, staged battles in the streets of Port Harcourt, the capital of 
the River State in the Niger Delta (HRW, 2008). The politicians behind these attacks have 
openly fomented violence for years untouched.  
The precedent created by Nigeria can potentially be duplicated by other countries in the Gulf 
of Guinea. It must be noted however that flawed elections are not uncommon in the region. 
Numerous countries in the Gulf of Guinea have experience some or other form of alleged 
undemocratic practices. Equatorial Guinea lacks a well established democratic tradition, but 
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has improved its human rights record and political performance over the past five years (US 
state department, 2009), while the Cameroonian general presidential elections held in 2007 
were noted for being flawed, especially in the registration of voters and the prevention of 
voter fraud.  
Although undemocratic measures to retain power are evident in Nigeria, the chances of the 
country reverting back to military rule are slim. The majority of the information supplied for 
this variable seems to be negative but paradoxically democracy in its most basic form seems 
to have a foothold in the region. For this reason the variable Authoritarianism/undemocratic 
measures to retain power/ generals in power is rated as medium. The undemocratic 
measures to retain power does not seem to cause a country within the region to slip back into 
a military regime and as such the rating is medium.  
4.2.6. Religious fundamentalism/radical religious forces/religion in politics 
As well as being an ethnically diverse nation, Nigeria is also separated by diverse religious 
views. 50 percent of Nigeria’s 140 million population follows Islam while 40 percent mainly 
concentrated in the southern part of the country, follows Christianity and the remaining 10 
percent still adhere to their indigenous beliefs (CIA world fact book, 2009). Islam is very 
dominant in the North of the country with 12 of the northern states adopting sharia (Islamic) 
law. Although the majority of the population of Nigerians northern states is Muslim, many 
Christians live there as well. Especially in these northern states, over the past few years, 
relations between the two faiths have been severely strained, with sporadic outbreaks of 
violence related to the introduction of the Islamic criminal punishment across the north of the 
country (Isaacs, 2009). Human rights groups say that Islamic courts fail to respect the due 
process rights which lead to harsh discriminatory sentences. In 2000 in the worst such case in 
the city of Kaduna, more than 2000 people died in street protests which were eventually 
brought under control by the Nigerian Armed Forces (BBC, 2002). It is estimated that during 
Obasanjo’s first four years as president 10 000 people died in clashes between the countries 
Christian and Muslim communities (Isaacs, 2009). However there are contending views that 
see this unrest not as a result of religious tensions but as being provoked by marginalized 
politicians, using cultural divisions and misunderstandings to destabilize parts of the country 
for their own ends. This observation was particularly felt during the first term of president 
Obasanjo’s tenure when opponents to his government sought to undermine the country’s 
stability. It is noteworthy to mention however that when Obasanjo won his second tenure as 
president in 2003 this trend had all but abated.  
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The rise of religious tensions in the north of Nigeria has led some researchers to believe that 
Islam could potentially spread further southwards.  According to Wilders and Bosma (Stuijt, 
2009), a crucial religious battle is now being fought on the fault line between be Muslim 
north and the Christian south. If seven more states adopt the Sharia law, Nigeria could 
potentially be forced to adapt its constitution in so doing making Nigeria an Islamic country. 
According to independent correspondents however, it cannot be said that Nigeria is a country 
radicalized by recent world events (Isaacs, 2009). Perceptions of the daily lives of the 
ordinary Muslims in Nigeria tend to be overshadowed by the media reports of conflicts and 
crisis between Muslims and Christian communities in the northern cities. This nullifies the 
foundations on which analysts base their findings such as those expressed by the Wilders and 
Bosma. Although there is little foundation on which to base this theory it is important to 
mention it for it represents a worst case scenario which could have far reaching consequences 
for western business in Nigeria if it came to the fold. The resurgence of the state and/or 
political inspired Islamic fundamentalism and terror makes this variable a powerful indicator 
of political risk in a region. From the Iranian revolution in 1978 onwards Islamic 
fundamentalism seems at odds with capitalism and foreign investment.  
Thus far most of the clashes between the two religions have been realised in the North of the 
country and as such the south and more importantly the Niger Delta has not been directly 
affected. There is little foundation on which to base a theory in which Islam spreads 
throughout the country and as such the south will most probably remain majority Christian. 
Therefore with religious tensions mainly being felt in the north of the country and not 
exacerbating the situation in the Niger Delta the variable religious fundamentalism/radical 
religious forces/religion in politics will be rated as medium. Primarily for the reason that 
Islam is prevalent in the North of the country this variable will not be rated as low.  
4.3. Evaluation of findings 
In an integrated region like the Gulf of Guinea it is the regional as opposed to the national 
political risk that becomes important. In the contemporary landscape of reformed 
geographies, many parts of the world have become integrated economic units. By carefully 
noting these economic and political developments, it has clearly become necessary to 
evaluate the risk of a particular region rather than the risk of a specific country. For this 
reason the casual relationship between the various players in the Gulf of Guinea cannot be 
ignored. The study’s central research question of how the conflict in the Niger Delta affects 
the political risk of the Gulf of Guinea was examined in this chapter.   
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Under the variable Political stability/ (lack of) political will/law and order, the impact of the 
conflict in the Niger Delta was rated high. Nigeria’s ability to fill its natural role as the 
region’s stabiliser is put in jeopardy by the continuing conflict in the Niger Delta. Crime and 
lawlessness are evident, and as such the traditional authority systems have failed to contain 
the violence. The federal government of Nigeria furthermore seems unwilling to implement 
the recommendations of its own committees, concerning the Delta. The disgruntled youth in 
reaction to the governments neglect moved away from their traditional power structure, and 
created a militia movement that has effectively cut Nigeria’s oil production by half. The 
example set by Nigeria is a coherent model from which other countries within the Gulf can 
learn. It is unfortunately not an example of good governance; instead it is one of neglect and 
bad administration, creating civil unrest in the economic heart of the country.  
The variable bad neighbours/dependence on a foreign power/external conflict is rated as 
high. With a culture of instability that is evident throughout the Gulf area one feels that the 
Niger Delta did not have the best democratic example set for it. The dispute between Nigeria 
and Cameroon over the Bakassi peninsula further aggravated an already tense area. A 
positive in the region is the involvement of the US. The country is wishing to secure the flow 
of oil to its shores while building up local capacity to combat the insurgency. It must noted 
that the Niger Delta itself is the ultimate ‘bad neighbour’ to have but in its own right the delta 
is influenced by the culture of bad governance in the region.  
A high risk rating is given to the variable war, armed insurrections. Despite counterclaims by 
the government, the region is in a state of war. The massive troop deployments are a stark 
reminder of this. However, the violence has not remained localised. Many militants have 
attacked Nigeria’s neighbours in either criminal or political pursuits. Even the capital of 
Equatorial Guinea was assaulted by heavily armed militants. The region is second only to 
Somalia as the most dangerous for maritime vessels, and it seems every year piracy attacks 
increase. This variable is not ranked as extreme due the fact that no countries themselves are 
currently at war.  
The variable ethnic/religious and/or politics/radical tensions, social conflict, deep 
ideological cleavages is rated as high. The Niger Delta is a region of the world where 
ethnicity plays a big role in politics. The region has experienced some of the most intense 
fighting between rival ethnic groups, and consequently created an environment of insecurity. 
There are however some positives coming out of the region. Some ethnic groups have banded 
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together to present a unified front to the government in places where there is common 
interest. This can potentially be a building block on which peace within the region between 
various ethnic groups can be built but until then the rating remains high.  
A medium risk rating is given to for Authoritarianism/undemocratic measures to retain 
power/generals in power. Nigeria has a history of military rule the country experienced its 
first civilian government transition in 2007. Although elections were marred by violence and 
fraud, the results were generally positive. What is distressing is that voter intimidation and in 
some cases all out conflict is common the Niger Delta election. Furthermore, the politicians 
that are behind these attacks on rivals have thus not been brought to justice and are so free to 
continue in the next elections. However democracy seems to have a foothold in the country 
and the general risk is medium as there is no evidence that Nigeria will revert back to military 
rule.  
Finally, a medium risk rating is given to religious fundamentalism/radical religious 
forces/religion in politics as religious fundamentalism plays a small role in a country but 
business is not direly affected.  Although there are twelve northern states in Nigeria that are 
under Muslim Sharia law, the religion has not thus far spread southward. Should the Delta 
militants become Islamic, one could argue that their actions would become even more radical 
and further shun business but the possibilities of this are low. However the variable is rated as 
medium because of the presence of the 12 northern states.  
Judging by the rating system, if any of the variables receive and extreme rating, the overall 
rating will be extreme, if two or more variables are rated as high the overall political risk will 
be high, if none of the above are evident then the overall political risk will be compiled by a 
majority rating the overall risk for the political risk of the gulf of Guinea is high as the 
corresponding table below will indicate. The political instability in the Niger Delta is 
ethnically motivated further compounded by bad governance. The region is extremely 
unstable and is experiencing some of the worst acts of violence in recent history. What is 
certain is the inefficiency exhibited by the federal state in resolving the conflict has made the 
Niger Delta and consequently the Gulf of Guinea an extremely volatile place in which to do 
business. However, as mentioned before, the Niger Delta and the Gulf of Guinea is a region 
where dramatic changes happen ever so often. As such a transformation could occur that 
would nullify this research’s findings. Therefore it is always prudent to analyse risk on a 
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continuous basis and in this regard an up to date record of the Niger Delta which is not 
delimited to June/July 2009 would prove to be invaluable.   
Regional risk variables 
 Political stability/ 
(lack of) political 
will/law and order 
bad neighbours/ 
dependence on a 
foreign 
power/external 
conflict 
war, armed 
insurrections 
ethnic/religious 
and/or 
politics/radical 
tensions, social 
conflict, deep 
ideological cleavages 
Authoritarianism/und
emocratic measures to 
retain power/ generals 
in power 
religious 
fundamentalism/ 
radical religious 
forces/religion in 
politics 
Extreme 
risk  
 
High risk 
 
Medium 
risk  
 
Low risk  
      
x x x x   
    x x 
      
                 Overall risk rating: High 
Table 2: Overall risk rating.  
4.4. Conclusion 
This chapter sought to analyse the political risk of the Gulf of Guinea. To do so the variables 
utilised in the regional risk index, in chapter two, were applied to the Niger Delta to asses 
their regional impact. Each of the variables was examined and a risk rating was applied to 
them. As the table above indicates, four of the variables were rated as having a high risk 
while two garnered a medium risk rating. The overall risk rating for the six risk variables was 
thus high indicating in stark terms that the Niger Delta severely affects the political risk of the 
Gulf of Guinea.  
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Chapter Five: Conclusion and evaluation.    
 
The aim of this study was to analyse the conflict in the Niger Delta in order to assess its 
impact on the political risk of the Gulf of Guinea. The study took the form of a political risk 
analysis which is a means of forecasting potential pitfalls for an investing client so as to 
mitigate or manage risk. The study further postulated that a country specific risk analysis 
would not be enough for an integrated system like the Gulf of Guinea. In the contemporary 
climate the regional has become more important than the national. Contagion effects, the spill 
over, positive as well as negative from one country to another casts doubt on the value of 
assessing a country specific risk analysis.  
The main research question of this study was concerned with was what kind of impact the 
conflict in the Niger Delta has on the political risk in the Gulf of Guinea. In order to 
investigate this, a series of sub questions were asked.  
 Looking at a number of established risk analysis frameworks: What are the major risk 
variables and regional important risk variables that can be extracted from these 
frameworks that will provide insight into regional political risk?    
 Looking specifically at the general criminality, lawlessness and insecurity, what are 
the characteristics of the conflict in the Niger Delta?  
 The final sub-question addressed in this research study is: What is the current 
political risk of the Gulf of Guinea?  
As the study took the form of a political risk analysis certain variables had to be highlighted. 
For the purposes of this study the major risk variables and variables that could be useful for 
regional risk analysis were extrapolated from four risk frameworks. The frameworks that 
were used were the EIU, BERI, BM, and the ICRG. These frameworks were chosen on the 
basis of the qualitative pool of variables they represent and in addition, they were easily 
analysed as the common risk variables are available. Furthermore, they are some of the few 
examples where the risk frameworks were readily supplied. Many companies do make their 
frameworks available for fear of losing their competitive advantage in the tough business 
industry that is political risk.  
The variables that were extracted from these four frameworks fell into two pools: those useful 
for regional political analysis and the major risk variables that most frameworks incorporate. 
75 
 
With the volume of literature on political risk analysis and country risk analysis, there is 
bound to be areas that overlap and are of a major concern to foreign investors.  
As this study did not focus on economical variables only those being political and social in 
nature were included. After evaluating the four frameworks, six variables falling into the two 
categories discussed above (major risk variables and regional risk variables), were derived at. 
The six risk variables were Political stability/ (lack of) political will/law and order, Bad 
neighbours/dependence on a foreign power/external conflict, War, armed insurrections, 
Ethnic/religious and/or politics/radical tensions, social conflict, deep ideological cleavages,  
Authoritarianism/undemocratic measures to retain power/ generals in power, and finally 
Religious fundamentalism/radical religious forces/religion in politics.  The first variable 
Political stability/ (lack of) political will/law and order is a combination of a major risk 
variable and regional risk variable. Political stability and law and order is a variable 
employed by all four frameworks but the (lack of) political will variable is found only in the 
BM. It was included for a regional analysis because if a county is affected by a regional 
power then unless the neighbouring country has the political will to change the situation for 
the host country, the political risk will undoubtedly not change. Bad neighbours/dependence 
on a foreign power/external conflict is a major risk viable along with War, armed 
insurrections, Ethnic/religious and/or politics/radical tensions, social conflict, deep 
ideological cleavages,  Authoritarianism/undemocratic measures to retain power/ generals in 
power, and finally Religious fundamentalism/radical religious forces/religion in politics. 
These variables were chosen because they are considered major risk variables, but are also 
useful for regional risk analysis.  
As this study is primarily a political risk analysis, the variables still needed to be rated. 
Therefore, for operational purposes these variables were placed or ordered in a risk index. 
The ratings devised for the variables were low risk, medium risk, high risk, and extreme risk.  
Each variable was conceptualised under these headings indicating what could be considered 
low, medium, high or extreme risk.   
The next section of this study focused on the current situation in the Niger Delta so as to 
create a springboard from which the political risk of the area could be determined. It has to be 
noted that this study was delimited in that only information until June/July 2009 was utilised. 
The area that this research circumscribes is very volatile, and dramatic changes are an every 
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day occurrence. Therefore, delimiting this study will make the research more manageable and 
less sporadic. 
The third chapter examined the history of the conflict while also looking at the recent trends. 
The security situation in the Niger Delta is tense as a result of years of government neglect. 
What started off as a genuine agitation by the locals was left to become a shooting war with 
all its attendant consequences. A fairer share of the oil revenue, along with some basic 
development was asked for, and subsequently evolved from peaceful rallies into an armed 
insurgency with the youth as the vanguard. Initially, the elders negotiated with the 
government but the youth, seeing that their methods were failing, decide to form militia 
groups which have thus far put up an effective resistance against the government and the 
MNOC’s. What is troubling is that the conflict has left the shores of Nigeria and spread into 
the neighbouring Gulf of Guinea. Various acts of piracy and criminality have been reported 
in Cameroon, Benin, and Equatorial Guinea. Furthermore, the ineffective navy of the various 
countries in the region have been unable to clamp down on the attacks. As it stands the Gulf 
of Guinea is second only to the waters of Somalia as the most dangerous in the world.  
The fourth chapter served the purpose of the political risk analysis. Using the risk index 
created in chapter two, each of the six variables were analysed and rated. As noted, the 
hypothesis of this thesis is that the Niger Delta severely affects the political risk of the Gulf 
of Guinea, and as such the variables were applied to the Niger Delta to determine its regional 
implications of the conflict. Of the six variables Political stability/ (lack of) political will/law 
and order, Bad neighbours/dependence on a foreign power/external conflict, War, armed 
insurrections, and Ethnic/religious and/or politics/radical tensions, social conflict, deep 
ideological cleavages were rated as having a high risk. Authoritarianism/undemocratic 
measures to retain power/ generals in power, and finally religious fundamentalism/radical 
religious forces/religion in politics each received a medium rating. A rating system was 
devised in chapter two, indicating that if any of the variables receive and extreme rating, the 
overall rating will be extreme, if two or more variables are rated as high the overall political 
risk will be high, if none of the above are evident then the overall political risk will be 
compiled by a majority rating. Judging by this definition, the overall risk for the political risk 
in the Gulf of Guinea is high as four variables are rated as such. The conflict in the Delta has 
a major impact, not only in Nigeria, but throughout the Gulf of Guinea as well.  
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This study was historical and analytical in nature. This approach helps the reader understand 
the historical backdrop of the situation before the analysis of the current situation is 
explained. As this study took the form of a political risk analysis certain aspects of the 
research have to be highlighted. Firstly, this research relied on secondary information and as 
such was at the mercy of personal prejudices of authors and journalists alike. To mitigate this, 
credible news sources were utilised in the actual risk report. However it has to be noted that 
in an ideal risk report of this nature first hand information from the ground would have been 
best and more accurate. This type of information results in a broader spectrum of sources 
while also allowing one to access information that is not publically available, or that is too 
new to find in literature. Sadly, this was not possible for this study, however primary data can 
definitely be a way in which future studies on the area could be undertaken.  
The second point which should be highlighted is the relevance of regional risk analysis. 
Country focused risk analysis is still the preferred means on analysing political risk although 
usually a section on regional concerns is usually included. Although it is not foreseeable that 
regional political risk analysis could wholly overtake a country specific risk analysis in the 
near future, a more intense focus on the region could be expected. A larger section on the 
regional implications could perhaps become evident as nations slowly become integrated into 
regions. In some cases a regional risk analysis is however not always viable. In the context of 
travel risk, a single country would still have to be assessed although outside influences would 
be taken into consideration. This study simply tried to show yet another side of the ever 
evolving field of risk analysis. The argument for regional risk analysis is that, especially in 
modern times, regions have become so integrated that it has taken prominence over the nation 
state when it comes to assessing risk (Ohmae in Hawkins, 1995:2) Globalisation of markets 
and the growth of the international portfolio investment have diverted attention away from 
the narrow nation view.  In the African context contagion effects from one country to another 
casts doubt on the value of assessing only a country specific risk analysis. It was perceived in 
this study that the assessment of the region as a whole with indication of trouble spots would 
prove invaluable for any investing enterprise. The risk index created in chapter two, was an 
attempt to create such a working regional risk model on which an effective risk analysis 
could be conducted. However it relied totally on political and social variables.  
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After conducting the political risk analysis some insights were arrived at.  The six variables 
(major and regional risk variables) varied in usefulness as far as their utility for a regional 
political risk was concerned. The variables political stability/ (lack of) political will/law and 
order, bad neighbours/dependence on a foreign power/external conflict and war, armed 
insurrections, were seemingly the most useful variables in conducting a regional risk 
analysis. Each of the above three variables had something to add in a regional context and 
proved very useful when assessing risk on such a scale. Political stability/ (lack of) political 
will/law and order analyses the political stability in a region while also looking at the 
political will of the governments in power, a vitally important factor. Bad 
neighbours/dependence on a foreign power/external conflict and war, armed insurrections, 
proved very useful in a regional context as they assessed the level of conflict in the region 
and/or the negative influences that are evident. However ethnic/religious and/or 
politics/radical tensions, social conflict, deep ideological cleavages, 
authoritarianism/undemocratic measures to retain power/ generals in power, and religious 
fundamentalism/radical religious forces/religion in politics could perhaps have been replaced 
by variables more suited for a regional analysis. Although, after analysing these variables 
some interesting insights came to light, they did not garner the usefulness that was perceived 
for them when the variables were being chosen. In future these variables could possibly be 
replaced by socio-economic ones. Factors such as economic growth, domestic economic 
strength, literacy and infrastructure could for example replace the latter three variables of this 
study in so doing creating a more rounded and complete risk analysis. Furthermore, the fact 
that many of the variables garnered a high political risk rating could possibly be indicative of 
a problem with the conceptualisation of the variables or simply it could simply reflect the 
current situation. The risk companies utilised in this research (EIU, BERI, ICRG), all assess 
risk over a time period. As such, it would be prudent to assess the risk in the Gulf of Guinea 
over a time period to determine whether the risk variables chosen were correctly 
conceptualised and are in fact useful in a regional context. This repetition will further 
highlight trends that could in future be managed or mitigated.   
As noted the six variables that were extracted from the frameworks are not set in stone, and 
can be traded for those more useful if need be. The variables included in this study were 
thought to be relevant to the Niger Delta and the Gulf of Guinea. Should another area of the 
world be investigated in future the variables could change. This study merely tried to provide 
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an introduction to a regional political risk analysis, and as such can be built on by future 
research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.  
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Appendix A: The complete Brink model including the list of variables and 
indicators 
(Brink, 2004:121-146) 
 
Political risk variables: political 
 
Pr1-Political system (50) Rate only one indicator 
 Autocratic single party system (Rate between 0 and 50) 
 Democratic multi-party system (Rate between 0 and 20) 
 One-party dominant democratic system (Rate between 0 and 30) 
 Regulated democratic multi-party system (Rate between 0 and 30) 
 Dictatorship in a non-party system (Rate between 0 and 50) 
 Socialist central or transitional planning system (Rate between 0 and 40) 
 
Pr2-Separation of powers (150) Rate all the indicators 
 Degree of autonomy and independence of legislative, executive and judicial powers (High degree, rate 
between 0 and 10; moderate degree, rate between 11 and 30; low degree, rate between 31 and 50) 
 Degree to which legislature, executive and judiciary check and balance powers (High degree, rate 
between 0 and 10; moderate degree, rate between 11 and > 30; low degree, rate between 31 and 50) 
 Trend of development of an over-powerful executive (Negative trend, rate between 0 and 10;-
possibility, rate between 11 and 30; positive trend, rate between 31 and 50) 
 
Pr3-0penness of political system (250) Rate all the indicators 
 Competitiveness of political system (Very open and competitive, rate between 0 and  10; possibility for 
competition, rate between 11 and 30; closed political system, rate between 31 and 50) 
 Competing elites and interest groups can determine public policy through bargaining and compromise 
(Yes, rate between 0 and 25; no, rate between 26 and 50) 
 Public accessibility regarding inputs (Very accessible, rate between 0 and 10; conditional, rate between 
11 and 30; no access, rate between 31 and 50) 
 Responsiveness, and responsibility of government (High degree, rate between 0 and 10; moderate, rate 
between 11 and 30; low, rate between 31 and 50) 
 Transparency of decision making process and policy environment (Very, rate between 0 an4 10; hardly, 
rate between 11 and 30; not at all, rate between 31 and 50) 
 
Pr4-Public accountability of government (150) Rate all the indicators 
 Strength of public protector, auditor general, transparency level (Very strong; rate between 0 and 10; 
conditional power, rate between 11 and 30; none, rate between 31 and 50) 
 Degree of functioning oversight mechanisms (Highly functional, rate between 0 and 10; conditional, 
rate between 11 and 30; useless, rate between 31 and 50) 
 Separation of private and public spheres (High degree of separation, rate between 0 and 10; 
conditional, rate between 11 and 30; low degree, rate between 31 and 50) 
 
Pr5-Economic planning issues (100) Rate all the indicators 
 Success or failure in meeting economic targets and deadlines promised by the political leadership 
(Extreme failure, rate 50; complete success, rate 0) 
 Instances of misleading economic planning and policies (Infrequent, rate between 0 and 25; frequent, 
rate between 26 and 50) 
 
Pr6-Form of government (50) Rate only one indicator 
 If previous government was toppled by a military coup (Rate between 0 and 50) 
 If a state of emergency results in interim government (Rate between 0 and 30) 
 If a political system is undergoing transformation toward a multi-party government, or if multi-party 
elections are pending (Rate between 0 and 50) . Stable government (Rate between 0 and 10)  
 
Pr7-Racial, ethnic, religious, nationality, language issues (150) Rate relevant indicators . 
 If collective groupings (liberation movements) hedge against the political system (Rate between 41 and 
50) 
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 No legitimacy for government (Rate between 31 and 40) 
 Sudden changes in political party allegiances and/or alliances (Rate between 11 and 20) 
 Occurrences of racially or ethnically motivated violence in past six months (Rate between 21 and 30) 
 If none of the above prevail (Rate between 0 and 10) 
 
Pr8-Border disputes/external conflict and international relations (110) Rate relevant indicators 
 If a dispute is initiated in order to divert attention away from domestic economic problems (Rate 
between 0 and 50) 
 Border disputes (land/sea/lake/river) or economic exploitation in disputed areas (Rate between 0 and 
30) 
 Long standing claims to historic territory contribute to domestic or international disputes or conflict 
(Rate between 0 and 20) 
 If none of the above prevail (Rate between 0 and 10)  
 
Pr9-Political terrorism (I IQ) (In past six months - rate relevant indicators) 
 Intensity of terrorist activity in past six months (If high, rate between 31 and 50;if moderate, rate 
between 21 and 30; if low, rate between 0 and 20) 
 Government expenditure on terrorist defence (Very high, rate between 31 and 50; moderate, rate 
between 21 and 30; low, rate between 0 and 20) 
 If such activity does not prevail (Rate between 0 and 10)  
 
PrI0-Role of the military (250) Rate relevant indicators 
 Past history of military unrest or mutiny (Rate between 0 and 50) 
 Threat of military take-over if severe economic deterioration prevails (Rate between O and 40)  
 If the military command stages a coup due to immobility in military ranks or an absence of benefits or 
remuneration (Rate between 0 and 30)  
 Acts of unwarranted military prestige (Rate between 0 and 20)  
 Little offensive military capability or intention (Rate between 0 and 10)  
 Level of military involvement in government (High, rate between 26 and 50; low, rate between 0 and 
25)  
 Mobilization of military in order to enforce executive will (Rate between 0 (benign) and 50 (malign)  
 
Pr 11-Legitimacy issues (240) Rate relevant indicators 
 If there is a lack of homogenous national identity (Rate between 0 and 30) 
 If there is a lack of distribution of resources (Rate between 0 and 50) 
 If there is a lack of public participation (Rate between 0 and 50) 
 If there is a lack of policy enforcement (penetration) (Rate between 0 and 40)  
 If uncontrolled and rapid urbanization overtaxes government functions (Very debilitating, rate between 
31 and 50, less debilitating, rate between 0 and 29) 
 If the political system is open and competitive (Rate between 0 and 20) 
 
 PrI2-Government behaviour (300) Rate all the indicators 
 Degree of accountability of government (More accountable, rate between 0 and 25; less accountable, 
rate between 26 and 50) 
 Degree to which limited or constitutional governance is practiced (Unconstitutional, rate between 30 
and 50; constitutional, rate between 0 and 29) 
 Degree of transparency of policy environment (More transparent, rate between 0 and 20; less 
transparent, rate between 21 and 50)  
 Degree of responsiveness (More responsive, rate between 0 and 25; less responsive, rate between 26 
and 50)  
 Degree to which responsible governance is practiced (More responsible, rate between 0 and 25; less 
responsible, rate between 26 and 50)  
 Level of government intervention into private sphere (High level of intervention, rate between 26 and 
50; low level of intervention, rate between 0 and 25)  
 
Pr I3-Consequences of social revolution (150) Rate relevant indicators 
 If a regime is threatened due. to societal will (If result is expected to be positive, rate between 0 and 20; 
if inconsequential, rate between 0 and 30; if negative, rate between 31 and 50) 
 A social revolution will alter the prospects of domestic and foreign investors (Advantageously, rate 
between 0 and 20; inconsequential, rate between 0 and 30; disadvantageously, rate between 31 and 50)  
 Post-revolutionary society is altered ideologically (Positively, rate between 0 and 20; inconsequential, 
 87 
 
rate between 0 and 30; negatively, rate between 31 and 50)  
 
Pr14-Political (in)stability (250) Rate relevant indicators 
 Implication of major political events, i.e. surrounding elections or scandals (Positive, rate between 0 
and 25; negative, rate between 26 and 50) 
 State of flux or political (dis)equilibrium (Stable, rate between 0 and 25; unstable, rate between 26 and 
50)  
 Unforeseen shifts in government policy (No, rate between 0 and 25; negative,  rate between 26 and 
50)  
 Unforeseen shifts in government's execution of power (Positive, rate between 0 and 25; yes, rate 
between 16 and 50)  
 Governmental constraints on profit-taking (None, rate between 0 and 25; some, rate between 26 and 50)  
 
Pr I5-Civil War (200) Rate relevant indicators 
 If domestic conflict within the boundaries of a country involves combatant civilians (Rate between 0 
and 50) 
 If civilians of different ethnic or religious origins are at war (Rate between 0 and 50)  
 If civilians are at war for historic territory or autonomy (Rate between 0 and 50)  
 Incidence of internal civil strife (Low incidence, rate between 0 and 25; high incidence, rate between 26 
and 50)  
 
Pr I6-State of emergency (220) In last 18 months - rate relevant indicators 
 If a state of emergency is expected or has been announced (Rate between 0 and 30) 
 If a country has a history of emergency situations (No, rate between 0 and 25; yes~ rate between 26 and 
50)  
 If declaring a state of emergency implies a political clampdown (Rate between 0 and 40)  
 If a state of emergency is declared as a last resort to end long-standing instability (Rate between 41 and 
50)  
 If a state of emergency is the result of a "failed state" (Rate between 0 and 50)  
 
Pr17-Economic expectations vs. reality (80) Rate both indicators 
 Government success rate in fulfilling promises (High, rate between 0 and 20; low, rate between 21 and 
40) 
 Incidence of unrest due to unfulfilled economic expectations (Low, rate between 0 and 20; high, rate 
between 21 and 40)  
 
Pr18-Leadership succession issues (270) Rate relevant indicators 
 A country has a history of authoritarian political structure (Rate between 0 and 40) 
 A leadership vacuum is anticipated (Rate between 0 and 40) 
 If a national social identity crisis occurs as a result of leadership succession (Rate between 10 and 30) 
 If political civil unrest is a result of leadership succession (Rate between 0 and 40) 
 Public scandals forces leadership succession (Positive change, rate between 0 and 20; negative 
implications, rate between 21 and 40) 
 Expected re-election or smooth transition (Rate between 0 and 40) 
 Successor to executive familiar and gradually introduced (Yes, rate between 0 and 20; no, rate between 
21 and 40) 
 
Pr19-Military in politics (120) Rate relevant indicators 
 Government is under military control/influence (Rate between 0 and 40) 
 If political leadership habitually wear uniform in public (Rate between 0 and 40) 
 Definition, setting of and adherence to military boundaries/limitations (Well-defined and maintained, 
rate between 0 and 20; ill-defined and ill-maintained, rate between 21 and 40)  
 
Pr20-Erosion of domestic support for the regime (80) Rate all indicators 
 Level of economic and social deterioration (Low levels, rate between 0 and 20; high levels, rate 
between 21 and 40) 
 An erosion of popular trust and confidence in government (High levels of confidence, rate between 0 
and 20; low levels of confidence, rate between 21 and 40) 
 
Pr21-Unconstitutional change of government (40) In past five years - rate one indicator 
 One violent change of government has occurred (Rate between 0 and 30) 
 More than one violent change of government has occurred (Rate between 0 and 40) 
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 If peaceful, yet unconstitutional change of government has occurred (Rate between 0 and 20) 
 No unconstitutional changes have taken place (Rate between 0 and 10) 
 
Pr22-ldeology as a political factor (80) Rate both indicators 
 Degree of influence of secular ideology on government policies (Low, rate between 0 and 20; high, rate 
between 21 and 40) 
 Anti-systemic government policies prevail (No, rate between 0 and 20; yes, rate between 21 and 40)  
 
Pr23-0rganised religion in politics (80) Rate both indicators 
 Degree to which religion is a factor in government policy (High, rate between 21 and 40; low, rate 
between 0 and 20) 
 Anti-systemic government policies prevail (No, rate between 0 and 20; yes, rate between 21 and 40)  
 
Pr24-Demographics, tradition and parochialism (360) Rate relevant indicators 
 Do social problems pose a challenge to the viability of government (No, rate between 0 and 20; 
inconsequential, rate between 0 and 30; yes, rate between 31 and 40) 
 If parochial values and structural elements in government contrast negatively with modem ideas and 
institutions in society (Rate between 0 and 30) 
  Level of conflict of central government with modem elements of society (Rate between 0 and 40) 
 Level of conflict of central government with traditional elements of society (Rate between 0 and 40) 
 If clashes between tradition and modernity in society lead to incidents of violence (Low incidence,. rate 
between 0 and 20; high incidence, rate between 21 and 40) 
 Is urbanization controlled (Yes, rate between 0 and 20; no, rate between 21 and 40) 
 Does urbanization place a burden on the state system to provide social needs (No, rate between 0 and 
20; yes, rate between 21 and 40) 
 Can institutional and physical infrastructure handle rapid urbanization (Yes, rate between 0 and 20; no, 
rate between 21 and 40) 
 A destabilizing dense urban population (Rate between 0 and 40) 
 If demographics and traditional parochialism either do not occur, or are not destabilizing (Rate between 
0 and 10) 
 
Pr25-Corruption/nepotism in government and rent-seeking (l00) Rate all indicators 
 If corruption exceeds the bounds of domestic and/or international acceptance (Rate between 0 and 40) 
 Companies have to budget for, or offer bribes (Rate between 0 and 40)  
 Ranking on corruption perception indices (Low, rate between 0 and 9; high, rate between 10 and 20) 
 
Pr26-Law tradition (110) Rate relevant indicators 
 A tradition of order and the rule of law prevails (Rate between 0 and 20) 
 A culture of lawlessness exists (Rate between 0 and 40) 
 Level and quality of protection of investments under the sovereign law of a host country (High, rate 
between 0 and 20; low, rate between 2 I and 40) 
 Government enforces and upholds order and stability (Rate between 0 and 10) 
 
Pr27-Status of the media (130) Rate all indicators 
 Public access to international media broadcasts are controlled (No, rate between 0 and 15, yes, rate 
between 16 and 30) 
 Persecution of journalists for criticizing government prevails (No, rate between 0 and 15; yes, rate 
between 16 and 30)  
 Level of institutionalized media censorship (Low, rate between 0 and 15; high, rate between 16 and 30)  
 Level of voluntary self-censorship by media (Low, rate between 0 and 15;high, rate between 16 and 30)  
 Media freedom uninhibited (Rate between 0 and 10)  
 
Pr28-Human rights record (65) Rate relevant indicators 
 Signatory and enforcement of human rights conventions and accords (Yes, rate  between 0 and 15; no, 
rate between 16 and 30) 
 Basic human rights are denied due to racial, ethnic, political or traditional affiliations (Rate between 0 
and 30)  
 Basic human rights are upheld or enshrined in a constitution or Basic Law (Rate. between 0 and 5)  
 
Pr29-Quality of the bureaucracy (120) Rate all indicators 
 Are government functions efficient and timely (Yes, rate between 0 and 15; no, rate between 16 and 30) 
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 Is internal communication functional (Yes, rate between 0 and 15; no, rate between 16 and 30)  
 Does government misappropriate funds to the peril of public services (No, rate  between 0 and 15; yes, 
rate between 16 and 30)  
 Are competencies and abilities/professionalism of civil servants questionable and/or of low levels (No, 
rate between 0 and 15; yes, rate between 16 and 30)  
 
Pr30-(Lack of) Political Will (65) Rate relevant indicators 
 Extent to which public officials are career civil servants (More, rate between 0 and 5; lesser, rate 
between 6 and 10) 
 Extent to which public officials are not in office for self-enrichment (More, rate between 0 and 5; 
lesser, rate between 6 and 10)  
 Policy is designed and enforced in the best interest of the public (Rate between 0 and 15)  
 Degree of political will (High, rate between 0 and 15; low, rate between 16 and 30)  
 
Pr31-lnvolvement in international organizations (30) 
 Member state of among others the United Nations, World Trade Organization, World Tourism 
Organization, International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, European Union, Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries, SADC, African Union, SACU, ASEAN, NAFTA, NEPAD, etc. 
(Active member, rate between 0 and 15; non-active member, rate between 16 and 30) 
 
Pr32-Domestic openness (120) Rate all the indicators 
 Perception of domestic transparency (High, rate between 0 and 10; low, rate between 11 and 20) 
 Modem legal frameworks (If followed as such, rate between 0 and 10; if not,  rate between 11 and 
20) 
 Adherence to International Law (If adhered to, rate between 0 and 10; if not, rate between 11 and 20) 
 Steps to eliminate the perception of corruption (If such steps in place and effective, rate 
between 0 and 10; if such steps in place but ineffective, rate between 11 and 20; if no attempt to 
eliminate or curb corruption, rate between 21 and 30) 
 Building .of strong modem institutions founded in stable political institutions (If in place, rate between 
0 and 10; if signs of development, rate between 11 and 20; if lacking, rate between 21 and 30) 
 
Pr33-Geographic position and geopolitics (130) Rate all the indicators 
 Geopolitics (If host country is in a favourable geopolitical position, rate between 0 and 10; if host 
country is in a vulnerable but manageable geopolitical position, rate between 11 and 20; if host country 
is in vulnerable and unmanageable geopolitical position, rate between 21 and 30) 
 Systemic status-rank (If sustainably high, rate between 0 and 10; if climbing, rate between 11 and 20; if 
dropping, rate between 21 and 30; if very low, rate between 31 and 40)  
 Position in systemic conflict (If not involved in such conflict, rate between 0 and 10, if a mediating 
force in systemic conflict, rate between 11 and 20; if direct party to such conflict, rate between 21 and 
30)  
 Regional vulnerability (Low degree of regional vulnerability, rate between 0 and 15; high degree of 
rate between 16 and 30)  
 
Pr34-Contract repudiation by government (210) Rate all indicators 
 Cancellation of operating licenses (No such instances, rate between 0 and 10; infrequent and selective 
instances, rate between 11 and 20; frequent and unexpected instances of cancellations, rate between 21 
and 30) 
 Cancellation of import and/or export licenses (No such instances, rate between 0 and 10; infrequent and 
selective instances, rate between 11 and 20; frequent and unexpected instances, rate between 21 and 
30) 
 Cancellation of concession agreements (No instances, rate between 0 and 10; infrequent and selective 
instances, rate between 11 and 20; frequent and unexpected instances, rate between 21 and 30)  
 Restrictions on remittances (No restrictions, rate between 0 and 10; varying degrees, rate between 11 
and 20; high degree, rate between 21 and 30) 
 Retraction of business licenses (No past retractions, rate between 0 and 10;event-related past 
retractions, rate between 11 and 20; frequent and unmotivated retractions, rate between 21 and 30) 
 Government adherence to a lawful purchasing agreement (Lawful compliance, rate between 0 and 15; 
failure to comply, rate between 16 and 30) 
 Creeping expropriation (Few instances, rate between 0 and 15; many instances, rate between 16 and 
30) 
 Pr35-Selective Discrimination (210) In past 18 months - rate all indicators 
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 Ability to import the necessary equipment (Investor able to import, rate between 0 and 10; imports 
negotiable, rate between 11 and 20; inability to import necessary equipment due to government 
restrictions rate between 21 and 30)  
 Ability to export (extracted minerals) (Investor able to export, rate between 0 and 10; exporting 
negotiable, rate between 11 and 20; inability to export necessary equipment due to government 
restrictions rate between 21 and 30)  
 Degree of financial deficiency (Government restrictions do not lead to financial deficiency 
 Degree of financial deficiency (Government restrictions do not lead to financial deficiency of 
investment, rate between 0 and 15; restrictions lead to high levels of deficiency, rate between 16 and 
30)of investment, rate between 0 and 15; restrictions lead to high levels of deficiency, rate between 16 
and 30)  
 Forced abandonment (No forced abandonment of investments in the past, rate between 0 and 10; trend 
of forced abandonment subsided, rate between 11 and 20; forced abandonment eminent or current, rate 
between 21 and 30) 
 Forced divestiture (No forced divestiture of investments in the past, rate between 0 and 10; trend 
subsided, rate between 11 and 20; eminent or current, rate between 21 and 30) 
 Deprivation of mobile assets in past eighteen months (None in the past, rate between 0 and 10; trend 
subsided, rate between 11 and 20; forced- divestiture eminent or current, rate between 21 and 30) 
 Intellectual property rights disputes (None in the past, rate between 0 and 10; possibility of flare-up, 
rate between J 1 and 20; disputes lead to divestiture, rate between 21 and 30) 
 
Pr36-Political violence (240) In past 18 months - rate all indicators 
 Revolutionary uprising (None in the past, rate between 0 and 10; active and mobile revolutionary press 
or civil society keeps government in check, rate between 11 and 20; past trend of uprising as frequent 
reactionary force, rate between 21 and 30) 
 Rebellion (None in the past, rate between 0 and 10; rebellion can lead to change in government, rate 
between 11 and 20; past trend of rebellion, rate between 21 and 30)  
 Insurrection (None in the past, rate between 0 and 10; can lead to change in government, rate between 
11 and 20; past trend of insurrection, rate between 21 and 30)  
 Hostile acts (None in the past, rate between 0 and 10; can lead to policy changes, rate between 11 and 
20; high frequency of hostile acts, rate between 21 and 30)  
 Enforcement of belligerent power (State does not practice coercive governance, rate between 0 and 10; 
government threatens with but does not revert to state-violence, rate between 11 and 20; state-violence 
used against citizenry is political in nature, rate between 21 and 30)  
 Instances of terrorism (None in the past, rate between 0 and 10; led to policy changes in government, 
rate between 11 and 20; high frequency of terrorist acts without responsibility taken, rate between 21 
and 30)  
 Instances of mobilism and riots (Civil commotion is organized, expected and within acceptable levels, 
rate between 0 and 10; commotion is volatile and instant, rate between 11 and 20; erupts into violence, 
rate between 21 and 30)  
 Instances of malicious damage and looting (None, rate between 0 and 10; few instances, rate between 
11 and 20, many focused on the presence of foreign businesses or MNCs, rate between 21 and 30)  
 
Pr37-Elections (260) Rate all indicators 
 High voter turnout (If high due to civil duty and participation, rate between 0 and 10; if due to 
intimidation, rate between 11 and 20) 
 Low voter turnout (If low due to complacency, rate between 0 and 15; if due to lack of organization or 
due to rigging, rate between 16 and 30)  
 Election laws (Internationally comparable and constitutional, rate between 0  and 10; election laws 
questionable, rate between 11 and 20; not adhered to or  do not exist, rate between 21 and 30)  
 Internationally compliant (Elections compliant with international standards, rate between 0 and 15; not 
compliant, rate between 16 and 30)  
 Open for scrutiny (Monitors and observers allowed into the host country if necessary, rate between 0 
and 15; sanctioned or not allowed at all, rate between 16 and 30)  
 Intimidation and violence (No reports, rate between 0 and 15; frequent reports, rate between 16 and 30)  
 Irregularities (tampering, vote counting) (No suspected irregularities, rate between 0 and 10; suspected, 
rate between 11 and 20; proven, rate between 21 and 30)  
 Media (Total media freedom in election coverage, rate between 0 and 10; sanctioned, rate between 11 
and 20; press intimidated, harassed and prevented from covering election, rate between 21 and 30)  
 International acceptance of result (If accepted, rate between 0 and 10; if accepted with reservations, 
rate between 11 and 20; if unaccepted, rate between 21 and 30)  
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Political Risk Factors: Economic 
 
Er1-Degree of liberalization (120) Rate all risk factors 
 Liberal investment, ownership and sectoral codes; incentives, floating foreign exchange rate (Yes, rate 
between 0 and 20; no, rate between 21 and 40) 
 Are imports kept in line with exports, is trade regime liberal (Positive, rate between 0 and 20; negative, 
rate between 21 and 40)  
 Central bank only intervenes to stabilize foreign exchange rates (Yes, rate between 0 and 20; no, rate 
between 21 and 40)  
 
Er2-Confiscation/expropriation (80) In past five - rate both indicators 
 Country has a past record of confiscating foreign-owned enterprises (No, rate between 0 and 20; yes, 
rate between 21 and 40)  
 Ideas of nationalism flare up periodically and pose a threat to foreign-owned enterprises (No, rate 
between 0 and 20; yes, rate between 21 and 40) 
 
Er3-Quality and nature of labour force (280) Rate all indicators 
 There is a shortage of skilled labour (No, rate between 0 and 20; yes, rate between 21 and 40) 
 Policies concerning the employment of expatriate (foreign) personnel are acceptable (Yes, rate between 
0 and 20; no, rate between 21 and 40)  
 Labour is an organized and influential political force (Less influential, rate between 0 and 20; highly 
influential, rate between 21 and 40)  
 Degree of corporatism (High degree, rate between 21 and 40; low degree, rate between 0 and 20)  
 Impact of split in government, labour and/or civil society alliance (High and consequential, rate 
between 21 and 40; low and inconsequential, rate between 0 and 20)  
 Degree of militancy and mobility of organized labour (Low, rate between 0 and 20; high, rate between 
21 and 40)  
 Degree to which labour legislation is liberal (High, rate between 0 and 20; low, rate between 21 and 40)  
 
Er4-Domestic economic strength (120) Rate all indicators 
 Size of average disposable income (Large, rate between 0 and 10; average, rate between 11 and 20; 
small, rate between 21 and 40) 
 Inflation rate hikes correspond to wage increases (Yes, rate between 0 and 20; no, rate between 21 and 
40) 
 Trends in consumerism (Decline, rate between 21 and 40; rise, rate between 0 and 20) 
 
Er5-Repatriation of profits (160) Rate all indicators 
 Process of transferring profits out of the host country (Easy, rate between 0 and 20; difficult, rate 
between 21 and 40) 
 Degree of convertibility of local currency (High, rate between 0 and 20; low, rate between 21 and 40) 
 Repatriation of profits guaranteed in investment code(s)incentives (Not secure nor guaranteed, rate 
between 21 and 40; conditional, rate between 20 and 30; guaranteed and possible, rate between 0 and 
20) 
 Are alternatives to restrictions on repatriation viable or not (Viable, rate between 0 and 20; not viable, 
rate between 21 and 40) 
 
Er6-Foreign ownership stake (160) Rate all the indicators  
 Can investors' stake in an enterprise be larger than 50% (Yes, rate between 0 and 20; no, rate between 
21 and 40) 
 Is less control acceptable in the hope of getting quick approval from the authorities (Not necessary, rate 
between 0 and 20; yes, rate between 21 and 40 
 Can local partners delay approval of business plans of foreign partners (No, rate between 0 and 20; yes, 
rate between 21 and 40) 
 Allowance of and guarantee under international arbitration agreements (Yes, rate between 0 and 20; no, 
rate between 21 and 40) 
 
Er7-Privatisation (160) Rate all indicators 
 Host country favours monopolies and state enterprises/parastatals over private enterprises (No, rate 
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between 0 and 20; yes, rate between 21 and 40) 
 "Large" private sector is protected by tariff barriers, monopolies or government contracts (No, rate 
between 0 and 20; yes, rate between 21 and 40) 
 Private sector rather serves as routing channel for uncontrolled foreign exchange outflows (No, rate 
between 0 and 20; yes, rate between 21 and 40) 
 Previously nationally owned enterprises have been privatized to improve service (Yes, rate between 0 
and 20; no, rate between 21 and 40) 
 
Er8-GDP (200) Rate all indicators 
 A declining GDP would result in subsequent social intolerance of government (No, rate between 0 and 
20; yes, rate between 21 and 40) 
 Relative value of goods and services is acceptable (Yes, rate between 0 a1Jd 20; no, rate between 21 
and 40) 
 Expenditure to produce goods and services is at an acceptable level (Yes, rate between 0 and 20; no, 
rate between 21 and 40) 
 Income received from producing goods and services is at an acceptable level (Yes, rate between 0 and 
20; no, rate between 21 and 40) 
 Level of general and secondary economic activity (High, rate between 0 and 20; moderate, rate 
between 10 and 30; low, rate between 21 and 40) 
 
Er9-Nationalisation of key industries/sectors (200) Rate all indicators 
 Tendency toward nationalization (Low and infrequent, rate between 0 and 20; high and frequent, rate 
between 21 and 40) 
 State-owned enterprises are monopolistic, protected from competition, and inefficient (No, rate between 
0 and 20; yes, rate between 21 and 40) 
 State-owned enterprises are politicized, run and staffed by government supporters or retired military 
personnel (No, rate between 0 and 20; yes, rate between 21 and 40) 
 State-owned enterprises are export-oriented and competitive (Yes, rate between 0 and 20; no, rate 
between 21 and 40) 
 Are state-owned enterprises geared for positive expansion and development (Yes, rate between 0 and 
20; no, rate between 21 and 40) 
 
Er10-Losses from exchange controls (110) Rate relevant indicators 
 If currency conversion crises prevail (Rate between 0 and 40) 
 Central Bank manages to stabilize domestic currency against international exchange rates (Rate between 
0 and 20) 
 Fixed exchange rate prevails under high inflation (Rate between 0 and 30) 
 Currency depreciation (Anticipated and controlled, rate between 0 and 20; uncontrollable and rapid, 
rate between 21 and 40) 
 
Er11-Degree of protectionism (240) Rate all indicators 
 Private enterprise is overly protected by tariffs (No, rate between 0 and 20; yes, rate between 21 and 
40) 
 Monopolies are protected from competition (No, rate between 0 and 20; yes, rate between 21 and 40) 
 Non-tariff barriers hedge against competition (No, rate between 0 and 20; yes, rate between 21 and 40) 
 Government contracts are the primary income of an industry (No, rate between 0 and 20; yes, rate 
between 21 and 40) 
 Import substitution is subsidized (No, rate between 0 and 20; yes, rate between 21 and 40) 
 Quotas, licensing or bureaucratic delays hedge against foreign investment (No, rate between 0 and 20; 
yes, rate between 21 and 40) 
 
Erl2-Role of organized labour (160) Rate all indicators 
 Implications of organization and mobility of labour (No consequence, rate between 0 and 10; some 
consequence, rate between 11 and 20; serious consequence, rate between 21 and 30; extremely serious 
consequences, rate between 31 and 40) 
 Membership of a labour organization is compulsory (No, rate between 0 and 20; yes, rate between 21 
and 40) 
 Willingness of labour to negotiate rationally with management (Willing, rate between 0 and 20; 
unwilling, rate between 21 and 40) 
 Confrontation between rival labour organizations is reason for incidents of violence (No, rate between 0 
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and 20; yes, rate between 21 and 40) 
 
Er13-Competitiveness (240) Rate all indicators 
 Degree of export-led orientation followed in the economy (High, rate between 0 and 20; low, rate 
between 21 and 40) 
 Import substitution resulted in subsequent exports (Yes, rate between 0 and 20; no, rate between 21 and 
40) 
 Is there a large number of domestic buyers and sellers of products produced locally (Yes, rate between 0 
and 20; no, rate between 21 and 40) 
 Degree of interventionist measures practiced domestically by government (Low, rate between 0 and 20; 
high, rate between 21 and 40) 
 Degree of mobility of domestic factors of production (High, rate between 0 and 20; low, rate between 
21 and 40) 
 Buyers and sellers are free to enter and leave the domestic market ( Yes, rate between 0 and 20; no, rate 
between 21 and 40) 
 
Er14-Level of government intervention (320) Rate all indicators 
 Government economic planning is centralized (Marginally, rate between 0 and 20; largely, rate 
between 21 and 40) 
 There is strict government control of import licenses (Less restrictive, rate between 0 and 20; more 
restrictive, rate between 21 and 40) 
 Level of government control of new investment in terms of general or production targets (Low, rate 
between 0 and 20; high, rate between 21 and 40) 
 Banks are state-owned (Some, rate between 0 and 15; mostly, rate between 16 and 30; all, rate between 
31 and 40) 
 State-owned banks are selective in directing credit to certain sectors (Not selective, rate between 0 and 
10; moderately selective, rate between 11 and 25; very selective, rate between 26 and 40) 
 Industry and agricultural sectors are state-owned/controlled (Some, rate between 0 and 10; mostly, rate 
between 11 and 25; all, rate between 26 and 40) 
 Entrepreneurship is promoted (Yes, rate between 0 and 20; no, rate between 21 and 40) 
 To what extent are inflexibility and inefficiency results of central planning (Some, rate between 0 and 
20; large, rate between 21 and 40) 
 
Er15-Economic impact of HIV/AIDS (200) Rate all indicators 
 HIV/AIDS is a destabilizing factor in the host country economy (No, rate between 0 and 20; yes, rate 
between 21 and 40) 
 Host government policy toward HIV/AIDS is realistic (Yes, rate between 0 and 20; no, rate between 21 
and 40) 
 Will the infrastructure in the host country be able to cope with the consequences of HIV/AIDS (Yes, 
rate between 0 and 20; no, rate between 21 and 40) 
 HIV / AIDS is a threat to the economic security of the host country (No, rate between 0 and 20; yes, 
rate between 21 and 40) 
 HIV / AIDS is a threat to regional economic security and stability (No, rate between 0 and 20; yes, rate 
between 21 and 40) 
 
Er16-Efficient banking system (180) Rate all indicators 
 The existence of state-owned banks is complementary to privately owned banks (To large extent, rate 
between 0 and 15; to some extent, rate between 16 and 30) 
 Interest rates are realistically determined ( Yes, rate between 0 and 15; no, rate  between 16 and 30) 
 Central Bank competency is recognized (Internationally, rate between 0 and 15; regionally, rate 
between 16 and 30) 
 Personal funds are available on request (Immediately, rate between 0 and 15; on application, rate 
between 16 and 30) 
 Foreign exchange is available on request (Immediately, rate between 0 and 15; on application, rate 
between 16 and 30) 
 Private banking facilities are sophisticated, internationally competitive and comparable, and safe (Yes, 
rate between 0 and 15; no, rate between 16 and 30) 
 
Erl7-Confidence in finance ministry (60) Rate both indicators 
 Competency of finance minister recognized (Internationally, rate between 0 and 15; regionally, rate 
between 16 and 30) 
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 Confidence in policy penetration (High, rate between 0 and 10; medium, rate between 11 and 20; low, 
rate between 21 and 30) 
 
Er18-Real interest rate (90) Rate all indicators 
 Interest rate minus inflation rate is low or high (High, rate between 0 and 15; low, rate between 16 and 
30) 
 Levels of the cost of borrowing money (Low, rate between 0 and 15; high, rate between 16 and 30) 
 Real interest rate is coupled with a low inflation rate (Yes, rate between 0 and 15; no, rate between 16 
and 30) 
 
ErI9-MIGA signatory and foreign direct investment (30) 
 Host country is a signatory to the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (Full, rate between 0 and 
15; conditional, rate between 16 and 30) 
 
Er20-S0und physical infrastructure (240) Rate all the indicators 
 Goods can be transferred and delivered on time by air, road and rail (To large extent, rate between 0 
and 15; to a lesser extent, rate between 16 and 30) 
 Are there often electricity supply problems (Not often, rate between 0 and 15; often, rate between 16 
and 30) 
 Condition of public roads (Good, rate between 0 and 10; fair, rate between 11 and 20; poor, rate 
between 21 and 30) 
 Availability of storage and warehousing capacity and facilities (Readily, rate between 0 and 10; 
adequate, rate between 11 and 20; scarce, rate between 21 and 30) 
 Volumes of new property developments or industrial construction sites are in relation with general 
economic developments (Yes, rate between 0 and 15; no, rate between 16 and 30) 
 Regular flights in and out of the host country are reliable (Yes, rate between 0 and 15; no, rate between 
16 and 30) 
 Repairs to damaged property or infrastructure are regularly undertaken (Regularly, rate between 0 and 
15; not so regularly, rate between 16 and 30) 
 Roads are maintained and networks improved (Improved, rate between 0 and 10; maintained, rate 
between 11 and 20; neglected, rate between 21 and 30) 
 
Er21-Economic growth rate (I50) Rate all indicators 
 Trend toward a declining annual growth rate (Slow decline, rate between 0 and 15; rapid decline, rate 
between 16 and 30) 
 Trend toward an increasing annual growth rate (Fast increase, rate between 0 and 15; slow increase, 
rate between 16 and 30) 
 Economic growth creates employment (High level, rate between 0 and 10; jobless growth, rate between 
11 and 20; low level, rate between 21 and 30) 
 Measures taken to reverse temporary decline in economic growth (In time, rate between 0 and 10; just 
in time, rate between 11 and 20; too late, rate between 21 and 30) 
 Extent to which economic growth in irreparable decline (Some extent, rate between 0 and 15; large 
extent, rate between 16 and 30) 
 
Er22-Annual average inflation rate (I20) Rate all indicators 
 Escalation rate of inflation is rapid or slow (Slow, rate- between 0 and 15; rapid, rate between 16 and 
30) 
 Investor can safeguard against a rising inflation rate by means of contract, or in the manner in which the 
organization structures itself in the host country (To large extent, rate between 0 and 15; to some extent, 
rate between 16 and 30) 
 Sudden rises of the inflation rate are a reflection of present distortions (Trend will moderate, rate 
between 0 and 15; trend will intensify, rate between 16 and 30) 
 Rapidly rising prices signify a continuation of social and political problems associated with allocative 
inefficiency (To some extent, rate between 0 and 15; to large extent, rate between 16 and 30) 
 
Er23-Economically active population (90) Rate all indicators 
 Percentage of people between the ages of 16 and 65 years exceeding that of people between the ages of 
0-15 years, and 66 years and above (If trend is positive, rate between 0 and 15; if trend is negative, rate 
between 16 and 30) 
 Economically active population with easy access to health facilities and education (Large measure, rate 
between 0 and 15; small measure, rate between 16 and 30) 
 95 
 
 Percentage of the economically active population having completed a secondary education (High, rate 
between 0 and 15; low percentage, rate between 16 and 30) 
 
Er24-Change in real wages (90) Rate all indicators 
 Real wages rise advantageously in relation to a rising inflation rate (Yes, rate 0 and 15; no, rate between 
16 and 30) 
 Changes in real wages result in labour protest (Seldom, rate between 0 and 15; often, rate between 16 
and 30) 
 Changes in real wages have disadvantageous social ramifications (Seldom, rate between 0 and) 5; often, 
rate between 16 and 30)  
 
Er25-Price index (150) Rate all indicators 
 Rapid increases in the price index are prevalent (No, rate between 0 and 15; yes, rate between 16 and 
30) 
 Indexation reduces the immediate effects of price increases (Constantly, rate between 0 and 15; 
sporadically, rate between 16 and 30) 
 To which degree are causative factors of inflation constant (Lesser degree, rate between 0 and 15; large 
degree, rate between 16 and 30) 
 Is government winning or losing the battle against inflation (Winning, rate between 0 and 15; losing, 
rate between 16 and 30) 
 To what extent is government neglecting economic matters in favour of political aims (Lesser extent, 
rate between 0 and 15; large extent, rate between 16 and 30) 
 
Er26-Balance o/payments (BOP) (120) Rate all indicators 
 Is size of country's public sector in decline or on the increase (Decline, rate between 0 and 15; increase, 
rate between 16 and 30) 
 Government uses some form of price intervention or special subsidies (Few, rate between 0 and 15; 
many, rate between 16 and 30) 
 BOP expresses a moderate to very high government budget deficit (Moderate, rate between 0 and 10; 
high, rate between 11 and 20; very high, rate between 21 and 30) 
 BOP expresses persistently high negative or positive values (High positive, rate between 0 and 10; 
moderate, rate between 11 and 20; high negative, rate between 1; and 30) 
 
Er27-Discrimination against foreign business (160) Rate all indicators 
 Non-tariff barriers prevent or improve the profitability of foreign investment (Improve, rate between 0 
and 15; prevent, rate between 16 and 30) 
 Licenses for foreign investors are subject to discrimination in allocation of export and other licenses (To 
lesser extent, rate between 0 and 10; to large extent, rate between 11 and 20) 
 Inclusion of foreign investors in quotas (Included, rate between 0 and 10; not included, rate between 11 
and 20) 
 Bureaucratic delays -purposefully keep foreign investors out of the market (Lesser extent, rate between 
0 and 10; large extent, rate between 11and 20) 
 Acquisition of a visa for entry/residence in a host country (Difficult, rate between 11 and 20; easy, rate 
between 0 and 10) 
 Foreign investors are forced to adhere to prescribed hiring practices (Lesser extent, rate between 0 and 
10; large extent, rate between 11 and 20) 
 Company taxes (Moderate, rate between 0 and 10; high, rate between 11 and 20) 
 Product boycotts against foreign produce (Seldom, rate between 0 and 10; often, rate between 11 and 
20) 
 
Er28-Adequacy of international reserves (60) Rate all indicators 
 Host country owns enough foreign reserves to cover three months worth of government expenses (More 
than enough, rate between 0 and 10; less than sufficient, rate between 11 and 20) 
 Does a sizeable surplus or deficit prevail in the balance of payments (Surplus, rate between 0 and 10; 
deficit, rate between 11 and 20) 
 Do imports exceed exports or does the opposite prevail (Exports exceed, rate between 0 and 10; imports 
exceed, rate between 11 and 20) 
 
Er29-Debt service burden and foreign aid (120) Rate all indicators 
 Host country reputation in servicing international debts (Good, rate between 0 and 10; bad, rate 
between] 1 and 20) 
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 International creditworthiness is questionable or satisfactory (Satisfactory, rate between 0 and 10; 
questionable, rate between 11 and 20) 
 Does debt service burden constitute more or less than 50% of GDP (Less, rate between 0 and 10, more, 
rate between 11 and 20) 
 Debt service burden exceeds exports (No, rate between 0 and 10; yes, rate between 11 and 20) 
 Debt service burden prevents social and economic development (No, rate between 0 and 10; yes, rate 
between 11 and 20) 
 Debt service burden exceeds GDP (No, rate between 0 and 10; yes, rate between 11 and 20) 
 
Er30-Preservation of resources (100) Rate all indicators 
 Extinction of species is adequately controlled (Adequately, rate between 0 and 10; inadequately, rate 
between 11 and 20)  
 Has government formulated and implemented adequate environmental plans (Adequate, rate between 0 
and 10; inadequate, rate between 11 and 20)  
 Population growth is a threat to the preservation of resources (No threat, rate between 0 and 10; 
substantial threat, rate between 11 and 20)  
 Levels of water contamination (Low, rate between 0 and 10; high, rate between 11 and 20)  
 Government practices development within national environmental legislation (Yes, rate between 0 and 
10; no, rate between 11 and 20)  
 
Er31-Deforestation rate (60) Rate all indicators 
 Deforestation is adequately controlled (Yes, rate between 0 and 10; no, rate between 11 and 20) 
 Deforestation is adequately coupled with reforestation programmes (Yes, rate between 0 and 10; no, 
rate between 11 and 20) 
 Rate of reforestation is higher or lower than that of deforestation (Higher, rate between 0 and 10; lower, 
rate between 11 and 20) 
 
Er32-Carbon dioxide emissions (60) Rate all indicators 
 Government regulations result in a decline or increase of carbon dioxide emissions (Decline, rate 
between 0 and 10; increase, rate between 11 and 20) 
 Successful government plans to regulate such emissions exist (Yes, rate between 0 and 10; no, rate 
between 11 and 20) 
 Such emissions lead to incidence of acid rain (Low incidence, rate between 0 and 10; high incidence, 
rate between 11 and 20) 
 
ErJ3-Trade issues and terms of trade (120) Rate all indicators 
 Are terms of trade favourable or unfavourable (Favourable, rate between 0 and 10; unfavourable, rate 
between 11 and 20) 
 Is rate of trade growth high or low (High, rate between 0 and 10; low, rate between 11 and 20) 
 International trade features as a large or moderate share of GDP (Large, rate between 0 and 10; 
moderate, rate between 11 and 20) 
 Levels of imports and exports are consistent with both a satisfactory economic growth rate and a 
financing gap which can be met (Consistent, rate between 0 and 10; inconsistent, rate between 11 and 
20) 
 Support of export promotion by government (Large extent, rate between 0 and 10; lesser extent, rate 
between 11 and 20) 
 Competitive exchange rate maintained (Yes, rate between 0 and 10; no, rate between 11 and 20) 
 
Er34-Unemployment rate (100) Rate all indicators 
 Relation of unemployed percentage of the economically active population to the employed (Does not 
exceed, rate between 0 and 10; exceeds, rate between 11 and 20) 
 High unemployment coupled with a low per capita income (No, rate between 0 and 10; yes, rate 
between 11 and 20) 
 High per capita income coupled with low-unemployment (Yes, rate between 0 and 10; no, rate between 
11 and 20) 
 High employment rate is coupled with high inflation rate (Yes, rate between 0 and 10; no, rate between 
11 and 20) 
 High unemployment is coupled with low inflation (Yes, rate between 0 and 10; no, rate between 11 and 
20) 
 
Er35-Loan default/unfavourable loan restructuring (60) Rate all indicators. 
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 Are structural adjustment programs (SAPs) being implemented at a high or moderate social cost 
(Moderate, rate between 0 and 10; high, rate between 11 and 20) 
 Levels of interest accumulated on debt (Acceptable, rate between 0 and 10; not acceptable, rate 
between 11 and 20) 
 Good or bad reputation of servicing international loans (Good, rate between 0 and 10; bad, rate 
between 11 and 20) 
 
Er36-Govemment expenditure (100) Rate all indicators 
 Level of public expenditure on defense (Acceptable, rate between 0 and 10;high, rate between 11 and 
20) 
 Level of government expenditure on defense supports the augmentation of military institutional power 
(No, rate between 0 and 10; yes, rate between 11 and 20) 
 Level of public expenditure on health (Acceptable, rate between 0 and 10; unacceptable, rate between 
11 and 20) 
 Level of public expenditure on education (Acceptable, rate between 0 and 10; unacceptable, rate 
between 11 and 20) 
 Government expenditure is organized along ethnic, language or social lilies (No, rate between 0 and 10; 
yes, rate between 11 and 20) 
 
Er37-Macroeconomic policy (120) Rate all indicators 
 Sound macroeconomic policy (Domestically and internationally, rate between 0 and 10; policy 
developing for improvement, rate between 11 and 20; policy goals not realistic, rate between 21 and 
30) 
 Balance of payments record (Budget surplus and high level of reserves, rate between 0 and 15; deficit 
and inadequate reserves, rate between 16 and 30) 
 Savings rates (High, rate between 0 and 15; low, rate between 16 and 30) 
 Levels of capital investment (High, rate between 0 and 15, low, rate between 16 and 30) 
 
Er38-Financial sector supervision (180) Rate all indicators 
 Supervisory practices (On par with international standards, rate between 0 and 15; questionable, rate 
between 16 and 30) 
 Foreign ownership limits and restrictions (If easing, rate between 0 and 16; if tightened, rate between 
16 and 30) 
 Capital (liquidity) requirements (If increasing, rate between 0 and 15; if slackened, rate between 16 and 
30) 
 Closing insolvent institutions (If closed responsibly, rate between 0 and 15; if oversight results in 
insolvent institutions not being closed, rate between 16 and 30) 
 Sanctioning of financial practice (Sanctioned and scrutinized, rate between 0 and 15; little 
transparency, rate between 16 and 30) 
 
Er39-Vulnerability spread (90) Rate all indicators 
 Reliance on oil imports (Flexible level of vulnerability to oil supply and prices, rate between 0 and 15; 
high level of reliance on oil imports and consequent vulnerability, rate between 16 and 30) 
 Export of single commodity (Many commodities exportable, rate between 0 and 15; single commodity 
exported concomitant to high level of commodity market and climate vulnerability, rate between 16 and 
30) 
 Reliance on single commodity (Degree of market and climate sensitivity of single commodity low, rate 
between 0 and 10; if sensitive but manageable, rate between 11 and 20; if highly sensitive, rate between 
21 and 30) 
 
Er40- Stability and ability of central banks (160) Rate all indicators 
 Extent of central bank insurance (Adequately insured, rate between 0 and 15; inadequate, rate 
b(between 16 and 30) 
 Qualifications, profile and competence of central bank management (Proven  competent, rate 
between 0 and 15; low levels of competence, rate between 16 and 30) . 
 Level of central bank independence and levels of state intervention (High level of independence and low 
level of interference, rate between 0 and 15; low level of independence and high level of interference, 
rate between 16 and 30) 
 Size of foreign reserve in months-worth coverage (In excess of three months, rate between 0 and 10; 
less than three months, rate between 11 and 20; insignificant level of foreign reserves, rate between 21 
and 30) 
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 Are banking and financial supervisory laws upheld (At all times and in all instances, rate between 0 and 
10; occasionally, rate between 11 and 20; laws exist but are not upheld, rate between 21 and 30; laws 
do not exist at all, rate between 31 and 40) 
 
Er4I-Fiscal prudence (220) Rate all indicators 
 Loan classification and bank licensing (Tight rules upheld, rate between 0 and 10; rules exist but are 
not upheld, rate between 11 and 20; rules do not exist at all, rate between 21 and 30) 
 Bankruptcy laws (Meet international standards, rate between 0 and 10; laws exist but are not 
internationally comparable, rate between 11 and 20; no bankruptcy laws exist, rate between 21 and 30) 
 Guidelines for the assessment of owners, board members and managers of financial institutions (Well 
established, internationally valid and enforced, rate between 0 and 10; guidelines exist but are not 
enforced, rate between 11 and 20; no existing guidelines, rate between 21 and 30) 
 Banking supervision laws and regulations (Tight laws, prudent regulations are enforced, rate between 0 
and 10; laws and regulations exist but are not enforced, rate between 11 and 20; no laws and 
regulations exist, rate between 21 and 30) 
 Strong rules governing disclosure, auditing and accounting practices (Are enforced, rate between 0 and 
10; exist but are not enforced, rate between 11 and 20; no such rules exist, rate between 21 and 30) 
 Deposit-insurance scheme in place (In place and functional, rate between 0 and 10; exists but unlikely 
to function, rate between 11 and 20; no such schemes exist, rate between 21 and 30) 
 Privatization of institutions experiencing high levels of state intervention (Strategies in place met with 
little resistance, rate between 0 and 10; strategies in place met with resistance, rate between 11 and 20; 
no such strategies are in place but talks have commenced, rate between 21 and 30; no such strategies 
exist, rate between 31 and 40) 
 
 
Political Risk Factors: Social 
 
 
Sr1-Government investment in human capital (110) Rate both indicators 
 Government investment in quality of labour (High levels of investment with positive results, rate 
between 0 and 20; high levels of investment, but ineffective, rate between 21 and 40; little or no signs, 
rate between 41 and 60) 
 Financing of skills development (Skills levies can be claimed back from government, rate between 0 
and 25; another system of skills development is in place, rate between 0 and 25; if system is not in 
place, nor any other such system, rate between 25 and 50) 
 
Sr2-Literacy rate (30) 
 Is the literacy rate of the economically active population higher or lower than 50% (Higher, rate 
between 0 and 15; lower, rate between 16 and 30) 
 
Sr3-Job mobility impediments (60) Rate both indicators 
 Public sector education lags behind education in business, engineering and science (Immeasurably, rate 
between 0 and 10; measurably, rate between 11 and 20; seriously, rate between 21 and 30) 
 A pool of educated but discontented people developed, demanding appropriate employment (Low 
measure of discontent, rate between 0 and 10; moderately discontent, rate between 11 and 20; large 
measure of discontent, rate between 21 and 30) 
 
Sr4-Gini coefficient (60) Rate one indicator 
 Gini coefficient is between 0.30 (highly equal distribution of income) and 0.70 (highly unequal 
distribution of income) (Rate between 11 and 20) 
 Gini coefficient is lower than 0.30 (Rate between 0 and 10) 
 Gini coefficient is higher than 0.70 (Rate between 21 and 30) 
 
Sr5-Education ratio - student:teacher (30) 
 Is the ratio less or more than 26 pupils per teacher (Less, rate between 0 and 15; more, rate between 16 
and 30) 
 
Sr6-Per capita income (30) 
 Is a positive or negative annual growth rate of per capita income prevailing (Positive, rate between 0 
and 10; stagnant, rate between 11 and 20; negative, rate between 21 and 30) 
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Sr7-Mean period of schooling (60) Rate one indicator 
 If mean period of schooling exceeds 10 years (Rate between 0 and 10) 
 If mean period of schooling is 10 years (Rate between 11 and 20) 
 If mean period of schooling is less than 10 years (Rate between 21 and 30) 
 
Sr8-Unemployment rate (30) In last quarter 
 Percentage rise in the unemployment rate (Low, rate between 0 and 15; high, rate between 16 and 30) 
 
Sr9-Attitude toward foreign businesspeople visitors (120) Rate all indicators 
 Acquiring a visa is laborious, expensive and difficult (No, rate between 0 and 15, yes, rate between 16 
and 30) 
 Are travelers harassed at airports, i.e. by (military) personnel (No, rate between 0 and 10; moderately, 
rate between 11 and 20; frequently, rate between 21 and 30) 
 Attacks on tourists and foreigners prevail (Infrequently, rate between 0 and 10; frequently, rate between 
11 and 20; excessively rate between 21 and 30)  
 Are tourist concessions implemented (Equal to international norms, rate between 0 and 10; less than 
norm, rate between 11and 20; not at all, rate between 21 and 30) 
 
SrI0-Acceptable quality of life (90) Rate all indicators 
 Access to public services (Easy, rate between 0 and 10; conditional, rate between 11 and 20; difficult, 
rate between 21 and 30) 
 Level of crime rate (Low, rate between 0 and 10; moderate, rate between 11 and 20; high, rate between 
21 and 30) 
 Is life expectancy in excess of an average of 66 years (Yes, rate between 0 and 15; no, rate between 16 
and 30) 
 
Sr11-Urbanisation rate (150) Rate relevant indicators 
 Pressure of urbanization on government spending, i.e. infrastructure (sewerage, roads, electricity, 
housing and the maintenance of law and order) (Moderate, rate between 0 and 10; increasing, rate 
between 11 and 20; exceptional, rate between 21 and 30) 
 Decline in agricultural productivity due to urbanization (Moderate, rate between 0 and 10; increasing, 
rate between 11 and 20; extensive, rate between 21 and 30) 
 Does urbanization place a burden on the state system to provide social needs (Yes, rate between 0 and 
15; no, rate between 16 and 30) 
 Can institutional and physical infrastructure handle rapid urbanization (Yes, rate between 0 and 15; no, 
rate between 16 and 30) 
 A destabilizing dense urban population (Rate between 0 and 30) 
 
SrI2-Population (40) Rate both indicators 
 Percentage of population growth per annum exceeds the percentage of employment growth per annum 
(No, rate between 0 and 10; yes, rate between 11 and 20) 
 Number of live births per annum exceeds the number of deaths per annum (No, rate between 0 and 10; 
yes, rate between 11and 20) 
 
SrI3-Average calorie intake and nutrition (20) 
 If average calorie intake is less than 2100 per day (Rate between 11 and 20) 
 If average calorie intake is more than 2100 per day (Rate between 0 and 10) 
 
Sr14-Health care (150) Rate relevant indicators 
 Ratio of population per doctor is less than 4000 (Rate between 0 and 5) 
 Ratio of population per doctor is between 400 and 4800 (Rate between 6 and 15) 
 Ratio of population per doctor exceeds 4800 (Rate between 16 and 20) 
 Ratio of nurses per doctor exceeds 2 (Rate between 0 and 10) 
 Accessibility of health care facilities and health care professionals (Very accessible, rate between 0 and 
25; not accessible, rate between 26 and 50) Government health policy (Realistic, rate between 0 and 25; 
unrealistic, rate between 26 and 50) 
 
Sr15-Life expectancy (20) Rate one indicator 
 If life expectancy exceeds an average of66 years (Rate between 0 and 10) 
 If life expectancy is less than an average of 66 years (Rate between 11 and 20) 
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Sr16-lnfant mortality rate (20) Rate one indicator 
 If the infant mortality rate exceeds 48 per 1000 live births (Rate between 11 and 20) 
 If the infant mortality rate is less than 48 per 1000 live births (Rate between 0 and 10) 
 
Srl7-Telephone communication and ICT (20) Rate one indicator 
 If the number of telephones exceeds 130 per 1000 people (Rate between 0 and 10) 
 If the number of telephones is less than 130 per 1000 people (Rate between 11 and 20) 
 
Sr18-Population access rates (40) Rate all indicators 
 If facilities can be reached on foot or by the local means of transport within one hour by at least 50% of 
the population (Rate between 6 and 10; if more than 50%, rate between 0 and 5) 
 If at least 79% of the population has access to health services (Rate between 0 and 5; if less, rate 
between 6 and 10) 
 If at least 69% of the population has access to safe water (Rate between 0 and 5; if less, rate between 6 
and 10) 
 If at least 36% of the population has access to sanitation (Rate between 0 and 5; if less, rate between 6 
and 10) 
 
Sr19-Provision of public services (25) Rate all indicators 
 Provision of public services is unreliable, sporadic and vulnerable to incompetence (Rate between 0 and 
10) 
 A culture of non-payment for public services prevails (Rate between 0 and 10) 
 Public services are reliable (Rate between 0 and 5) 
 
Sr20-Global Human Development Rating (HD!) (JO) Rate one indicator 
 If HDI rates a country in the "high" category - averaging 0.916 (Rate between 0 and 2) 
 If HDI rates a country in the "medium" category - averaging between 0.570 and 0.759 (Rate between 3 
and 5) 
 If HDI rates a country in the "low" category - averaging 0.389 (Rate between 6 and 10) 
 
Sr2I-Daily newspapers (l0) 
 If there is an average of 96 copies per 1000 people (Rate between 0 and 5; if less, rate between 6 and 
10) 
 
Sr22-Radio and television (l0) 
 If there is an average of 350 radio receivers per 1000 people (Rate between 0 and 5; if less, rate between 
6 and 10) 
 
Sr23-Social consciousness and conscience of government (60) Rate both indicators 
 Investment in social capital and entrepreneurship (Actions in place for the investment in developing 
social capital and entrepreneurship are showing results, rate between 0 and 10; actions are under 
development but not yet implemented, rate between 11  and 20; no such actions in place, rate between 
21 and 30) 
 Openness/competitiveness in technological skills (Development of technological skills results in 
technological competitiveness and openness, rate between 0 and 10; development programme is in early 
stages, rate between 11 and 20; development of and investment in technological skills not a priority, 
rate between 21 and 30) 
 
Sr24-Societal uprising (120) In past 18 months - rate all indicators 
 Violence, demonstration(s) aimed at MNCs (None, rate between 0 and 10; trend is noticeable, rate 
between 11 and 20; flare-up around political events, policy speeches and scandals, rate between 21 and 
30; frequent and unexpected instances, rate between 31 and 40) 
 Instances of collective subversion, looting, vandalism (None, rate between 0 and 10; trend is noticeable, 
rate between 11 and 20; flare-up around political events, policy speeches and scandals, rate between 21 
and 30; frequent and unexpected instances, rate between 31 and 40) 
 Malicious damage (None, rate between 0 and 10; trend is noticeable, rate between 11 and 20; flare-up 
around political events, policy speeches and scandals, rate between 21 and 30; frequent and unexpected 
instances, rate between 31 and 40) 
 
Sr25-Climate (40) 
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 Is country situated in tropical or subtropical climatic zone (If no, rate between 0 and 20; if yes, rate 
between 21 and 40) 
 
 
 
